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Chapter 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
Higher levels of social capital have been associated with many positive effects ranging 
from the prevention of crime to enhancing the economic growth and overall functioning of 
democracy1. The role that social capital performs at individual and societal level has spurred 
numerous researches about its recent dynamics and factors that may determine the speed and 
the direction of its change. The progress is however limited and only a small share of 
variation in social capital levels across countries and over time could be explained. Some 
ambiguity exists with regard to both: the direction of change over time and the factors which 
may trigger it. Among the determinants, welfare state development is the most controversial 
and often discussed. More specifically, many argue that if the state gets into the business of 
organizing everything, people will become dependent on it and lose their ability to 
spontaneously work with one another (De Swaan, 1988; Fukuyama, 2000; Kumlin and 
Rothstein, 2007). This negative relationship was conceptualized in the ‘crowding out’ 
hypothesis.  
However, the empirical evidence of negative dynamics in social capital and crowding-
out effects is controversial. Those scholars who suggest that with respect to certain elements 
of social capital the negative trend is really taking place (Putnam, 1995, 2000; Uslaner, 2000-
2001; You, 2005a,b) usually omit welfare state impacts from their analysis. Those who focus 
directly on this relationship generally provide empirical evidence of the positive, or at least 
neutral, influence of welfare state development on people’s trust in others, participation in 
volunteer organizations and social networks, and supportive behavior in families and 
neighborhoods (Hall, 1999; De Hart and Dekker, 1999; Rothstein, 2001; Van Oorschot and 
Arts, 2005). 
The impact of public policies on social capital requires a more detailed elaboration and 
can be considered an issue of utmost importance if taking account of the current 
transformation of welfare states. The latter is happening because of the enforcement of neo-
liberal principles which results in the shrinking of social spending on the one hand, and 
redesigning their structure on the other. The potential effects of this change on social capital 
among the population are impossible to predict if the relationship between welfare state 
development and the level of social capital is not fully understood and explained.  
The main objective of this study is to test the “crowding out” hypothesis by applying a 
new approach based on the multidimensionality of social policies and the differences in their 
effects on social capital formation. The latter is considered plausible due to the fact that the 
                                                 
1
 See for instance Billiet and Cambree, 1999; Fedderke, Dekadt, and Luiz,1999; OECD, 2001; Mishler and Rose, 
2005; Portes, 1998, 2000; Seligson, 1999; Stark, 2003; Woolcock, 1998. 
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research conducted so far has mostly focused on the careful measurement of social capital 
while welfare state policies were treated as a single indicator without taking into account the 
diversity of social programs as well as their characteristics and the differences in their impact 
on social values and networks. Focusing on the multidimensionality of social capital and the 
relevant ignorance of the multidimensionality of the state activity provides a reason to think 
that this narrow operationalization of the predictor can to some extent explain the controversy 
of the empirical results obtained so far and provide some ground for better theoretical 
elaboration on the association in question. Moreover, an approach of this kind may allow us to 
identify what policies lead to the decline of and what policies may enhance the social capital 
development. The latter would have a direct policy implication allowing for a design of a set 
of policies which, apart from ensuring individuals’ wellbeing, would also have a positive 
impact on the level of their social capital.  
 
1.1.Introducing a multidimensional approach to the analysis of social capital  
The research conducted up to now is mainly based on the one-dimensional understanding 
of the relationship between the welfare state and social trust. Our main idea consists of 
demonstrating that this relationship should be analyzed in light of a multidimensional 
approach. Multidimensionality rests on the premise that it is necessary to operationalize 
welfare state development from all possible sides to study its effects on social trust. To define 
the multidimensional space, we will base our research on three assumptions. First, each social 
program is intended to cover certain risks or contingencies, and is designed for a certain group 
of people, namely those experiencing these contingencies. Second, it is assumed that social 
spending does not reflect the actual level of decommodification and ignores the stratification 
function of welfare states. Apart from that, we assume that each policy possesses a number of 
characteristics, which reflect the features of the program design, implementation, as well as 
financing conditions. This logic hence suggests a three-fold analysis for defining three axes 
around which the multidimensional space is formed. First, one should analyze the effects of 
the level of social spending on certain social programs on trust indicators among their direct 
recipients. Second, it is worth seeing how the level of out-sourcing of individuals from the 
market affects their trust indicators. Finally, one can account for how the specific conditions 
of benefits provision, financing and design affect trust levels. In other words, we derive three 
axes around which the multidimensionality of social policies is formed. The first one is the 
functional axis, which takes into account different functions performed by the social policies 
and forms functional dimension. The functions are derived on the basis of the risk or 
contingencies which social policies are designed to cover. The distinction here applies to the 
existence of policy specific effects on social trust levels. The second axis takes into account 
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the final outcomes of social policies, namely the level of decommodification and stratification. 
Around this axis, an outcome dimension is formed which focuses on the effects of welfare 
state outcomes on social trust indicators. The third axis can be called qualitative and it takes 
into account the different policy characteristics in order to study their separate effects on 
social trust levels. The dimension formed around this axis is called qualitative. 
This multidimensional approach constitutes a clear breakthrough in analyzing the 
effects welfare states may have on social capital. This study is valuable for social policy 
research for two reasons. First, it will contribute to a better understanding of the relationship 
between welfare states and social trust by isolating the effects of different social policies and 
their characteristics on social capital. Second, based on these results it will become possible to 
provide suggestions about the ‘ideal’ characteristics for the welfare state design which would 
guarantee not only individual well-being but also societal prosperity by imposing pro-social 
behavior.  
 
  
1.2. Limiting social capital to social trust  
For the purpose of the research, we will limit the analysis of social capital to social 
trust. The selection of these elements of social capital is done in order to be able to fully 
detect all of its determinants to control for their possible spurious and/or indirect effects. The 
choice of social trust can be explained by the fact that an emphasis on trust over other ties is 
prevalent in the literature (Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Putnam, 1995) since it is easy to measure 
compared to other positive emotions. Moreover, trust is highly associated with generalized 
reciprocity and hence remains a good proxy for positive reciprocal ties in general 
(Paxton,1999). It hence becomes indispensable to shed some light on the relationship between 
social capital and social trust. 
 The recent interest in the concept of social capital can be partly traced to the early 
works of Pierre Bourdieu. Although he does not analyze social trust and its relationship to 
social capital, Bourdieu introduces and elaborates on the notion of social capital in general. 
Through the late 1960s and early 1970s, Bourdieu produced a series of studies seeking to 
establish culture as a dynamic and creative, but also a structuring phenomenon. Bourdieu 
(1980, 1986) sees capital in three guises: as economic capital, as cultural capital and as social 
capital. He defines social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which 
are linked to possession of a durable network of institutionalized relationships of mutual 
acquaintances and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group.” He also 
elaborates on the link between these three forms of capital, emphasizing that social capital is 
not reduced to economic or cultural capital, nor is it independent of them. Based on his final 
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analysis it is however possible to conclude that economic capital is at the root of all other 
types of capital, including social capital.  
Moreover, Bourdieu (1980) analyzes social capital determinants and argues that 
capital in this form is represented by the size of the network and the volume of the capital 
possessed by those to whom the person is connected. Consequently, social capital depends on 
the size of one’s connections and on the volume or amount of capital in these connections’ 
possessions. In other words, Bourdieu sees social capital as a production of the group’s 
membership.  
Bourdieu defines social capital as a form of capital possessed by members of a social 
network or group. He is more concerned with social capital as an individual attribute in terms 
of individual networks or forms of capital (Mihaylova, 2004). In contrast to this individual 
position, other scholars of modern social capital research favor a broader notion of social 
capital which encompasses social groups, organizations and societies. Moreover, Bourdieu 
did not directly analyze the concept of social trust as a form of social capital. But he does 
recognize that social capital is a collective asset that endows members with credits and is 
maintained and reinforced for its utility when members continue to invest in the relationship.  
Social capital was further studied by Coleman (1982, 1990). He defines social capital 
as a particular kind of resource available to an actor, comprising a variety of entities which 
contains two elements: they all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate 
certain actions of actors – whether persons or corporate actors – within the structure. Placed 
more clearly in the educational context he developed his notion of social capital as follows: 
“social capital is the set of resources that inhere in family relations and in community social 
organization and that are useful for the cognitive or social development of a child or young 
person.” Whether any structural aspect is a capital depends, according to Coleman, on 
whether it serves a function for certain individuals engaged in particular activities. For this 
reason, social capital is not fungible across individuals or activities, but should rather be seen 
as the resources, real or potential, gained from relationships. In his scheme of social action, 
Coleman delineates how actors exercise control over resources in which they have an interest, 
and how they are also interested in events that are at least partially controlled by other actors.  
Coleman’s research primarily addressed educational achievements and social 
inequalities. He measured social capital by the physical presence of parents per number of 
children in the family so as to determine the amount of attention that children received. 
Among other factors influencing educational performance, he measured the number of times a 
child had to change schools because the family moved. Coleman argued that social relations 
(both family relations and relations with the wider community) constitute useful capital 
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because they establish obligations, expectations and trustworthiness. They also create 
channels of information and set norms that can be backed up by sanctions (Mihaylova, 2004).  
In much of his analysis, Coleman shares marked similarities with Bourdieu, including 
a striking concern for social capital as a source of educational advantage. Unlike Bourdieu, 
however, Coleman saw the creation of social capital as a largely unintentional process, which 
he defined mainly in functional terms. For Coleman, social capital functions precisely because 
it arises mainly from activities intended for other purposes. Yet, if a major use of the concept 
of social capital depends on its being a by-product of activities engaged in for other purposes, 
it follows that there is often little or no direct investment in social capital. 
Moreover, Coleman focuses on individual behavior and uses that to draw conclusions 
about larger social entities. Coleman’s premise is that actors operate according to a single 
principle of action: to maximize their realization of interests. Thus, he works within an 
elementary model of rational choice (Harris, 2001 in Mihaylova, 2004). This was the main 
subject of criticism from different scholars. Apart from that, he was criticized for providing a 
rather vague definition of social capital.  
Thus, for Coleman the definition of social capital owes its cohesion to the relational 
effects in social structures that benefit the actors. As an example of these effects, generalized 
trust is mentioned as one of the most recognized. So from a micro-level point of view one 
could analyze the level of trustworthiness in a given society or the actual extent of obligations 
held. Other effects are also pointed out by Coleman, such as the information potential that 
relationships could provide (saving time to get the sources) or the relational benefits (market 
opportunities, job offers) that organizations could produce for their members as a by-product 
of their activities. Coleman thus uses an output approach to define the relationship between 
social capital and social trust. Generalized trust is viewed by him as an effect or output of 
social capital.  
Social capital in general and social trust in particular is more elaborated on in the 
studies conducted by Putnam (1993, 1995, 2000). He offers a succinct definition of social 
capital, by which he means features of social life – networks, norms, and trust – that enable 
participants to work together more effectively to pursue shared objectives. These three 
‘features’ – networks, norms, and trust – are the triad which dominates conceptual discussions. 
He also gives considerable emphasis to the tension between ‘bridging’ and ‘bonding’ forms of 
social capital. Bonding social capital refers to the links between like-minded people, or the 
reinforcement of homogeneity. Bridging social capital, by contrast, refers to the building of 
connections between heterogeneous groups; these are likely to be more fragile, but also more 
likely to foster social inclusion. His contribution also consists in offering the 
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operationalization of social capital which includes measures of community organizational life, 
engagement in public affairs, community voluntarism, informal sociability, and social trust.  
Putnam’s contribution is not limited to defining social trust as an element of social 
capital but also consists of analyzing the process of its formation. He argues that social 
associations and the degree of participation indicate the extent of social capital in a society. 
These associations and participation promote and enhance collective norms and trust, which 
are central to the production and maintenance of the collective well-being.   
Putnam’s work was however the subject of heavy criticism. According to Harris (in 
Mihaylova, 2004) Putnam does not provide the theory of trust but rather confusions of various 
concepts: interpersonal trust, generalized trust, belief in the legitimacy of institutionalized 
norms and confidence in their implementation and cultural traditions. But regardless of this 
confusion he was the first to define social trust as an element of social capital.  
The concept of social capital was further studied by Newton, who predominantly uses 
the ‘input’ approach to define the relationship between social capital and social trust. Newton 
(1999a, 1999b) suggests that social capital consists of the set of values and attitudes of 
citizens relating primarily to trust, reciprocity, and cooperation. Seen in this way, he regards 
social capital as a subjective phenomenon of social and political culture which refers to the 
collective attitudes people have about their peers, and therefore to the way that citizens relate. 
Crucial to this treatment are those features of a subjective world view which predisposes 
individuals to cooperate with each other, to trust, to understand, and to empathize. According 
to him the concepts of reciprocity and trust are central to the concept of social capital in this 
sense: they constitute the social cement which binds society together by turning individuals 
from self seeking and egocentric calculators, with little social conscience and little sense of 
social obligation, into members of a community with shared interests, shared assumptions 
about social relations, and a sense of common good. He refers to Simmel’s (1950) comments 
on trust which say that trust is one the most important synthetic forces within society. Newton 
also studies the relationship between reciprocity and trust. He asserts that generalized 
reciprocity involves a degree of uncertainty, risk, and vulnerability. It is therefore built upon 
trust: reciprocity involves risk, and taking risks in society requires trust in others. 
Trust thus precedes all other elements of social capital. Newton (1999a, 1999b) also 
criticizes the writers who focus on the social networks of individuals, groups, or organizations 
as the crucial component of social capital. He says that trust is “a necessary link between 
supply and demand; it puts consumers and producers into contact with each other, it speeds up 
deals, it turns rational fools into effective cooperators and it avoids the need to sew up 
everything by means of expensive and time consuming contracts which are legally 
watertight.” He assumes that the normative and subjective definition of trust is logically prior 
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in the sense that social networks, formal or informal, are necessarily built upon the norms of 
reciprocity in social relations without which strong and extensive networks would not be 
created and formal and informal associations would not proliferate.  
The relationship between social trust and social capital was further studied by Torcal 
and Montero (1999). In their theoretical elaboration on the dynamics of social capital, they 
limit the former to the membership in voluntary associations. In their analysis they refer to the 
traditional assumption that trust itself ‘lubricates’ cooperation and that cooperation, in turn, 
promotes trust. This model of the origins of social capital is derived from Coleman and his 
rational choice approach, according to which all elements that form social capital are mutually 
self-reinforcing.  
Torcal and Montero (1999) see social trust in a rational choice perspective as rational 
and relational, although not always fully calculated action. They argue that social trust may 
also be seen as a cultural attitude, and that it is its majoritarian presence in collectivity which 
facilitates the creation of social capital. The latter points to similarities with Newton in 
studying the relationship between social trust and membership.  
Torcal and Montero (1999) also elaborate on social capital determinants, emphasizing 
that institutional change and democratic politics foster the creation of social capital, but that 
there still might not be enough to break a situation of low intensity equilibrium. According to 
them, this outcome seems evident in light of the persistently weak associative and political 
life found in some countries with stable democracies. They further assert that the installation 
and increase in social capital in these new democracies is conditioned by the attitudinal 
presence of trust among citizens. The latter allows one to again draw conclusions that trust is 
regarded here as the key pre-condition for other elements of social capital to be created and 
changed in stock. Their work is thus based on the ‘input’ approach to define the relationship 
between social trust and social capital, which assumes that trust is a precondition for social 
capital to accumulate.  
Next, Torcal and Montero (1999) express doubt about the traditional assumption that 
face-to-face interactions can be the driving force behind rising social capital in new 
democracies. They explain by pointing out that these interactions are rare and irregular 
outside small voluntary organizations. A pre-existing level of trust among individuals has to 
exist, and socialization according to them is instrumental in the creation of social trust and 
hence in any significant increase in the levels of social capital. Their analysis of the Spanish 
case shows that the full functioning of democratic politics does not result in an axiomatic 
increase in social capital when measured as membership in voluntary associations.  On the 
basis of these results, they demonstrate that the evolution of social capital in new democracies 
is conditioned by trust among citizens. Democracy may create social capital according to 
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them, but the rate of change is dependent on the extent to which different generations harbor 
different levels of interpersonal trust.  
An interesting explanation as to the positioning of social trust in the concept of social 
capital is provided by Michael Woolcock (1998, 2002). He distinguishes between three 
approaches to conceptualizing social capital. According to him, one approach is to refer to 
macro-institutional issues under a separate banner, calling them instead as ‘social capabilities’ 
or ‘social infrastructures’. He sees the virtue of this strategy in relieving social capital of its 
mounting intellectual burden, analytically and empirically disentangling micro community 
and macro-institutional concerns. The problem is that it removes a convenient discursive 
short-hand for the social dimensions of development vis-à-vis other factors of production and 
treats as separate what is more accurately considered together.  
A second approach is to call for a more tightly focused micro definition of social 
capital to advocate a ‘lean and mean’ conceptualization focusing on the sources of social 
capital  - i.e. primarily social networks  - rather than its consequences such as trust, tolerance 
and cooperation. Woolcock sees the upside of this approach in the fact that it clearly defines 
what is and is not social capital, making for cleaner measurements and more parsimonious 
theory building. However, the downside here is that it tends to overlook the broader 
institutional environment in which communities are inherently embedded.  
A third approach in the conceptualization of social capital, consists in dismissing the 
debate altogether. For researchers relying on this approach, whether social capital is or should 
be understood as a micro or macro phenomenon becomes a moot point. Here the research is 
done even without the existence of a universally agreed definition.  
Moreover, Woolcock (1998, 2002) distinguishes between two micro-level approaches 
to social capital conceptualization: one regards social capital as the source and the other as its 
consequence. The latter approach incorporates social trust. He emphasizes however that any 
definition of social capital should focus on its sources rather than consequences, on what it is 
rather than what it does. He does however recognize that this approach eliminates an entity 
such as ‘trust’ which is vitally important in its own right but which can be regarded as an 
outcome (of repeated interactions, of credible legal institutions of reputations). Trust is thus 
built upon an ‘output’ approach which assumes that it can be regarded as an element of social 
capital but still a consequence rather than a source of its other elements.  
A completely different approach is used by Freitag (2003) to position trust in the 
definition of social capital. In his overview of the literature on social capital, he came to the 
conclusion that social networks and social trust constitute two main aspects or two dimensions 
of the concept of social capital. On the one hand, he writes, social connectedness and the civic 
engagement of individuals such as associational membership are seen as crucial components 
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of social capital because they embody the capability to mobilize a wide range of personal 
contacts that are decisive to the improvement and effective functioning of one’s social and 
political life. On the other hand, when defined as subjective norms of trust, social capital 
involves attitudes people have about other people and therefore reveals how individuals are 
affiliated with one another. Although Freitag recognizes that these two dimensions are 
interrelated, he argues that there are reasons to separate them conceptually. According to him, 
norms and values like social trust are subjective and intangible, thereby referring to a more 
qualitative dimension. However, social networks are objective and easier to observe, and thus 
belong to a rather quantitative dimension (Freitag, 2003).  
The analysis of the concept of social capital therefore provides evidence that social 
trust is mentioned in many works as an element of social capital. This allows for eliminating 
the confusion with the definition of social capital. The latter is a wider concept than social 
trust. To be more precise, social trust is just a part of social capital. On the other hand, social 
trust is assigned a key role in developing and reinforcing other elements of social capital. As 
was demonstrated before, social trust is a precondition for developing reciprocity and 
membership in voluntary organizations. This conclusion enables us to apply social capital 
theories to the analysis of separate phenomena related to social trust issues.  
Another source of confusion related to social trust issues consists in the co-existence 
of many forms of trust. According to the literature trust may take different forms among 
which one can distinguish the following: (1) thin, thick and abstract trust (Newton, 1999a,b), 
(2) primary and secondary trust (Sztompka, in Möllering, 2006), (3) rational, institutional and 
active trust (Möllering, 2005), (4) interpersonal, network and institutional trust (Rus, 2005), (5) 
strategic and moralistic trust (Uslaner, 2000-2001), (6) generalized and particularized trust 
(Uslaner, 2000-2001), (7) systemic or institutional trust (Luhmann, 1979), (8) thick 
interpersonal trust, thin interpersonal trust and institutional trust (Khodyakov, 2007), (9) 
fiduciary, mutual and social trusts (Thomas, 1998)2.  In spite of the diversity of trust forms, 
for the purpose of this research the distinction will be between interpersonal trust and 
institutional trust. The former is understood as the belief that most people can be trusted and 
which usually appears in the literature as generalized trust (Uslaner, 2000 – 2001). The latter 
reflects the confidence and faith people have in public institutions and organizations.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 All researchers have a static perspective on social trust, although social trust can be considered as time 
dependent and hence requires a dynamic approach.   
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1.3. Overview of the dissertation structure 
This dissertation consists of eleven chapters. Each chapter is organized as follows. The 
second chapter will analyze the concept of social trust itself. Systematization of the recent 
literature on the notion of trust will be provided and will be accompanied with the discussion 
of their drawbacks. The discussion will conclude with a proposition to use a new 
classification in the literature on the meaning of trust which is derived based on four 
mechanisms: rational choice, psychological, institutional, and reflexive. In the following 
section, the overview of the theories about social trust formation will be presented. They will 
be grouped into two types: ‘individual’ and ‘societal’ theories. Individual theories embrace 
network, socio-psychological, life experience, ideological, and socio-demographic theories. 
Societal theories refer to income inequality, country wealth, fractionalization, institutional and 
protestant theories.  
In the third chapter, we will analyze the relationship between welfare states and social 
trust. We will demonstrate that theoretical explanations assume that the state may destroy 
social trust through a negative impact on volunteering, individual’s ability to cooperate, or 
their sense of responsibility. On the other hand, there are theories that argue that synergy 
between the state and social trust is possible, which is mainly based on the idea that the state 
can keep individual integrated when he or she has difficulties. The chapter will conclude with 
the formulation of the key drawbacks derived from the existing studies.  
The fourth chapter will discuss methodological issues, methods used, and the way 
variables are operationalized. The chapter will start with the justification of the need to 
introduce a multidimensional approach for studying the relationship between social trust and 
welfare states. In the following section, the description of three dimensions will be given.  
The main source of the data will be the World Values Survey from the wave 1999´-2000 
selected for 18 OECD countries. The analysis will be conducted at both the aggregated and 
individual levels. The main methods used will be multilevel logistic regression for 
interpersonal trust and multilevel linear regression for institutional trust.   
The fifth chapter will analyze the level of interpersonal and institutional trust among 
selected countries as well as its change over time. The analysis will begin with an overview of 
the average levels of trust across selected countries. This will be followed by the description 
of how trust changed from 1981-2004. Finally, we will present descriptive analysis of the 
relationship between social spending and social trust. The latter will include scatter plots to 
visualize a grouping of countries based on their level of spending and social trust. We will 
also present a hierarchical cluster analysis which will show whether countries can cluster in a 
way similar to welfare regime typology. In addition to this, we will relate social spending to 
social trust levels to discover whether there is a certain correlation between these variables. 
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Moreover, inclusion in the multilevel model of social spending will allow us to show whether 
it can explain a large share of variation in social trust, especially at the country level.  
The sixth chapter will be aimed at analyzing the functional dimension which is defined 
based on the functions social polices perform. The functions will be derived on the basis of 
the risks or contingencies which social policies are designed to cover. The analysis will be 
conducted by relating relevant social expenditures measured as percentage of GDP to the 
levels of institutional and interpersonal trust among their direct recipients. Relevant social 
expenditures will include pensions and unemployment spending which is linked to the social 
trust levels among pensioners and unemployed people. The results will be compared to those 
calculated based on social trust for the whole population and total social expenditures. The 
analysis will provide grounds to conclude whether the effects of social policies are policy 
specific or not. Explanation of the relevant social spending effects among pensioners and the 
unemployed will be conducted based on the attitudinal theory of trust formation.   
The seventh chapter will study the outcome effects of social policy which forms 
outcome dimension. The first sub-chapter will provide arguments in favor of the introduction 
of an outcome spectrum in social trust analysis. In the next section, an analysis will be 
presented which will relate the level of decommodification and stratification in the selected 18 
OECD countries to interpersonal and institutional trust indexes among their population. It will 
become possible to see whether decommodification affects social trust indexes in the same 
way as social spending. Apart from that, it will be possible to analyze how the stratification 
mechanism of social policies influences social trust levels.  
The eighth chapter will analyze the effects of policy characteristics on social trust 
levels. Out of all the characteristics, we will focus on the effects of institutional design on 
social trust indexes. The analysis will be conducted by relating the spending on non means-
tested and means-tested benefit schemes to social trust indexes. Apart from that, the question 
of the possible interaction of qualitative dimensions with functional ones will be raised. The 
analysis hence will be extended to the question of whether the effects of the institutional 
design of benefit schemes can be policy specific or not. In the following section, we will 
argue for the need to account for other characteristics of social polices. More specifically, it is 
necessary to take into account how the type of labor market policies, the form of delivery, and 
the mode of financing affect interpersonal and institutional trust indexes.  
The ninth chapter will extend the analysis of the multi-dimensional approach to trust in 
social security systems, which will consist of replicating the analysis of three dimensions. As 
the main data source, we will use the European Quality of Life Survey, which contains 
questions about people’s confidence towards social security systems. Based on the results of 
this analysis, it will be possible to assert whether the effects of different measures of welfare 
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state development on trust towards social security systems follow the same pattern as those 
obtained for institutional trust.  
Chapter ten will elaborate how the effects of social policy differ across groups or, in 
other words, whether they can be group specific or not. This will include, on the one hand, 
discussions of the existence of a gender gap in social trust, and, on the other hand, an analysis 
of the differences in effects of social policy on social trust by gender. The literature review 
will also be provided, which will allow for inferences about the theoretical probability of the 
gender gap in social trust levels to be drawn. The analysis that will follow will allow us to 
make conclusions about the group specific effects of social spending on social trust for both 
sexes.  
The concluding chapter will focus on analyzing the recent trends in the evolution of 
welfare state approaches to securing individuals’ well-being and predicting their effects on 
social trust given the relationship between relevant social spending and social trust obtained 
from empirical analysis. The overview of the literature on welfare states transformation will 
be provided which will show that, under pressure from external and internal factors, social 
policy undergoes a deep restructuring concerning both the level of spending and the character 
of social benefits provisions. The effects of these changes will be assessed for social trust. It is 
possible to expect that the final outcome will be the result of the interaction of different 
trajectories the effects of which in the short-run may significantly differ from those in the 
long-run.  
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Chapter 2: THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL TRUST AND MECHANISMS OF ITS 
FORMATION  
 
2.1. Evolution of the concept of social trust  
 
The concept of trust was developed over a long period of time but the concept itself is 
recognized as multi-faceted. There is no agreement among scholars about the meaning of trust, 
its main characteristics, and mechanisms of its formation and there is a wide variation in the 
literature about the theoretical framework of its analysis. Apart from that, trust can also be 
considered a multi-disciplinary concept which is studied by economics, sociology, 
management, political and administrative sciences. Each discipline puts diverse emphases in 
defining trust and discussing its determinants which makes the analysis more complicated and 
difficult to understand. Some researchers try to employ an integrated framework of analysis in 
their attempts to disaggregate trust and explain its origins. Other researchers suggest that trust 
exists at different societal levels (micro, meso, and macro), which may explain the diversity of 
trust definitions. We will try to present the different classifications of trust which summarize 
the whole diversity of trust definitions and represent its general meaning. We will next try to 
give a more precise analysis of the trust definitions to capture all approaches used to define 
and explain trust. 
In early research scholars associated trust and distrust with an individual’s expression 
of confidence in the intentions and motives of others (Deutsch, 1958; Lewicki et al, 1998; 
Mellinger, 1956; Read, 1962). In contrast, the focus of recent research is on the behavior 
based on positive expectations of the trustor about a trustee’s course of action (Barber, 1983; 
Hosmer, 1995; Mayer et al., 1995). Such classification is however too limited since it does not 
distinguish between the possible mechanisms of trust formation or the types of processes upon 
which trust emerges. It is not clear from this definition whether the intentions or expectations 
of others are formed on a rational basis or if they are the results of a psychological process.   
Another classification of trust studies which, to some extent, accounts for the 
drawbacks of the previous typology is provided by Mizrachi, Drori and Anspach (2007) 
within the frame of management sciences. They distinguish between three broad strands in 
studying trust. The first strand treats trust as a unitary phenomenon with a stable meaning. 
The second strand identifies the macro social determinants of trust such as embeddedness in 
social networks. The third strand distinguishes among types of trust which vary over the 
course of interpersonal relationships. They refer here to calculative and normative trusts, 
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which they consider as the two major clusters of trusting behavior varying in scope and 
degree.  
Alternative classification that emphasizes the role of history is provided by Bjornskov 
(2005). In discussing the possibility of public policy affecting trust, he distinguishes between 
two strands. The first strand tends to see trust as a cultural or moral feature. The latter can be 
attributed to a historical perspective of trust analysis, which asserts that trust is a result of 
historical processes that determine whether a society has a high or low level of trust. The 
second strand interprets trust as reputation, which arises from conscious and purely self-
interested motives that are endogenously determined, with institutions and policies shaping 
incentives for trust. This again can be attributed to history since reputation reflects an 
individual’s past course of action or his or her propensity to keep promises in the past. 
 To some extent, similar characteristics of trust are proposed by Tonkiss and Passey 
(1999). They distinguish between a number of common features that emerged from their 
analysis. First, they see trust relations as characterized by voluntarism. This can be interpreted 
from two perspectives since, on the one hand, the level of trust depends on the involvement of 
an individual in voluntary activities and, on the other hand, entering trusting relations is a 
decision taken by the individual himself and it is hence up to him to decide whether to trust 
others or not. Second, trust is linked to shared values. This again reflects what Bjornskov 
(2005) relates to cultural and moral features. Finally, trust relations are separate and 
potentially incompatible with relations of confidence based on control and constraints. The 
latter is however highly disputable since in our opinion control enhances trust instead of 
replacing it. Control can be present in trusting relations for instance in contracts in which the 
state performs the role of third party enforcer executing control over the partners’ conduct and 
intervening in the relationship when the contract terms are not held. 
Murphy (2006) proposes his own classification of the literature on trust which is based 
on the role social trust performs in society. According to him, the first stream regards trust as 
an input for exchange relationships that reduces transaction costs. One can derive two 
perspectives here. In the first perspective, trust is viewed as an individualized and rationally 
based input, form of capital, commodity or lubricant that facilitates the decision-making 
processes of individuals. The second transaction-cost driven approach focuses on the 
development of the institutions, norms and property rights that increase the general level of 
trust in a society or economy. In other words the first stream is related mostly to the rationalist 
approach which puts emphasis on rational choice behavior. The second stream (Murphy, 2006) 
regards trust as an embedded structural characteristic of organizations and networks. Here, 
sociologists view trust as a structurally embedded asset or property of relationships, 
organizations, and networks that helps to mobilize resources, enable cooperation, and shape 
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interaction patterns within economies, industries, and firms. A third area of the literature sees 
trust more as a social outcome and focuses on how agents construct trust through 
communication and interpersonal negotiation. This stream emphasizes that trust is not a 
rational choice per se but rather a moral and subjective construct that emerges when one agent 
complies with the expectations of a relationship and where one’s self identity is recognized 
and verified by others.  
Lewicki et al. (1998) define two main approaches to trust analysis which put different 
emphases on trust sources as well as the relations between trust and distrust. According to 
them, there are behavioral and psychological approaches to analyzing trust. The behavioral 
approach is grounded in the observable choices made by an actor in interpersonal contact. 
This approach defines trust in terms of choice behavior which is derived from confidence and 
expectations while assuming rational choices.  Here trust begins at zero when no prior 
information is available. Trust grows as cooperation is extended or reciprocated.  
The psychological approach includes unidimensional, two-dimensional and 
transformational approaches. Whereas the behavioral tradition focuses on observable behavior 
and inferred expectations, the psychological tradition emphasizes cognitive and affective 
processes. Thus, whereas those who espouse the behavioral approach fast-forward to the 
action and presume that it is rational thinking that led to that action, the psychological 
approach backs up to consider the root causes of that action, particularly beliefs, expectations, 
and affects. Psychological approaches therefore allow for the possibility that trust may result 
from other factors in addition to, or instead of, strict rationality. Moreover, although the 
psychological approach may incorporate behavioral measures, the emphasis is on 
understanding the internal psychological processes and dispositions that shape or alter those 
choices.  
A successful attempt to bring together multidisciplinary definitions of trust is done by 
Tschannen-Moran and Hoy (2000). They recognize that despite widespread agreement on the 
importance of trust, there is an overall lack of agreement on a suitable definition of the 
construct. They distinguish between definitions provided by various disciplines: “From a 
philosophical perspective, trust has to do with ethically and morally justifiable behavior; in 
economic terms, trust is a rational calculation of costs and benefits; in individual terms, trust 
is conceived as the extent to which people are willing to rely upon others and make 
themselves vulnerable to others; from an organizational perspective , trust is often a collective 
judgment that another group will not act opportunistically, is honest in negotiations, and 
makes a good faith effort to behave in accordance with commitments” (Tschannen-Moran and 
Hoy, 2000: 551). Based on the summary of trust definitions, they derive their own 
multidimensional definition of trust. Accordingly, trust is regarded as one party’s willingness 
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to be vulnerable to another party based on the belief that the latter party is (a) benevolent, (b) 
reliable, (c) competent, (d) honest, and (e) open.  
The literature on the meaning of trust and its forms is quite large and can also be 
classified based on the theoretical approach underlying the mechanism of trust formation. It is 
possible to distinguish between rational choice, and the institutional, psychological, and 
reflexive perspectives, which are summarized in the table below. Rational choice mechanisms 
presuppose the prevalence of reason in trust formation processes which happen within 
cognitive functions and are based on an assessment of others’ trustworthiness. Psychological 
mechanisms rely on emotions and reflexes and can mainly be considered affective since trust 
is formed based on the positive affect for an object of trust. Institutional mechanisms stress 
the role of formal and informal institutions which were developed within constraints of 
dominant cultural ideology and history. Finally, reflexive mechanisms are regarded as a leap 
of faith that is a result of interaction and suspension and is based on the positive perception of 
trustee’s trustworthiness in the future. 
 
Table 2.1.: Approaches to defining the meaning of social trust  
 
 Trust sources Key process of trust 
formation  
Main basis for trust  
Rational choice  
 
Reason Cognitive  Others’ 
trustworthiness  
Psychological  
 
Emotions, reflexes 
or automatic 
responses  
Affective  Positive affect for 
the object of trust 
and/or attitude of 
optimism  
Institutional  
 
Formal or/and 
informal institutions  
Culture, history or 
dominating ideology  
Institutional 
arrangements  
Reflexive  
 
Blind trust or leap of 
faith  
Interaction and 
suspension  
Positive perception 
of a trustee’s 
trustworthiness in 
the  future  
 
A more detailed elaboration of these approaches is provided below.  
 
2.1.1. The rational choice approach  
The first approach is based on the idea that trust can be formed mainly from 
evaluations of others’ trustworthiness while defining the trust in the frame of rational choice 
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perspectives. The most prominent scholars who use rational choice approach to analyze this 
form of trust are Hardin and Coleman.  
Hardin (2001) writes that ‘a natural and common account of trust is that certain people 
are trustworthy and can therefore be trusted’. According to Möllering (2006), these simple 
observations express three ideas: first, trust is selective- we can only trust certain people.  
Second, trust is reasonable: we look for good reasons and we assess the trustworthiness of 
others before trusting them. Third, trust is decisive: we trust by taking a step in a certain 
direction, and thereby reaching a certain state of expectation while performing corresponding 
actions and facing the consequences.  
The rational choice approach stresses heavily the role of ‘reason’ in defining trust 
levels. Another decisive feature of the rational choice perspective is the fact that the decision 
whether or not to trust someone is mainly based on cognitive processes which involve 
assessing other’s trustworthiness based on observable characteristics or past behavior. The 
perceived trustworthiness of others is seen here as the main determinant of trust levels while 
trust itself is characterized as a function of trustworthiness. The general logic of utility 
maximization assumes that the more trustworthy other poeple seem to us, the more trust can 
be generated.   
Hardin’s contribution also consists of introducing the concept of encapsulated interest 
(Hardin, 2006). He forms the definition while trying to address the question about the 
incentives of the trusted to fulfill trust.  By encapsulated interest he means that trustor A can 
see that trustee B knows that he will only be able to maximize his own interest if he takes A’s 
interests into account: “I trust you because your interest encapsulates mine, which is to say 
that you have an interest in fulfilling my trust.” In other words, by refusing to trust or by 
behaving in a way which damages A’s interests, B would harm himself. Hardin’s concept of 
trust is rationally accounted for when the trustor perceives that the trustee realizes that his 
own interests are encapsulated with the interests of the trustor, who learns to trust by drawing 
on relevant past experiences with the trustee or with other people, and by making and 
continuously updating an estimate of the trustee’s trustworthiness.  
A conceptualization of trust according to the rational choice tradition is also offered by 
James Coleman (1990). The central idea here is that a trustor’s decision can be regarded as a 
bet: “if the chance of winning, relative to the chance of losing is greater than the amount that 
would be lost (if he loses) relative to the amount that would be won (if he wins); and  if he is 
rational, he should place it”. Coleman thus introduces a probabilistic approach into the 
process of generating trust. In order for the process to work, the trustor needs to know the 
potential gain (G); the potential loss (L) and an estimate of the probability (p) (0< p < 1) that 
the trustee will be trustworthy. Möllering (2006) concludes that according to Coleman, a 
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purposive actor will place trust  in someone else if p/ (1 - p) >L/G. In other words, the trustor 
will rationally trust a trustee if he perceives the probability of the trustee’s trustworthiness to 
be high enough to yield a net expected gain.  
The main problem here which was also recognized by Coleman is how to get the 
required information about potential gain, loss and estimates of the probability of success. He 
notes that in most cases p, L and G are known to a varying degree, with p being the most 
difficult to estimate. The estimation of these parameters is therefore done based on obtained 
information. The process of obtaining information is again subordinated to ‘reason’, which 
assumes that “the search should continue as long as the cost of an additional increment of 
information is less than the benefit it is expected to bring.” Moreover, Coleman emphasizes 
that in order to obtain a reliable estimate of B’s trustworthiness, trustor A must seek to 
understand B’s motives although Coleman does not elaborate on this idea.  
Rus (2005) provides his own elaboration of the meaning of trust. By developing the 
theory of trust within a rational choice perspective, Rus shifts the emphasis from the object of 
trust to the characteristics of the trustee. According to him, trust is a dimension of 
interpersonal relations that is associated with three elements: interdependence among actors, 
uncertainty or risk regarding the behavior of the other party to a transaction and expectations 
that the other party will not abuse the trusting actor’s vulnerability. He defines trust as an 
expectation by an actor that the other party will fulfill its obligations in spite of uncertainty 
and opportunities for defection and self-serving behavior. He analyzes the role of uncertainty 
in trusting relations while making a distinction between uncertainty and risk. Rus (2005) says 
that in trusting relationships, uncertainty is never operationalized in terms of risk, since risk 
requires information, calculation, assessment, monitoring, management, and governance. 
Trust avoids all the steps required for the rational management of a transaction. Actors accept 
uncertainty in a given transaction and do not manage it directly. Instead, they manage the 
social relationship that underlies the implicit or explicit contract. When actors base 
transactions on trust they actually shift governance from a transaction to a relationship by 
converting transactional uncertainty into rational certainty. 
Rus (2005) says that the defining characteristics of trust are that uncertainty is always 
present in trusting relations and is not operationalized as a set of objectives, conditions and 
processes that control the level of risk involved in a given transaction. Because trusting parties 
do not try to rationalize the uncertainty in a transaction, ‘all trust is in a certain sense blind 
trust.’ He does however assert that while trust is blind, the choice of a partner to trust is rather 
highly informed. Again, the choice of a partner is based on how trustworthy he or she is. The 
trustworthiness of partners is determined based on information gathered by trusting parties. 
Trust hence requires that actors collect information on the trustworthiness of their partners in 
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a transaction. Actors may obtain information about their partners from very different sources. 
Information may come from macro sources, such as public information provided by 
institutions, from a meso level, such as interorganizational networks, and from a micro level, 
which is defined by personal experience with a given partner.  
Haas and Deseran (1981) also define trust as dependent on a perception of 
trustworthiness. Their theory also emphasizes the role of a trustee’s trustworthiness in 
relations. They refer to Blau’s definition of trust under which one understands a “belief on the 
part of one person that another will fulfill his or her obligation and generally pull his or her 
weight in their relationship to one another” (Haas and Deseran, 1981: 4). The problem of 
maintaining and creating trust is seen by them as a problem with the presentation of oneself as 
a trustworthy person. They assume that its resolution is accomplished largely through the use 
of conventional language: “that is, the establishment of trust requires that there be a 
vocabulary of typical gestures which refer to typifications of social relationships” (Haas and 
Deseran, 1981: 5). Such typifications involve the imputation of intentions or orientations to 
actors standing in certain types of relationships with one another. They recognize that the 
imputation of intentions to another person is difficult both because it is intrinsically difficult 
to know another person’s intentions and because people often try to conceal their true 
intentions to convey false information about themselves. Unlike Rus, they recognize that 
gathering information about others is not a way out of this dilemma since one rarely has 
enough information about the orientations of others to draw firm conclusions about them. But 
one may rely on the documentary method of interpretation, that is, one takes specific items of 
behavior as being documents or evidence of a certain orientation. One can hence pervade 
another of his or her trustworthiness by displaying a willingness to invest a good deal in their 
relationship with one another or, in other words, “doing investments in expensive gestures of 
good faith.” The authors conclude by observing that the more each is willing to invest, the 
more trust the other will be inclined to feel. Haas and Deseran (1981) called the exchange of 
such tokens of good faith ‘symbolic exchange’. 
Molm et al. (2000) also relate trust to trustworthiness and analyze the conditions in 
which trust appears. They distinguish between trust as expectations of benign behavior based 
on inferences about a partner’s personal traits and intentions, and assurance that expectations 
are based instead on knowledge of an incentive structure that encourages benign behavior. 
The scholars propose that negotiating exchanges with binding agreements provides assurance, 
while reciprocal exchanges enable trust. However, the authors notice that whether or not trust 
actually develops depends on a partner’s behavior and the information it conveys about the 
partner’s trustworthiness. In support of these predictions, their results show that reciprocal 
acts of individual giving produce significantly higher levels of trust than the joint negotiation 
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of binding agreements, even when exchanges of equivalent value, in equivalent structures of 
power and opportunity, are compared. And, when the risk of reciprocal exchange provides the 
opportunity to demonstrate their trustworthiness, actors’ behaviors- their commitments to one 
another and the equality or inequality of their exchanges – strongly influence the level of trust 
they develop.  
Doney et al (1998) also develop their own view on trust within rational choice 
perspective. However, they go further than other authors since they emphasize that 
expectations about a trustor’s trustworthiness constitute only one perspective of understanding 
trust. According to them, there is a second perspective which emphasizes a trustor’s 
willingness to use trusting expectations as a basis for behavioral intentions and behavior. 
Doney et al (1998) refer to the definition of trust provided by Deutsch, which consists of 
viewing trust as actions that increase one’s vulnerability to another. The authors argue that 
both belief and behavioral intention components must be present for trust to exist. In other 
words, trust involves more than just forming beliefs about another’s trustworthiness; there 
must be a willingness to act based on those believes. In this framework, Doney et al. (1998) 
develop an integrative definition of trust that encompasses each of these diverse perspectives. 
Accordingly, they define trust as a willingness to rely on another party and to take actions in 
circumstances where such action makes one vulnerable to the other party. In their opinion, 
this definition incorporates the notion of risk as a precondition for trust, and it includes both 
the belief and behavioral components of trust. In their understanding, expectations of a 
target’s trustworthiness drive a trustor’s behavior, and both are necessary for trust to be 
present. How a trustor comes to form trusting expectations is not however specified in the 
definition. But Doney et al. (1998) argue that trustor’s engage in one or more cognitive 
processes in order to determine whether or not targets are trustworthy. In other words, they 
again reduce the definition to the cognitive process of trust building.  
Their contribution consists in defining five cognitive trust–building processes.  
(1) Calculative process: one party calculates the costs and/or rewards of another party. 
To the extent that the benefits of cheating do not exceed the costs of being caught, the trustor 
infers that it would be contrary to the other party’s best interest to cheat, and that party can be 
therefore trusted.  
(2) Prediction process: Trust emerges via a prediction process whereby a trustor 
determines that a target’s past actions provide a reasonable basis upon which to predict future 
behavior. Using a prediction process, the trustor confers trust based on prior experiences 
demonstrating that the target’s behavior is predictable. Thus trust building on prediction 
requires information about a target’s past actions.   
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(3) Intentionality process: Motives underlie an intentionality process in which trust 
formation is influenced by one party’s perception of the other party’s intentions. Using an 
intentionality process to establish trust, trustors interpret a target’s words and behavior and 
attempt to determine their intentions in exchange.  
(4) Capability process: Trust building by means of capability process involves a 
trustor’s willingness to trust based on an assessment of the target’s ability to meet his or her 
obligations as well as the trustor’s expectations.  
(5) Transfer process: trust is built through a transfer process when the trustor transfers 
trust from a known entity to an unknown one. Trust is transferred from a trusted proof source 
to another individual or group with which the trustor has little or no direct experience.  
A rational choice perspective also gives the framework for trust analysis in a study 
conducted by Khodyakov (2007). He introduces a dynamic perspective in analyzing trust by 
proposing the use of agency theory to grasp all dimensions of trust which would embrace all 
three temporal properties (the past, present and future) which influence the creation, 
development and maintenance of trust. By accepting an agentic nature of trust, he claims that 
the decision to trust another person is made in the present and is affected by the partner’s 
reputation, which represents the past, and by expectations of possible tangible and/or non-
material regards, which represent the future. The author proposes the following definition of 
trust as a process which takes all three temporal dimensions into account: “Trust is a 
processes of constant imaginative anticipation of the reliability of the other party’s actions 
based on the reputation of the partner and the actor, the evaluation of current circumstances of 
action, assumptions about the partner’s actions and the belief in the honesty and morality of 
the other side.” (Khodyakov, 2007; 126). This definition of trust reflects the idea of 
temporality and accounts for rational and to a limited extent non-calculative or affective 
dimensions of human behavior.  Khodyakov (2007) thus proposes that the choice of whether 
or not to trust involves all temporal dimensions. A rational decision regarding trust is based 
here on information about past behavior, which is a good foundation for estimating the 
trustworthiness of others. Moreover, trustworthiness is also analyzed based on the current 
observable characteristics of the other party which is completely in line with the rational 
choice perspective of trust formation. Although he mentions the future as a temporal 
dimension, it is possible to argue that it is also related to the past and present since 
expectations of possible tangible and/or non-material regards is usually based on past 
behavior and present characteristics.  
Thus, the rational choice perspective provides a developed framework for analyzing 
the meaning of trust. There are however several critics who emphasize weakness of this 
approach. A common weakness of rational choice perspectives is that their understanding of 
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rationality in trust relies heavily on calculative cognition and prediction. There are a lot of 
critics to this aspect of trust formation who state that the common problem is usually 
attributed to the availability of information. Rothstein (2000) for instance emphasizes that the 
amount of information A needs in each and every moment, when A must decide whether or 
not to trust B, must be very high. He therefore expresses some doubts that this definition can 
capture trust between agents as it takes place in the real world. “Do agents really make such 
complex calculations each and every time they decide whether or not to trust?”. Rothstein 
doubts this since the time and resources the agents would need to gather that type and amount 
of information about B must be too large which would therefore make trust a rare event.  
Rothstein (2000) also emphasizes that the calculative nature of trust is also absent in 
the case of the contract since it is simply impossible to predict the complexity of the 
environment and to foresee all possible contingencies. Moreover, the rational choice 
definition of trust does not allow for the variation of trust across nations. He stresses that in 
countries with a low culture of trust are suitable for the rationalistic definition, while societies 
with a high culture of trust usually employ factors other than rationalistic calculations.  On the 
other hand, Rothstein (2000) agrees that information matters in trust decisions. Of course 
agents are not fully informed about the world they live in, but they are able to base their 
decisions on fragmented information which is mostly concerned what other agents have done 
in the past: “they (the agents) are likely to take into account what is known about the moral 
standards, professional norms and historical record of these other agents”. In small groups this 
information can be collected from personal knowledge and communication, in large groups 
however, it becomes difficult.  
Critics of the rationalist perspective of trust formation can be found in studies 
conducted by Murphy (2006). He argues that the rational choice approach does not 
sufficiently address the contingent, reflexive, affective, and ideological forces that influence 
collaborative activities or the inevitable power differentials shaping network configurations 
and the prospects of trust. Emotions are recognized as essential elements of the process of 
trust formation by a number of scholars. The role of emotions in generating trusting behavior 
is well developed in the psychological approach.  
 
2.1.2. The Psychological Approach  
The main idea of the psychological approach consists in emphasizing the role of 
emotions in generating trust. This approach goes beyond the common ‘rational choice’ 
understanding and asserts that trust succeeds where rational prediction alone would fail. 
According to David Lewis and Andrew Weigert (1985) trust in everyday life is a mix of 
feelings and rational thinking. Accordingly, trust should be conceptualized as having 
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cognitive, emotional, and behavioral dimensions which are merged into a unitary social 
experience. Cognitive processes discriminate between persons and institutions that are 
trustworthy, distrusted, and unknown. In this sense, “we cognitively choose whom we will 
trust in which respect and under which circumstances and we base our choice on what we take 
to be a good reason, constituting evidence of trustworthiness” (Lewis and Weigert, 1985: 970). 
The cognitive element of trust goes beyond peer rationality. As the authors underlie it, the 
cognitive dimension in trust is characterized by a cognitive leap beyond the expectations that 
reason and experience alone would warrant – they simply form a platform from which the 
leap is made.  In this view, emotional trust rests on the strong positive effect for the object of 
trust and is analytically distinct from rational reasoning about why the trustee will be 
trustworthy. Emotional trust refers mainly to the extent to which a trustor is willing to be open 
to the trustee and does not fear emotional harm from the trustee. Finally, the behavioral 
context of trust is regarded here as the undertaking of a risky course of action based on the 
expectations that all persons involved in the action will act competently and dutifully. The 
behavioral content of trust is reciprocally related to its cognitive and emotional aspects: 
“when we see others acting in ways that imply that they trust us, we become more disposed to 
reciprocate by trusting in them more” (Lewis and Weigert, 1985: 971). 
The role of emotions is emphasized in a trust analysis conducted by Karen Jones 
(1996). According to her, trusting is composed of two elements: one cognitive and one 
affective or emotional. Roughly, “to trust someone is to have an attitude of optimism about 
her goodwill and to have the confident expectations that, when the need arises, the one trusted 
will be directly and favorably moved by the thought that you are counting on her” (Jones, 
1996: 5-6). If A’s attitude toward B  is predominantly characterized by optimism about B’s 
goodwill and by the expectation that B will be directly and favorably moved by the thought 
that A is counting on her, then A has a trusting relationship with B. In other words, Jones 
claims that trust is composed of two elements: an emotional attitude of optimism about the 
goodwill and competence of another as it extends to the domain of our interaction, and, 
further, an expectation that the one being trusted will be directly and favorably moved by the 
thought that they are being counted on. The expectation here is visibly grounded in the 
attitude of optimism. We expect others to react favorably to our counting on them because we 
are optimistic about their goodwill. Our expectation is usually grounded in the very same 
evidence that grounds our attitude of optimism. Thus, the attitude of optimism is a central 
component.   
Nooteboom (2006) argues as well that trust has psychological causes that impel 
feelings without reasoning and rationality. Psychological causes include emotions and may 
entail reflexes or automatic responses. Rational reasons entail inferences on the basis of 
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perceived behavior and someone’s trustworthiness. Admittedly, rational reasons and 
emotional causes go together in the context of trust. An assessment of someone’s 
trustworthiness on the basis of observed or reported behavior is limited by uncertainty and 
bounded rationality. According to social psychology, it is mediated by mental heuristics, in 
the perception and attribution of motives and competences of people, which are to some 
extent emotion-laden. Using such heuristics, people infer on the basis of ‘relational signals’ 
whether people are in a mental frame conducive or detrimental to trustworthiness.  
Thus the emotional component in generating trust is central to the psychological 
approach. However, it should be noted that this approach is to some extent complementary to 
the rational choice perspective. It does not completely substitute the cognitive process but 
complements it.  
 
2.1.3. The Institutional Approach  
Besides the rational and emotional argument, there is a point of view that can be called 
institutional. This point of view emphasizes the role of formal and informal institutions in 
generating trust. Farell (2005), for instance, argues that trust can be analyzed as an effect of 
institutions. In other words, interpersonal trust is viewed here as the contingent result of 
particular institutional arrangements. He suggests that formal and informal institutions are 
likely to be associated with quite different outcomes in terms of trust relations among 
individuals. He argues that formal institutions involve written rules that are typically enforced 
by a third party such as the state; informal institutions involve unwritten rules that are 
typically enforced through bilateral relationships within a given community of actors and 
work through reputation penalties. Farell (2005) compares formal and informal institutions 
and elaborates on the differences in their effects on the form of commitments and the range of 
involved actors. Formal institutions such as laws are relatively specific, and they must thus 
induce clear ex-ante expectations about actors’ likely strategies under circumstances that are 
unforeseen and addressed by the institutions. At the same time, they are likely to provide 
weak guidance when anticipated circumstances arise. In contrast, informal institutions are 
diffuse, unwritten understandings; although they may provide less precise ex-ante 
expectations about actors’ strategies, they are more easily adapted to previous unforeseen 
contingences.  
Farell (2005) goes on to assert that trust cannot be reduced to mere institution-induced 
expectations. Nonetheless, such expectations may serve as an important anchoring point for 
trusting relationships insofar as they provide a technology that actors can employ to make 
credible commitments to each other. Formal and informal institutions will have different 
consequences for expectations and thus for trust. Formal institutions may help actors engage 
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in tightly defined transactions with a wide variety of other actors who are not part of the same 
community, as long as the latter actors are subject to the appropriate institutions and the same 
third party enforcer. Informal institutions, in contrast, may allow for relationships that involve 
wider – and ex-ante more diffuse-set of issues. However, these trust relations are only 
possible with members of the same community, which usually encompasses a smaller set of 
actors. In other words, appropriate formal institutions will allow actor X to engage in relations 
with a wide range of other actors Y over a predefined set of matters Z. Appropriate informal 
institutions will allow X to engage in relations with a narrower range of other actors Y but 
with regard to a broader and more diffuse set of matters Z.  
Farell (2005) applies his theory to the analysis of trust relations and their effects on 
different types of cooperation for the manufacturing industries in Germany and Italy. He 
concludes that in Germany where there were no extensive informal institutions of the sort 
found in Italy, firms typically were not able to trust each other enough to cooperate through 
the kinds of extensive subcontracting found in Italy. In the few cases where they did rely 
substantially on subcontracting, it appears to have involved formal institutions. By contrast, in 
Italy, informal institutions supported a highly flexible form of reciprocal gift exchange which 
could shift according to change in demand. German final firms, if they wished to make 
credible commitments to their subcontractors, had to do so through relatively inflexible 
contractual forms.    
In this frame of trust formation, the theory of collective memories,which emphasizes 
the role of formal and informal institutions, easily fits.  Rothstein (2000) argues for instance 
that it may seem that it is the culture of the society that decides whether or not the individuals 
trust others and formal institutions. Or, in other words, trust levels are given by the culture, 
the dominant ideology, or history. It is a part of American political culture to hate the 
government, while Scandinavians, for example, put enormous trust in their political system 
and gladly pay half of their income in taxes. However, Rothstein (2000) correctly points out 
that it is not today’s formal institutions as such that people evaluate, but their historically 
established reputation with regard to fairness and efficiency. What matters here is the 
collective memory about the actual operation of institutions. Moreover, collective memory is 
not regarded as something given or able to change. Rothstein (2000) emphasizes that the 
collective memory is deliberately created by strategic political entrepreneurs in order to 
further their political goals and ambitions at some point in time.  
Nooteboom (2006) tries to combine several approaches under one definition of trust 
which also incorporates the role of informal and formal institutions in the process of trust 
emergence. According to the author, trust can be defined as the expectations that a partner 
will not engage in opportunistic behavior, for whatever reasons including control of his 
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conduct: in other words, trust is asset of positive expectations that a partner will not engage in 
opportunistic behavior even in the face of short-term opportunities and incentives in the 
absence of control. Control of another party’s conduct and management of a sanction system 
is what formal institutions are supposed to do. The author distinguishes between three societal 
levels of the mechanism of trust formation: micro, meso and macro levels among which he 
specifies the macro level which is directly related to the institutions providing a mechanism 
for trust formation. More specifically, on the macro, institutional, level opportunity control 
may be based on legal coercion which can be regarded as an aspect of formal institutions. 
Apart from that trustworthiness may be based on socially inculcated values, norms, and 
customs which can be regarded as informal institutions. Besides this macro level, the author 
refers to two other levels. More specifically, on the meso level, there is incentive control by 
reputation. On the micro (relation specific) level, opportunity control may be based on 
hierarchical control or incentive control.  
Murphy (2006) also uses three levels to explain the process of trust formation among 
which there is an explicit reference to formal and informal institutions. According to him, 
there is a micro-level or subjective scale at which trust-building practices are influenced by an 
individual’s disposition or general willingness to trust, his or her perceived power or control 
of the situation, calculations of the risk and uncertainties related to the extension of trust and 
his or her assessment of the rewards associated with, or interests encapsulated through, the 
actions derived from the establishment of trust. The meso or intersubjective scale is 
constituted by the personal front and the setting. The personal front is constructed through the 
performance or embodiment of speech acts, expressions, gestures, emotional energies and 
social cues or significant symbols. The setting relates to the physical locations and spaces 
within which or across which the interaction occurs and the props, appearances, materials, and 
technologies that can mediate these exchanges. Finally, Murphy (2006) specifies the macro 
level or scale. Here, the role of wider institutions, structural conditions, circumstances, and 
hierarchies are accounted for, and which include the laws, norms, and rules for conducting 
business, the value system embodied in religious beliefs or political ideologies, and the 
sanctioning institutions that can help individuals respond to opportunistic behavior. The third 
level thus refers to the formal and informal institutions which structure social relationships, on 
the one hand, and create incentives for non-opportunistic behavior on the other.  
Contract as a formal institution is another alternative for reducing uncertainty in trust 
relations. The latter was deeply studied by Shapiro (1987), who uses a principle-agent 
framework to study how to cope with uncertainty in trust relations. She bases her analysis of 
trust relationship on the assumption that this conception has two elements: an idea of ‘agency’, 
in which individuals or organizations act on behalf of others (known as principles), and the 
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idea of risky investment of future contingency, inherent in agency relationships. Trust is used 
here as a social relationship in which principles – for whatever reasons or states of mind – 
invest resources, authority, or responsibility in another to act on their behalf for some 
uncertain future return. In order to understand the various ways in which embeddedness 
penetrates these trust relationships, it is necessary to take a sustained look at principal’s 
responses to uncertainty.  
According to Shapiro (1987), principals cope with potential risks and uncertainties in a 
number of ways. Some avoid or limit their participation in agency relationships. Alternatively, 
principals attempt to reduce their exposure to agent abuse by spreading their risk. 
Personalizing the agency relationship by embedding it in structures of social relations 
represents a third copying mechanism. More specifically, principals may limit their 
relationships to known agents, members of their social networks, kinship or ethnic groups, or 
neighborhoods. Contracts represent a fourth strategy by which principals can assume some 
control over the behavior of those who act on their behalf. Contracts stipulate the principal’s 
preferences and priorities, discloses the responsibilities and obligations of the agents, 
explicitly states the procedures agents are to follow and the decision rules that are to employ, 
plans for contingencies, creates incentives for contractual compliance, and specifies sanctions 
to be imposed if agreements are not kept. Contracts thus help to institutionalize the 
relationship between people building trusting relationships. However, it is often mentioned in 
the literature that contracts cannot foresee all possible contingencies which may arise in a 
trusting relationship.  
The institutional perspective of trust formation thus provides some framework for 
explaining how trust formation happens. This theory is however limited to some extent since 
it first does not explain how trust appears in societies with poor formal institutions. East 
European countries have long being characterized by corrupt, poor, and ineffective formal 
institutions which are rarely enacted in practice, but they still have rather high levels of trust. 
Second, the institutional theory which covers both formal and informal institutions cannot 
explain how the shift from low trusting to high trusting societies happens since both forms of 
institutions (especially informal) are quite stable and sustainable in time. Third, it is 
sometimes mentioned in the literature that contracts may replace trust rather than generate it 
since contracts reduce the uncertainty from which trust cannot emerge.   
 
2.1.4. The Reflexive Approach  
Finally, there is another form of trust as ‘reflexivity’, which refers to the fact that trust 
can be thought of as an outcome of a process of interaction and is usually based on reflexivity 
(Möllering, 2006). It will most likely have effects on the process too and alter the conditions 
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and the manner in which future interactions take place. Even static models of trust, Möllering 
(2006) asserts, include a vague feedback mechanism whereby a trusting state of mind towards 
a trustee in the present promotes positive perceptions of that trustee’s trustworthiness in the 
future. 
Möllering (2006) further argues that trustors cannot just select the right conditions and 
then be passive and wait for trust to emerge; they have to actively work on trust and engage in 
extensive signaling, communication, interaction and interpretation in order to maintain the 
continuous process of trust constitution. Möllering (2006) refers to Giddens in talking about 
active trust. This new, unexplored concept stands for the reflexivity of trust as an on-going 
process that is as much influenced by knowledgeable actors as it exerts influence on them.  
In the frame of trust as reflexivity, Möllering (2006) discusses blind trust. The main 
point of his argument is that actors are able to learn that it can be rewarding if they behave as 
if people can be trusted even in unpromising situations. This learning process enables a trust-
building process to take place. Möllering (2006), while analyzing a great amount of research, 
draws the conclusion that common to all research is the fact that actors do not need to trust 
each other fully from the beginning of a relationship, because they may engage 
experimentally in a kind of as-if trust which may gradually produce genuine trust. While such 
a process may simply emerge, the more interesting possibility is that actors will actively 
produce mutual experiences with the aim of testing whether a trust relationship is feasible, but 
without being able to know in advance the associated benefits and risks. He refers to Cook’s 
study of trust (2005), which found that trust can be built through risk taking. It follows again 
that an essential feature of trust and its development must be an actor’s ability to ‘just do it’ 
and overcome, at least momentarily, the irreducible uncertainty and vulnerability involved in 
social exchanges. Trust is a matter of reflexivity that often needs to develop gradually in a 
process which, once they get started, may be partly self-reinforcing but requires active agency 
too.  
This point is discussed more often under the heading of trust as a leap of faith. 
Möllering (2006) analyzses the meaning of this ‘leap of faith’ as the essential feature of trust. 
He argues that the image of a leap of faith is a very fortunate one since it connotes agency 
without suggesting perfect control of uncertainty. He prefers to speak of suspension as the 
process that enables actors to deal with irreducible uncertainty and vulnerability. Suspension 
is according to him an essential element of trust, since trust as the state of positive 
expectations of others can only be reached when reason, routine, and reflexivity are combined 
with suspension. Without suspension, trust cannot occur. The trust weal, introduced by him, 
implies a feed-back mechanism, suggesting that when trust is reached, this will have an effect 
on the trust bases, too. In other words, learning takes place.  
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Möllering (2006) suggests three ways of coming to terms with suspension. First, he 
returns to the idea that trust implies an ‘as –if attitude’. He shows that as-if is a rather 
common expression in the literature on trust, which is however generally taken far too lightly. 
Second, the term ‘bracketing’ is used, which expresses a kind of temporary blending out. He 
argues that perhaps uncertainty and vulnerability are bracketed in the formation of trust. Third, 
he regards trust as matter of willpower and, more specifically, faith. Central to his discussions 
here is the notion of a leap of faith. He argues that an important aspect of trust processes 
presented before was that the development of trust depends on getting the process started 
somehow, after which there is a chance that it will be self-reinforcing. In this regard, faith 
would not only be instrumental in getting the process started, but is itself a prime example of 
a self-fulfilling attitude.  
The contemplation on the meaning of trust provided by Held (1968) fits in with the 
leap of faith framework. Held analyzes trust in the frame of the prisoner’s dilemma. Here the 
question can be formulated as follows: is it rational to take a chance that the other fellow will 
also cooperate, in which case both will be better off, or is it rational to suppose that one 
should further one’s own interest, just as he may? In other words, the problem is described 
here in terms of whether or not it is rational to trust. Held (1968) criticizes Tullock’s 
definition of trust which asserts that to trust someone is to be able to make an accurate 
prediction that his behavior will be co-operative. Based on this reasoning, she refines the 
definition of trust by pointing out that trust seems to have more to do with situations of 
uncertainty than with situations of certainty. She does not propose any way of reducing the 
uncertainty but she writes that it is exactly in uncertainty that trust is born: “In short, it seems 
that trust is more required exactly when we least know whether the person will or will not do 
an action” (Held,1968: 157). When uncertainty is present, the emergence of trust is made 
possible. It is hence plausible to conclude that she is talking about the leap of faith required in 
uncertain situations.  
Jones (1996) criticizes this approach of as-if trust. She bases her reasoning on the 
assumption that one thinks that by trusting and displaying our trust we will be able to elicit 
trustworthy behavior from others. When we do this, she continues, our hope is that by trusting 
we will be able to bring about the very conditions that justify our trust. It might be thought 
that we do not need to inquire whether attempts at this sort of bootstrapping can be justified, 
for we need never actually trust on the basis of forward-looking considerations – all we need 
to do is act as if we are trusting. But she further puts under doubt the hope that acting as if you 
are trusting will have the same results as acting on the basis of genuine trust, cultivated in the 
hope of bringing about trustworthiness. Acting as if you are trusting and genuine trusting 
could have the same result only if one assumes that there is no perceptible difference between 
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the behavior that would be produced from trust and the behavior that would be produced from 
acting as if you trust someone. She links this situation to the frequency of contacts. She 
concludes that it is precisely the frequency of contacts between those who trust and those who 
would elicit trustworthiness that makes it implausible to suppose that merely acting as if you 
are trusting could, on each of many separate occasions, result in behavior indistinguishable 
from the behavior of one who genuinely trusts.  
A leap of faith as the process of trust formation is criticized as well by Tillmar and 
Lindkvist (2007) who analyze the grounds for the emergence of trust. They emphasize that 
trust does not appear  out of nowhere: there must be some starting point. The authors do 
however recognize the possibility of cooperation between people when established and 
reliable societal institutions are largely lacking and a generally low culture of trust prevails. 
Their case study in Tanzania suggests that in the absence of an adequate institutional 
framework, people tend to focus on imaginatively creating good reasons for trust by drawing 
on any available social or material circumstances in their context. More specifically, in such 
conditions people try to minimize the necessary leap and focus instead on identifying secure 
reasons for trust. It is seen for instance as advantageous if people have a house or children. 
Apparently, it is a way of benefiting from a natural hostage situation, which would serve to 
reduce the possibility and the incentives of a collaborator absconding. A similar tendency to 
reason in terms of what might hinder people from pursuing their own interest 
opportunistically are salient in connection with the business training programs where people 
learn bookkeeping and how to write contracts. It also appears advantageous for members to 
know the character, habits, and goodwill of potential collaborators. Since business owners had 
started to interact through the Chamber of Commerce and training, they were provided with at 
least a starting point for gaining trust based on knowledge of the people’s character. Finally, 
increased interaction between people from different tribes and sexes that take place within 
business training programs and the Chamber of Commerce also contribute to the creation of 
trust across borders of tribe and gender.  
 
Thus, the literature on trust is quite numerous and sometimes inconsistent which 
reflects the diversity of disciplines studying trust and the wide range of approaches applied to 
analyze trust relations. It is difficult to pick up from a given range of definitions the one 
which would perfectly fit our analysis. It is however possible to draw some conclusions which 
sum up the numerous theories describing trust formation. 
First, trust describes social relations, a set of largely informal relationships that may 
help the achievement of goals. These social relations can refer to a multitude of social 
interactions, regulated by social norms, between two or more people, with each having a 
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social position and performing a social role. Social relations in a simplistic way can be 
described as relations between people, but more specifically a relation between individuals 
insofar as they belong to a group. But one can also say that social relations can be expressed 
as the relation between groups of people or as relations between an individual and a group of 
people. What is rarely specified in theoretical discussion on trust is that while trust may be 
built within relationships on a personal basis, it may also arise outside relationships on the 
basis of institutions. In other words, the trustee can be individual people, but also collectives, 
such as organizations and institutions.  
Second, trust involves a certain level of abstraction and has its limits. The abstraction 
stems from the fact that while entering into trusting relations with others, the individual does 
not usually know the partner in the relationship. One should hence be able to generalize the 
positive experience that the individual obtained in the past to unknown partners with whom he 
or she establishes relations in the present and future. This requires that successful interaction 
with one person should be abstragated to all individuals with whom the trustor may 
potentially cooperate. This process is however limited to some extent since trust is dependent 
on circumstances.  
Third, trust has cognitive, emotional, and behavioral components. Trust is based on a 
cognitive process which discriminates among persons who are trustworthy, distrusted, and 
unknown. Trust has a rational experiential basis (Thomas, 1998). We may not calculate risk 
and probabilities, but we do make decisions in deciding whom to trust and with what we 
entrust them. In other words, trust is grounded in the ability to know and understand others 
well enough to predict his or her behavior. Definition of trust also accounts for affective 
determinants or psychological causes that impel feelings without reasoning and rational 
reasons. Psychological causes include emotions and may entail reflexes or automatic 
responses. Finally, definitions of trust generally include some references to expectations or 
beliefs that others will behave in a predictable manner and not devoted entirely to self-interest. 
We trust them to take our interests into account, even in situations in which we are unable to 
recognize and evaluate the potentially negative courses of action on their part.  
Fourth, trust is associated with relational risk. Here risk is used in an ordinary 
language sense of being vulnerable to the actions of others and yielding to the possibility of 
loss. Many writers, particularly rational-choice theorists, use trust and risk synonymously so 
that trust is warranted when the expected gain from placing oneself at risk of another is 
positive but not otherwise. If rational actors simply calculate expected payoffs based on 
perceived risks as in a prisoner’s dilemma game, then trust is not present and risk is a more 
precise term (Thomas, 1998).  It is also recognized that risks can be reduced through repeated 
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interactions which enhance one’s understanding of others and knowledge about the 
predictability of others.   
Fifth, trust should be regarded as a dynamic concept or, as it is suggested by 
Khodyakov (2007), it is more a process than a static concept. Apparently, all three time spans 
are present in the process of building trust relations: past, present and future. The past is 
involved as far as the trustor has certain experience in cooperating with the individuals upon 
which he forms a predisposition to trust or distrust potential trustees. The past is also involved 
when a trustor relies on the reputation or the past records about a trustees’ behavior in trusting 
relations. The present is reflected in the evaluation of a trustees’ trustworthiness done by the 
trustor based on their current characteristics and current circumstances. Finally, the future is 
included due to the fact that trust is defined in terms of positive expectations with respect to 
the possible outcomes of interactions which are anticipated at a specific moment in future.  
 
2.1.5. Trust in survey questions  
Trust represents a multifaceted concept, defined from a point of view of different 
prospectives.  In spite of the diversity of trust notions, it is difficult to choose which one is 
most suitable for the purpose of research. The main explanation is the fact that we base our 
research on the survey data where traditional questions of trust were asked: ‘would you say 
that most people can be trusted or you cannot be too careful in dealing with people’. And the 
most striking feature of the survey work, as Hardin (2006) emphasizes is the fact that surveys 
on trust, especially interpersonal trust, are atheoretcial: the notion of trust is left completely 
untheorized. The latter happens due to the fact that it is the respondents, not the social 
scientists, who implicitly define trust since it is up to the respondents to interpret the 
traditional question on trust while their responses are defined through the prism of their own 
understanding.  
Most of the survey research on trust implicitly assumes that the notion of trust has a 
commonly understood meaning. It therefore does not test for different conceptions or theories 
of trust. However, Hardin (2006) sees a great merit in traditional question of trust: ‘generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in 
dealing with people?’. This question overtly asks for judgments of the trustworthiness of 
others. Nevertheless, he also finds problems with the trust question. The main problem is that 
the question does not differentiate varied conceptions of trust and it does not address or 
acknowledge the relational character of actual trust. It does not differentiate between varied 
categories of people whom one would be more or less likely to trust, and it does not 
differentiate different objects of trust ranging from reciprocating minor favors to fulfilling 
major, very costly promises. He underlines that such a question generally asks about trusting 
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everyone or most people, implicitly with respect to anything at all: “In the formula A trusts B 
with respect to X, both B and X in the survey instruments often implicitly roam over the 
ranges of everyone and everything”, Hardin (2006) continues. This contradicts common sense 
since no sane person trusts equally with respect to any and every level of risk.  
Similar arguments are provided by Glaeser et al (2000). On the basis of the experiment 
the authors show that standard survey questions about trust do not appear to measure trust. 
However, they do measure trustworthiness, which is one ingredient of social capital. 
Moreover, they emphasize that the standard questions of trust are too vague and difficult to 
interpret while variation in responses might arise for numerous reasons: differences in beliefs 
about the trustworthiness of a common set of people, differences in interpretation of who 
comprises ‘most people’, differences in interpretation of what it means to be able to trust 
someone; or differences in the ability to elicit trustworthy behavior from other people.  
Miller and Mitamura (2003) went even further in their argument about the ambiguity 
of the traditional question on trust. They assert that the question does not ask respondents to 
choose between trust and distrust but rather between trust (measured through trustworthiness) 
and caution. Moreover, Miller and Mitamura (2003) emphasize that trust and caution are not 
opposites: certainly it is possible for a person to believe that most people can be trusted, and 
at the same time believe that it is prudent to be cautious. In other words, caution does not 
necessarily imply distrust.  
Miller and Mitamura (2003) explain this distinction between caution and distrust by 
separating the question into two components. ‘Would you say most people can be trusted?’ is 
asked as an assessment of other people’s trustworthiness. It does not relate “the respondent’s 
behavior, but rather seeks a general appraisal of other people’s behavior” (Miller and 
Mitamura, 2003: 63). The second half of the question, however, asks people whether they 
believe that ‘you can‘t be too careful.’ According to Miller and Mitamura (2003), this refers 
to one’s own behavioral preferences rather than that of others. In doing so, it taps the 
respondent’s willingness to be vulnerable. In other words, it asks for a self-evaluation 
regarding the respondent’s degree of comfort in taking risks. Hence it is possible for a risk-
averse person to feel that people in general are trustworthy, but still be inclined to be careful 
in dealing with others. Thus, they conclude that how one answers the traditional question on 
trust will depend on two factors: an assessment of other people’s trustworthiness and an 
assessment of one’s willingness to take risk. This distinction has profound implications, 
because it could undermine a number of past studies. For example, studies that have used this 
question to suggest that social trust has recently declined in the United States may instead be 
witnessing an increase in caution (Miller and Mitamura, 2003).  
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The critics are justified since the traditional question of trust is too indefinite and not 
concrete. It should however be added that this question is also impersonal. This is due to the 
fact that the trustee is not specified and is not defined by the question, but rather created in the 
imagination of the trustor. This entails several consequences for the definition of trust which 
can be interesting for the analysis.  
First, the mechanism of trust formation, which presupposes that trust is based on how 
trustworthy a trustee is, is blocked here. It seems that trustworthiness is not a decisive factor 
in choosing the level of trust the respondent develops. The absence of a trustee or, to be more 
precise an unclear specification of the trustee and the object of trust in the relationship, does 
not allow for defining how trustworthy the trustee is at building upon a certain level of trust. 
The interaction between trustor and trustee does not really take place, but is rather imaginative 
for the trustor. The imaginative nature of trusting relations has its own consequences. Here, it 
is the general propensity to trust others which matters in defining the response to the trust 
question. More specifically, what becomes important here is the past experience of 
respondents in trusting relationships and their outcomes upon which the respondent forms his 
or her propensity to trust other people. If most promises were held for the trustor and the past 
trusting relations yielded positive outcome, the trustor tends to be more trusting and willing to 
positively and optimistically evaluate future deals involving trust. The actors thus learn that it 
can be rewarding if behave as-if-trusted even in unpromising situations. In the opposite case, 
when past experiences are limited to meeting dishonest people with trusting relations yielding 
more negative outcomes, the individual tends to show less trust in general. Past experience 
thus contributes to the routinization of the conduct of the respondent, which defines the future 
behavior with respect to whether or not to trust ‘other people’. 
Second, the traditional question on trust presupposes the prevalence of respondents’ 
characteristics over a trustee’s characteristics in the process of trust formation. Trust 
formation includes the choice of partner, which is based on his or her history and/or 
observable characteristics and is not completely spontaneous.  Rus (2005), for instance, 
asserts that the choice of trustee is not blind but highly informed. This can also be supported 
by the fact that numerous studies point out the role of reputation and past records of a 
potential trustee in trust building processes. In addition to that or in the absence of reputation 
or access to information about past records, we try to assess how trustworthy an individual is 
based on his or her observable characteristics. This mechanism is completely blocked in the 
impersonal process of trust formation that is imitated by the traditional question on trust. This 
happens because it becomes difficult to evaluate trustees in the circumstances in which they 
are referred to as ‘most people’. Here, the characteristics of the potential trustee are unknown 
and become insignificant since the trustee is not clearly defined. In such circumstances, 
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personal characteristics of the trustor which predefine the respondent’s potential to trust 
obtain a superficial role. The respondent trying to reply to a question about trust thus does not 
take into account how trustworthy others can be, but rather assesses his or her personal 
potential to trust others in general.   
Third, the traditional question on trust is surrounded with more uncertainty than 
trusting relations taking place in real life. The latter can be explained by the fact that in most 
circumstances, trusting relations are not spontaneous since the choice of partner is highly 
informed. Thus, trust is rather blind here since we do not know the potential people in whose 
hands we place trust. Uncertainty entails more risk and hence the decision to trust will depend 
on the extent to which the individual is willing to become vulnerable to the actions of others.  
It is possible to assume then that the level of desire to show vulnerability is a function of the 
general level of risk aversion which the respondent possesses. Highly risk averse people are 
afraid to enter trusting relations since they prefer to avoid risk wherever possible. They are 
therefore more likely to give negative answers to the trust question. People who can easily 
take on risk may be less afraid to be vulnerable to the actions of others and hence give 
positive answer to the trust question. Risk aversion thus places constrains for trust levels and 
defines the general attitude of an individual towards trusting relations.  
Fourth, the imaginative nature of trust blocks the cognitive process since it is not 
feasible to assess the possible outcomes of trusting relations and define whether the potential 
gain will outweigh potential losses. Neither the former nor the latter are clear in the trustor’s 
imagination and are not linked to concrete people and concrete situation. Thus trust building 
attributed to the cognitive process that occurs at the individual level stemming from the 
characteristics and behavior of trustees is not possible in the traditional question on trust. The 
concept of encapsulated interest fails here as well since it is difficult to predict whether the 
trustee will be able to maximize his own interest if he takes a trustor’s interests into account 
due to the fact that the trustee merely exists in the trustor’s imagination. The third element 
which is blocked here is the role of reputation. Reputation performs the role of signaling in 
trusting relations and cannot be involved in the analysis of trust in surveys since the trustee is 
not clearly identified.  
Fifth, a full understanding of interpersonal trust is not possible without understanding 
the systemic context in which such personal trust develops. The respondents evaluate his or 
her level of trust while taking into account how safe the environment in which the trustor 
operates is. In the countries, where the legal system’s range of laws and sanctioning 
mechanisms functions effectively, the trustor will be more prone to trust. This happens since 
the respondent realizes, that in the case the trustee does not act honestly, he will be punished 
by the state. The state is hence regarded as a protector that guards a trustor’s interests and 
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helps individuals respond to opportunistic behavior. The system of laws functions as a 
protecting element, which boosts the average level of trust in society. Therefore, in countries 
with an effective legal system, the respondents will be more willing to trust ‘other people,’ 
while countries where the interests of the trustor are less protected by the state will see 
respondents being more cautious and less trusting in general.    
Sixth, the individual level of trust depends on the average level of trust in society 
which can be viewed as a public good and as such it affects individual behavior. The norms 
and rules- the value system embodied in religious beliefs or political ideologies- form the 
necessary preconditions for a society to be less trusting or highly trusting. The reasoning 
applied here assumes that trustworthiness may be based on socially inculcated values, norms, 
and customs or identification or routinization of conduct in a relationship. In societies with a 
prevalence of trusting attitudes, people usually have positive expectations about others’ 
conduct and hence they respond positively to trust questions. In less trusting societies, people 
have mostly negative expectations about others and thus tend to give negative answers to the 
traditional trust question. 
The most proper definition reflected by the traditional question on trust can thus be 
defined as follows: trust is a willingness to act honestly towards other people routinized 
through the past experiences of a respondent and embedded within the constraints of his or 
her general propensity to trust as well as risk aversion, which are formed in specific formal 
and informal institutions prevailing in society. This definition reflects all six remarks drawn 
from the analysis of trust building processes that are imaginative in nature.  
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2.2. An Overview of theories of social trust formation  
 
One of the most controversial issues about social capital in general and social trust in 
particular is how it is formed. There are many theories that attempt to explain the mechanism 
of trust formation, ranging from those emphasizing ideological factors to those stressing 
country-level characteristics. In our opinion all theories can be classified into two types. The 
first type includes those theories relying on some individual-level characteristics and can 
hence be called ‘individual’. The second type consists of theories that emphasize the 
importance of country-level characteristics and can thus be named ‘societal theories’. The 
general logic of this typology as well as the subdivision of each type into specific theories are 
illustrated in figure 2.1. 
 
2.2.1. Network theories  
The most often mentioned determinants of social trust are civic engagement and 
socializing with friends which can be combined into a network society theory. Classical 
theory holds that social trust is produced by individual involvement in voluntary associations 
which generates the skills and habits associated with democratic culture and practice (Brehm 
and Rahn, 1997; Daniszewski, 2004; Etzioni, 1995; Newton, 1999a,b; Oyen, 2002; Putnam, 
1993, 2000; Paxton, 2002; Sell, 1999; Siisiainen, 1999; Stolle and Rochon, 1999). The 
argument asserts that by participating in regular and close contact with others individual 
develop reciprocity, cooperation, empathy for others, an understanding of the common 
interest and common good and, as a result, trust. The most important form of participation 
from this point of view is direct, face to face and sustained involvement in voluntary 
organizations in the local community. This model is supported by many empirical findings. 
Scholars usually find that members of associations are more politically active, more informed 
about politics, more sanguine about their ability to affect political life, and more supportive of 
democratic norms. It should be noticed that the role of civic engagement in generating trust 
concerns not only interpersonal but also institutional trust. The main argument for this theory 
rests on the assumption that civic engagement connects people to each other and to the 
political process (Espinal et al., 2006).  
On the other hand, there are some studies that find little relationship between civic 
engagement and political attitudes (Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Newton, 2001; Newton and 
Norris, 2000). The main argument supporting the absence of relationship between two 
variables of interest is that civic participation is likely to expose the disjuncture between the 
democratic ideal and reality, particularly when these organizations are critical for a 
government perceived as corrupt or illegitimate.  
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There are also studies that argue that the causal link in the relationship between 
volunteering and social trust is backward and hence generalized trust is actually a cause rather 
than an effect of civic engagement (Kwak, Shah and Holbert, 2004; Kumlin and Rothstein, 
2007; Newton, 2001; Uslaner, 2000-2001).  
In addition to the problem of the effects of volunteering on social trust, there are some 
studies which shed doubt on the idea that volunteering may affect social trust levels. For 
instance, Kumlin and Rothstein (2007) assert that many voluntary organizations and networks 
are in fact based on the idea of distrust rather than trust. Uslaner (2004) also provides 
arguments contesting the importance of volunteering for social capital. He asserts that even if 
social trust is learned from various forms of civic engagement, there are two key obstacles to 
doing so. First, most people spend little time in any voluntary organization, at best a few 
hours a week. In his opinion, this suffices to make people more (or less) trusting of their 
fellow citizens. Second, we are simply unlikely to meet people who are different from 
ourselves in our civic life. Such membership is hence likely to enhance particularized trust at 
the expense of out-group trust.   
Thus, the literature is quite controversial about the relationship between social trust 
and volunteering. The data is however ambiguous about this relationship as well. With respect 
to interpersonal trust, we found that those who are engaged in voluntary activities usually 
show more trust towards others. More specifically, interpersonal trust among volunteers 
equals to 0.483, while among those who do not participate in voluntary associations, the trust 
index amounts to 0.37. With respect to institutional trust, we see no difference between two 
groups of people; both of them display confidence towards public welfare institutions which 
can be assessed at a level of 14.  
Despite the fact that the literature puts considerable emphasis on the role of 
volunteering in creating social capital, we did not receive much evidence to support this 
hypothesis. Only 0.8% of total variance in institutional trust is explained by membership in 
voluntary organizations. For interpersonal trust, only 1.6% of the total variance is explained 
by volunteering.   
Network supporters also argue that what matters in trust building is the network of 
everyday life: informal relations with friends and family and participation in social relations 
at the workplace. Socializing often appears in the literature as a standard control variable in 
trust equations (Paxton, 1999; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2006). More sociable people are usually 
perceived as more trusting. Li, Pickles and Savage (2005) for instance elaborate on this 
question in more detail. Their empirical analysis based on British Household Panel Survey 
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 The calculations here and further are conducted based on the World Values Survey.  
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suggests that informal networks, especially those that arise from neighborhood attachment, is 
of particular importance in generating social trust whereas that from civic participation is 
relatively unimportant. Moreover, they emphasize that informal neighborhood relations plays 
a crucial role in generating trust for people in disadvantageous positions while those in more 
advantageous positions are more likely to have social capital from social networks and civic 
engagement.   
Our descriptive analysis however provides limited evidence supporting the idea of the 
importance of socializing for social trust. Based on the WVS calculations more sociable 
people display equally as much trust as less sociable people. For both groups, the average 
interpersonal trust levels were found to be 0.41 while institutional trust was found to slightly 
exceed 14.  
These results suggest that in modern societies sociability can hardly be considered a 
determinant of social capital. This is confirmed by the small explanatory power of socializing 
as a covariate of social trust. Only about 0.1 percent of total variance in social trust is 
explained by variation in the level of socializing. Delhey and Newton (2002, 2005) to some 
extent provide the explanation for this phenomenon. Their analysis suggests that the informal 
network plays a more crucial role in post-Soviet countries than in Western democracies.  
Thus, network theories emphasize on the one hand the importance of participation in 
voluntary associations and organization and they stress the focus on the role of informal 
socializing in trust generating process on the other. However, none of these theories are 
decisive in creating social trust since their effects are quite small if judged by the explanatory 
power of these two variables. But one should note that these two variables are considered 
standard controls in trust equations. It hence becomes necessary to include them in the final 
equation if we want to find out the direct effects of social efforts on social trust. 
 
2.2.2. Socio-psychological theories  
According to a well-developed social-psychological school of thought in the United 
States in the 1950s and 1960s, social trust is considered a core personality trait of individuals 
(Allport, 1961; Cattell, 1965; Erikson, 1950; Rosenberg, 1956, 1957; Rotenberg, 2007; 
Runkel, 1959) that is dependant on the quality of the maternal relationship. Mothers create a 
sense of trust in their children; it is learned in early childhood, and tends to persist in later life, 
changing only slowly as a result of later experiences. Rotenberg (2007), for instance, 
demonstrates in his empirical analysis that, during the elementary school years, mothers shape 
their children’s trust beliefs whereas fathers shape their children’s trusting behavior. Parents 
who fulfil promises to their children constitute reliable nurturing activities. Mental 
representations of parent-infant trustworthy interactions are the building blocks of a child’s 
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trust beliefs in parents and others. In other words, reliable nurturing parents promote trusting 
relationships between themselves and their children and serve as role models for children’s 
relationships with others. Moreover, Rotenberg emphasizes that mothers serve as the primary 
attachment figure because they play a more significant role in the socialization of their 
children’s trust during childhood than fathers do.  In general, however, he finds that parents’ 
trusting behavior is correlated with children’s trusting behavior. However, this factor cannot 
be operationalized based on the WVS and hence inclusion of this variable in the equation is 
not possible.  
 Another model of social capital formation rooted in individual morality was suggested 
by Freitag (2003) and Uslaner (2002a,b). Their major criticism of the models of trust 
formation is that it has little to say about the role of morality in the creation of social capital. 
Recent research has suggested that empirical evidence from anthropology and psychology 
supports the proposition that human beings have a universal ‘moral sense’ that pervades their 
thinking and conditions their attitudes towards other people. The traditional hypothesis is that 
individuals with a strong moral sense which promotes empathy with others and a desire for 
fairness are likely to be predisposed to trust other people in comparison with individuals who 
lack such a moral sense. Due to the lack of empirical data which could operationalize the level 
of an individual’s morality, we omit this theory from consideration. But still one should keep 
in mind that social trust is a complex phenomenon which is also affected by socio-
psychological factors.   
An additional socio-psychological factor which is considered as critical in trust 
creation is the level of optimism, or our outlook on the world. This approach was elaborated 
in depth by Uslaner (2002a,b). He concludes that people who are optimistic believe that 
others can be trusted. They believe that things will get better and that they can make the world 
better by their own actions (Uslaner, 2002a,b). Optimism in Uslaner’s view is a multifaceted 
phenomenon. It contains four components. The first two are central: the view that the future 
will be better than the past and the belief that we can control our environment to make it 
better. The other elements of optimism are a sense of personal well-being and a supportive 
community. His empirical analysis shows that measures of optimism and control overwhelm 
most other predictors in the model. In addition, overall subjective measures of optimism 
matter a lot more than objective measures about economic circumstances. The absence of the 
question about the level of optimism in the WVS does not allow us to measure the effects of 
optimism on interpersonal and institutional trust.  
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2.2.3. Life experience theories  
Alternative models suggest that one’s experience may substantially influence trust 
levels. Among the social trust determinants, life satisfaction is mentioned as one of utmost 
importance. Individuals who are generally happy and satisfied with their lives are more likely 
to trust other people than individuals who are unhappy or dissatisfied (Orren, 1997; Newton, 
1999a; Uslaner, 2002a,b; Whiteley, 1999). There are many explanations that support the 
effects of life satisfaction on trust levels. Delhey and Newton (2005) find that surveys suggest 
that social trust tends to be expressed by the “winners” in society as measured in terms of 
money, status, and high levels of job and life satisfaction and subjective happiness. They refer 
to Putnam’s research which concludes that ‘have-nots’ are less trusting than ‘haves,’ probably 
because haves are treated by others with more honesty and respect. In contrast, distrust is 
more common among “losers” – those with a poor education, low income and low status, who 
express dissatisfaction with their life. Distrust also tends to be expressed by victims of crime 
and violence as well as the divorced.  
According to this view, it is possible to conclude that social trust is the product of 
adult life experience. Those who have been treated kindly and generously throughout their 
lives are more likely to trust others than those who have suffered from poverty, 
unemployment, discrimination, exploitation and social exclusion. This sort of interpretation is 
consistent with the findings of Hall (1999) and Van Oorschot and Arts (2005) who provide 
evidence that being unemployed may be negatively related to social capital in general, or 
social trust in particular. Hall (1999) explains this relationship by pointing to the fact that 
unemployment places individuals at a disadvantage that erodes social trust relative to others. 
An alternative explanation was provided by Christoforou (2005), who assumes that 
unemployed people may develop distrust towards other social groups and society as a whole 
because they are considered to have deprived him or her of opportunities for employment and 
self-development.  
When analyzing the variation of trust across satisfaction levels, one finds strong 
support that more satisfied people tend to be more trusting towards other individuals and 
institutions. Interpersonal trust levels among less satisfied people was calculated at a level of 
only 0.27 while more satisfied people tend to possess trust levels that exceed 0.43. 
Institutional trust for the former was found to be 14. 4 and for the latter 15.6. Moreover, 
satisfaction with life appeared to explain 3.3 percent of the total variance in social trust and 
hence can be considered a strong predictor of social trust levels. Despite the strong 
explanatory power, this variable seems to have no spurious or indirect effects on institutional 
and interpersonal trust.  Hence, the inclusion of this variable in the equation will not 
contribute to better understanding the relationship between social trust and social spending. 
 51 
Moreover, satisfaction levels must correlate with income, and controlling for both of them 
may result in the problem of multi-colinearity. 
As far as unemployment is concerned, the data generally follows the path of 
theoretical argumentation. The level of trust among unemployed people calculated on the 
basis of the WVS is less than  half of that for the rest of the population. More specifically, 
interpersonal trust for unemployed people was found to equal 0.29 while for others this index 
was obtained at the level of 0.41. Institutional trust indexes equal 14 and 15 respectively. It is 
hence necessary to control for the unemployment status of the respondent since employment 
status seems to have a strong effect on trust levels among individuals. Moreover, 
unemployment is a subject of direct intervention by the state in the form of social policies and 
hence it should be controlled for when studying the relationship between social spending and 
social trust.   
Knack and Keefer (1997), Putnam (2000), and Uslaner (2002a,b) also see an 
association between household income and trust at the individual level pointing out that 
people from better-off households have generally higher indicators on social trust. The 
general logic is that the poor are less trusting since they cannot afford to lose what little they 
have while insecurity and anxiety are the most powerful forces driving distrust4. Empirical 
analysis also shows that higher levels of income coincide with a strong probability of higher 
interpersonal trust from the part of the individual. This may lead to the idea that not all 
individuals may enjoy access to the stock of social capital available in society; low income 
may lead to social exclusion which hinders trust formation. Higher poverty rates appear to 
weaken an individual’s incentive to act collectively and cooperate.  Christoforou (2004) 
explains that this happens not only because of absolute poverty, with its adverse effects on the 
physical ability of individuals to respond  to their role as social actors in groups, but also 
because of relative poverty, which create sentiments of discrimination and injustice, thus 
leading to distrust towards people, collective action and society as a whole.  
Our descriptive analysis generally supports the idea of income being a predictor of 
social trust. There is a considerable variation of interpersonal trust levels across income 
quintiles. Those belonging to the first quintile usually possess interpersonal trust equal to 0.33 
which increases to 0.56 for the people in the last quintile. As far as institutional trust is 
concerned, we find no variation across income groups while institutional trust was estimated 
at the level of 14 for all levels of income. The explanatory power of the income variable in the 
                                                 
4
 There is however research indicating that the causal relationship between trust and income is reversed, that is, 
the level of trust defines the level of an individual’s income (see for instance Slemrod and Katuscak, 2005). 
Their results suggest that trust  is associated with higher  income. According to their empirical analysis, trusting 
as opposed to not trusting increases one’s income by 7.59 percent. However, in their check of the reverse 
causation they recognize the possible endogeneity problem in their analysis and hence do not exclude the 
possibility that income can be a determinant of trust levels among individuals.  
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case of institutional trust is however small - about one percent. In the case of interpersonal 
trust, controlling for income helps to explain about 3.3 percent of variance. Income might also 
be partially related to welfare state development. It can be regarded as a micro-level outcome 
of the macrolevel state activity as social policy. This is because the main objective of social 
policy is to provide alternative sources of income for those who are out of the labor market.  It 
hence becomes indispensable to control for income when studying the relationship between 
social policy and social trust.  
Fukuyama (2000), Helliwell and Putnam (1999), Knack and Keefer (1997), and Knack 
and Zak (2001) regard education as a positive factor leading to an increase in social capital:  
more educated people have higher levels of social trust. Helliwell and Putnam (1999), for 
instance, estimate that college graduates are over 35 percent more likely to answer yes to the 
trust question than high school dropouts. Their regression analysis shows that trust is indeed 
higher in states where there are fewer high school dropouts. On the other hand, education is 
viewed as a factor that develops opportunities for collective action, either through offering 
access to social networks and personal acquaintances or through cultivating values and morals  
that lead to a sense of citizenship and solidarity. In some cases, education is interpreted as a 
means for attaining social status, which complements human capital in generating higher 
income. Education is thus seen as a means for moral development and social awareness which, 
in a society of widespread cooperation, produces benefits in the form of higher income as a 
medium-run by-product, rather than as an end in itself.  
The WVS data in general support the idea that education is a predictor of social trust. 
There is obvious variation of interpersonal trust levels across different education groups. 
According to the WVS, less-educated people possess average interpersonal trust levels equal 
to 0.31. This level increases to 0.41 for moderately-educated people and to the level of 0.57 
for highly-educated people. Institutional trust however does not vary across educational 
groups. The role of education in explaining variation in institutional trust is quite small since 
only 0.2 percent of total variation can be explained by this variable. This percentage goes up 
to 5.4 percent when studying the effects of education on variations in interpersonal trust. 
Moreover, education is closely related to social policy since it is organized by the state in 
most countries. Moreover, active labour market policy includes re-education measures among 
unemployed people. This makes necessary to control for the respondents’ educational level 
when analyzing the relationship between social policy and social trust.  
 
2.2.4. Ideological theories  
Ideological differences are recognized as influencing trust levels. Inglehart (1999) and 
La Porta et al. (1997) point to the significance of religious traditions in their analysis of the 
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WVS data. La Porta et al. (1997) suggest that hierarchical religions such as Catholicism and 
Islam are associated with low levels of trust, while Inglehart (1999) found that Protestant and 
Confucian societies are generally more trusting. Branas-Garza et al. (2006) however found 
that Catholicism reinforces both horizontal and vertical trust more than other religions. 
Moreover, Catholic affiliation reinforces the link between religiosity and social capital. 
Uslaner (2000) demonstrates that protestant societies are more trusting due to their 
individualistic nature while Muslims tend to trust less because of their more collectivistic 
culture. Bjornskov (2005), like Uslaner, argues that Protestants are more trusting than other 
religions. He distinguishes between two possible explanations. One stresses that Protestantism 
is not a hierarchical religion. The second emphasizes that in Protestantism, the responsibility 
of ones actions is individualized so that actions that are considered morally wrong will 
somehow be penalized in the afterlife.5 On the other hand, Catholics believe it to be possible 
to be absolved of one’s sins by the church. The practice of absolution thus releases the 
subjects of the Pope of individual responsibility for their worst deeds, which could lead 
people to be more wary of trusting their fellow citizens. Another joint problem for 
hierarchical religions may be the potential tendency for individuals to place part of the 
responsibility for their actions on a supreme power, leaving this God-given uncertainty to 
naturally lead to lower degrees of trust in fellow citizens. Another possible effect of 
hierarchies is that people come to live according to strict rules. They may therefore fail to 
develop trust because following rules does not induce any social learning about what people 
would do in the absence of any enforced formal rules.  
The WVS data provides evidence that generally supports the above given 
argumentation. Protestants are found to be most trusting with an average interpersonal trust 
score of 0.50. Catholics appeared to be least trusting since their trust index is only 0.33, 
considerably smaller than that of Protestants. Other religions and atheists seem to differ little 
in their trust levels. Both groups had interpersonal trust score estimated at 0.41. It should also 
be noted that religion must conduct a certain influence on the relationship between social trust 
and social policy since inclusion of religion in the model considerably changes the sign on 
social spending. It is however difficult to explain the direct or indirect effects of religion on 
the relationship between social trust and social spending. But one thing is sure here: religion 
should be included in the model.  
Apart from one’s specific religion, social trust is influenced by the religiousness of an 
individual (Branas-Garza et al, 2006; Van Oorschot and Arts, 2005). More religious people 
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 However, in his further analysis, he comes to the conclusion that the positive effects of Protestantism are most 
likely due to positive effects specific to the Nordic countries that potentially might be traced back to particular 
Viking norms.  
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are found to be associated with higher levels of social capital of all forms. On the one hand, 
faith in people and faith in a Supreme Being both promote civic engagement. People with 
more faith participate more often in civic affairs – especially in more demanding activities 
such as volunteering. On the other hand, faith leads people to put less emphasis on 
materialistic values and more on helping others. Whiteley (1999) also suggests that religious 
beliefs should generally create an ethos which is trusting, altruistic, and favourably inclined 
towards cooperation with other people.  
The empirical data give little support to this argument since we obtained results based 
on the WVS which advocate for the absence of any difference in social trust between more 
and less religious people. Both groups have  interpersonal trust scores that were estimated at 
the level of 0.41 while institutional trust was found to equal 14. Although they seem to differ 
little in trust levels, we find strong spurious effects of religiosity on the relationship between 
social spending and social trust. Inclusion of the religiosity variable in the equation drastically 
changes the coefficient on social spending. The latter can be perceived as the necessity to 
control for religiosity if one wants to obtain the direct effect of social spending on social trust. 
Moreover, religiosity was found to explain slightly more than one percent of total variation in 
social trust, which is an additional argument for including religiosity in the model.   
The control for ideology reflects the fact that basic ideological beliefs may well 
influence an individual’s willingness to trust other people. Whiteley (1999) asserts that 
ideologies from the left, which emphasize cooperation, solidarity, and fraternity, are more 
likely to result in an ethos of trust in other people than ideologies of the right, which stress 
individualism, competition, and a social Darwinism struggle for survival. Another explanation 
that supports this view is provided by Triandis (1995 in Simpson, 2006), who suggests that, 
given a tension between individual and collective interests, actors in collectivist societies tend 
to give greater priority to group goals leading to higher levels of trust among individuals. Van 
Oorschot and Arts (2005) also insist on the significance of political effects on the different 
elements of social capital, in particular on interpersonal trust. Their empirical research shows 
as well that left-leaning people tend to have more trust in other people than right-leaning 
people.   
However, when looking at the aggregated level of collectivist traditions, the research 
finds that collectivist societies are usually less trusting than individualist societies (Simpson, 
2006; Yamagishi et al., 1998). In spite of wide argumentation about the effects of political 
stance on social trust, we see little variation in trust levels across left-leaning and right-
leaning groups. Both possess interpersonal trust just that slightly exceeds 0.4 and institutional 
trust of about 14 unites. Moreover, the explanatory power of political stance is too small 
(about 0.2 percent) to be included in the final equation. Besides that, political stance causes no 
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spurious effect on the relationship between social spending and social trust, which again is a 
good reason to omit this variable from the analysis.  
 
2.2.5. Socio-demographic theories  
There is also a group of socio-demographic characteristics which can also influence an 
individual’s level of trust. Age is an important social background variable in the context of the 
study of basic values like trust. On the one hand, Inglehart’s analysis of post modern values is 
rooted in the idea that basic values are developed by individuals during their pre-adult years. 
Based on this approach, Whiteley (1999) asserts that different age cohorts will have different 
levels of social trust because of differences in the political and economic environment which 
existed in society during their formative years. The precise relationship between social trust 
and pre-adult experience however remains to a great extent unclear. On the other hand, there 
are empirical studies which show that older people tend to have higher trust indicators than 
younger people (Hall, 1999). Moreover, Espinal et al. (2006) found that the relationship 
between age and trust is nonlinear. More specifically, it follows the exponential mode, 
meaning that there is a square positive term which points out that as age increases, its positive 
impact on trust increases exponentially such that older people are much more trusting than 
younger people. There are also studies that indicate the absence of any kind of age or cohort 
effects on trust formation (Torcal and Montero, 1999). 
Empirical calculations based on the WVS do not support these expectations. People 
aged 30-44 were found to have the highest level of both interpersonal and institutional trust. 
The level of the former was estimated at 0.44 while the latter at 14.8. Younger people have a 
slightly lower level of both forms of trust which equal 0.39 and 14.7 respectively. Older 
people surprisingly possess almost the same trust levels as younger people. Their 
interpersonal trust level was found to equal 0.41 and institutional trust 14.4. Since age is a 
standard control variable in all studies, we opt for including this variable in the final equation.  
   Gender effects are not clearly defined in the literature with respect to social trust but 
are still mentioned among its determinants. Some scholars (see for instance Lin, 2000a,b; Lin 
et al., 1981; Lowndes, 2000; Moore, 1990) claim that women in general have less social 
capital than men. The standard argument is that gender discrimination makes women less 
socially successful and satisfied with their life than men or that women with dependent 
children are inclined to be cautious and distrustful in protecting their off-spring. The WVS 
data do not support the idea of a gender gap in social trust. The institutional trust for both 
males and females was found at the level of 14.6. There is a slight difference between men 
and women with regard to interpersonal trust, but it is not big enough to claim the existence of 
a substantial gender gap. The level of interpersonal trust among women was estimated to 
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equal 0.40 while for men 0.42. In spite of a lack of a considerable gender effect on social trust, 
we will control for these variables in our analysis.  
 
2.2. 6. Societal theories  
Societal theories are based on the idea that country-level characteristics may 
predispose the level of social trust. Such characteristics include income inequality level, 
wealth of the country, corruption level, percentage of Protestants living in the country and 
fractionalization level.   
Kawachi et al. (1997), Knack and Keefer (1997), Putnam (1993) and Uslaner (2000) 
suggest that among other factors, income inequality essentially determines the level of trust in 
a country. Countries with higher degrees of inequality are usually associated with lower trust 
indicators. This can be explained by the fact that people are more likely to be trusting when 
they feel common bonds with each other, which usually only exists in homogeneous societies. 
Income inequality makes people on the lower end of the income spectrum feel at a 
disadvantage  compared to upper classes, which ruins bonds among the population. Citizens 
who see their fellow citizens as equals and as ‘one of their own’ can more easily make a leap 
of faith and trust others they do not necessarily know.  
Uslaner (2002a, b) demonstrates that the level of economic equality is the strongest 
determinant of trust. He explains that equality promotes trust in two ways. First, a more 
equitable distribution of income makes people with fewer resources more optimistic that they 
too can share in society’s bounty. Indeed, optimism is the basis of trust. Second, a more 
equitable distribution of income creates stronger bonds between different groups in society. 
When some people have far more than others, neither those at the top, nor those at the bottom 
are likely to consider others as part of their moral community. They do not perceive the 
shared fate with others in the society and are hence less likely to trust people who may be 
different from themselves. Generalized trust, he continues, does not depend on your personal 
experience, including how well-off you are. But collective experience – including, but not 
limited to, the distribution of resources in society, plays a crucial role in shaping trust. 
Following this line of thought, he concludes that we are unlikely to reverse the decline in 
generalized trust until people feel better about the future. And they are unlikely to feel better 
about the future until we reverse the trend in economic inequality.  
There is also micro-level explanation of the impact inequality may have on social trust 
levels. Boix and Posner (2005) argue that the degree of social and political inequality is one 
of the main factors that affects social cooperation and hence explains variation in social 
capital stocks across countries. They assert that cooperation among economic non-quals is 
problematic because there will always be incentives for the poor, who will naturally be 
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dissatisfied with the existing distribution of assets, to defect from cooperative arrangements 
that perpetuate the status quo. Moreover, to maintain their economic and political privileges, 
the rich will maneuver to undermine any collective effort that the poor may undertake to 
better their lot. Boix and Posner (2005) went even further in their argument about the role of 
inequality for cooperation. The implication of their discussion consists in the fact that whether 
or not cooperation takes root will depend on the preexisting set of social and political 
relations in a community and on the degree of inequality and polarization suffered by society. 
They illustrate this by analyzing the case of Italy. They write that in the North, where there is, 
roughly speaking, more equality, cooperation proved relatively easy to sustain. The wide 
inequalities which characterize social life in the South, however, fuels resentments which 
prevent co-operative practices from crystallizing.  
Bjornskov (2005) provides an alternative explanation for the effects of inequality that 
mainly emphasizes the role of perceptions. He argues that the effects of income inequality are 
also due to perceived injustices arising from perceptions of why some people are rich and 
others are not. ‘Haves’ might in particular be seen as having exploited those who ‘have not’, 
which will tend to reinforce stereotypes of other groups in society and thereby perpetuate 
mistrust between those groups. As such, he concludes, the effects of inequality might be due 
both to the actual fractionalization as well as individual perceptions of fractionalization.  
The vital question here is whether one should control for inequality when analyzing 
the effects of social policies on social trust. The welfare state can be understood as an 
instrument that reduces various forms of economic inequality and its effects, which contain to 
a large extent the effects of social policy on social trust. This can be also supported by a high 
correlation between inequality and social spending. This correlation is negative pointing out 
that increase in social spending tends to reduce income inequality while the absolute value of 
the correlation coefficient slightly exceeds 0.770. We also see a substantial correlation 
between income inequality and social trust in both of its forms. More specifically, the 
correlation coefficient between interpersonal trust and income inequality at the aggregated 
level equals -0.608. The correlation between institutional trust and income inequality is 
estimated at -0.683. Both correlation coefficients are statistically significant and negative 
which confirms the theory that high income inequality tends to ruin social trust.  
Knack and Keefer (1997), Inglehart (1999), and Paxton (2002) find that a country’s 
wealth is positively related to social trust and is even more effective at the national than the 
individual level. This impact is explained either directly by the fact that wealthier countries 
promote taking the risks that trust involves, or indirectly by educating people better, which is 
associated with liberal and trusty attitudes.  
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There is however a certain controversy about the direction of influence between a 
country’s wealth and trust levels. Knack and Keefer (1997 in Slemrod and Katuscak, 2005) 
test the impact of trust attitudes on a country’s wealth as measured by growth in 29 European 
countries. They find that social capital variables exhibit a strong and significant positive 
relationship to economic growth. Moreover, they found that trust is more correlated with per 
capita income in later years than with income in earlier years, suggesting that the causality 
runs from trust to growth more so than vice versa. But since there is no longitudinal study, 
which would directly analyze the direction of causality between trust and a country’s wealth, 
we use the traditional assumption that it is wealth which affects trust levels but not vice versa.  
We see a strong correlation between social trust and GDP per capita at an aggregated 
level. More specifically, the correlation coefficient between a country’s wealth and 
interpersonal trust equals 0.323 which points to the fact that wealthier countries usually have 
associated with more trusting populations. The correlation between institutional trust and 
GDP per capita is found to be much stronger at 0.687. This allows one to conclude that the 
overall performance of the economy measured through GDP per capita is associated with the 
trusting attitudes of the individuals towards public institutions.  
Few studies point out that institutional factors (democracy, corruption and quality of 
governance) may also influence social trust indicators (Booth and Richard, 2001; Inglehart, 
1999; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Newton, 1999a,b; Paxton, 2002). Since there is a certain 
controversy with regard to the direction of the causal relationship between these factors and 
trust (Uslaner, 2000; Knack, 2002), it is tricky to include them in the equation. However, our 
logic suggests that corruption levels matter in building social trust, especially in countries 
with new democracies. La Porta et al. (1999) and Putnam (1993) show that nations with more 
trusting citizens have more efficient and less corrupt governments by assuming the direction 
of influence from corruption to trust. In agreement with them is Espinal et al. (2006) who 
argues that corruption presents a serious obstacle to long-term democratic stability and 
consolidation, undermining representation and the functioning of democratic institutions and 
thereby producing distrust.  Uslaner (2000) agrees that corruption is strongly correlated with 
generalized trust but he asserts that corruption does not lead to trust – though lack of trust can 
give birth to civic knavery.  But we will argue that in corrupt societies where entitlements to 
social benefits can be easily arranged by bribing civic servants, the trust in such welfare 
institutions and even generalized trust is oftentimes also affected. The transparency, fairness 
and credibility of decisions concerning an individual’s access to social benefits are largely  
determined by the level of corruption.  Messages about welfare fraud send signals to the rest 
of society about the behavior of others. Furthermore, a corrupt legal system invites the use of 
bribes or other methods of corruption from the side of the citizens. As a result, it makes no 
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sense to trust ‘most people’ if they are generally known to cheat, bribe, or generally corrupt 
the impartibility of government institutions in order to extract special favors. One reason for 
‘most other people’ to be trusted is that they are generally known to refrain from such forms 
of behavior (Rothstein and Stolle, 2001). In corrupt systems, which are known to tolerate 
bribes and which do not adhere to the norms of impartiality, generalized trust cannot thrive.  
This theoretical elaboration is widely supported by the data. The correlation between 
corruption levels and social trust is found to be high, and especially for institutional trust. 
More specifically, the correlation coefficient between interpersonal trust and corruption 
indexes is estimated at 0.688, which generally means that more trusting people can be found 
in less corrupt societies. The same direction of the effect is obtained for institutional trust with 
a stronger magnitude of influence at 0.747. Institutional trust is thus highly determined by the 
degree of credibility and fairness of these institutions.  
Another country level characteristic affecting trust is the degree of racial 
fragmentation in society. The impact of racial fragmentation on trust stems from the argument 
that more fragmented societies tend to express less trust. As Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) 
emphasize, this can be explained by two reasons. One is that people distrust those who are 
dissimilar from themselves; in more heterogeneous communities trust is lower because 
interracial contacts are less frequent. This is what they call the ‘aversion to heterogeneity’ 
explanation. A second interpretation has to do with complementaries in individuals’ 
willingness to trust. If an individual is surrounded by non-trusting people, he or she may be 
less inclined to trust others, and vice versa. And since the percentage of minorities is higher in 
more racially mixed communities, the average level of trust is lower, and hence everybody 
trusts less as an equilibrium response to a low trust environment. They refer to this second 
interpretation as the ‘local interaction’ one. Their analysis of interpersonal trust shows the 
negative relationship with racial fragmentation in society. However, an analysis of trust 
towards different institutions provides results that suggest that it is not affected by the level of 
racial fragmentation.  This provides ground for believing that racial fragmentation affects how 
much people trust other individuals but does not influence the overall level of trust.  
The descriptive analysis generally confirms this theoretical argumentation. The 
correlation between social trust indexes and fractionalization measurements is found to be 
negative, which means that social trust tends to be lower in more fragmented societies. 
Moreover, the absolute value of the correlation coefficients is larger for interpersonal trust 
than for institutional trust which again confirms the idea that fractionalization is a determinant 
of interpersonal trust rather than institutional trust. The estimated value of the correlation 
coefficients is found at 0.242 for institutional trust and -0.325 for interpersonal trust.  
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Some studies show that the percentage of Protestants living in a country can determine 
trust levels. Most assert that countries with a large share of Protestants are more trusting, 
although different explanations have been proposed. One of the explanations is that 
Protestantism is a non-hierarchical religion as opposed to Catholicism and Islam. In 
Protestantism, responsibility for one’s action rests with the individual such that actions that 
are morally wrong will somehow be penalized in the afterlife. On the other hand, in 
Catholicism it is possible to absolve one’s sins by the church.  Our data generally confirm this 
theory. The correlation between social trust and percentage of Protestants is positive, which 
suggests that in Protestant societies, the overall level of trust is higher than in non -Protestant 
societies. Moreover, this relationship is stronger for interpersonal trust rather than for 
institutional trust since the correlation coefficient is much higher for the former (0.697) than 
for the latter (0.431).  
The analysis of trust determinants provided above allow us to choose control variables 
that can be included in the final equation which will serve as the basis for studying the 
relationship between different measures of welfare state development and social trust levels. It 
should also be emphasized that the scope of our study does not allow us to include all the 
determinates found in the literature in the final equation. We will instead control for those 
determinants that may cause spurious or indirect effects in the relationship between social 
trust and measures of welfare state development. The variable is recognized as causing 
spurious or indirect effects if the coefficient or the significance level on the variable of 
welfare state development changes after the inclusion of this control variable in the model. It 
should be noted that for some of the control variables it is difficult to theoretically explain 
why they may cause spurious effects and what their nature is.  
The overview of theories about social trust formation allows us to describe the general 
logic and mechanism of trust building. The results point out that trust formation is subject to 
simultaneous influence by a large number of factors reflecting both individual-level as well as 
society-level characteristics. The distinction between the different theories can provide the 
basis for understanding the ways in which welfare states may intervene in the process of 
social trust formation.  
 
2.3. Overview and concluding remarks  
The main objective of the second chapter was to analyze the concept of social trust 
and the mechanisms of its formation. Systematization of the recent literature on the notion of 
trust is provided and is accompanied by a discussion of their drawbacks. The discussion 
concludes with a proposition to use a new classification for the literature on the meaning of 
trust which is derived based on four mechanisms: rational choice, psychological, institutional, 
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and reflexive. The rational choice mechanism presupposes the prevalence of reason in trust 
formation processes that is based on an assessment of others’ trustworthiness. The 
psychological mechanism relies on emotions and reflexes and can be considered affective 
since trust is formed based on a positive effect for the object of trust. The institutional 
mechanism stresses the role of formal and informal institutions that are developed within the 
constraints of a dominant cultural ideology and history. Finally, the reflexive mechanism is 
regarded as a leap of faith resulting from interaction and suspension and is based on the 
positive perception of a trustee’s trustworthiness in the future. 
Next, the overview of the theories on social trust formation are provided and are 
grouped into two types: ‘individual’ and ‘societal’ theories. Individual theories embrace the 
network, socio-psychological, life experience, ideological and socio-demographic theories. 
Under societal theories, the following mechanisms of trust formation are specified: income 
inequality, country wealth, fractionalization, institutional, and Protestant theories.  
It thus becomes obvious that social trust is a complex and multidimensional concept 
that is based on multiple mechanisms of formation. The need to know the mechanisms of 
social trust formation can be explained by the fact that it will allow us to better understand the 
patterns of a state’s influence on social trust that goes through many direct and indirect 
mechanisms. On the other hand, an overview of trust determinants allows us to select the 
most influential ones to control for their indirect and spurious effects when analyzing the 
direct effect of different measures of welfare state development on social trust indexes. The 
next step consists in studying the theoretical and empirical research on the relationship 
between the welfare state and social trust.   
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Chapter 3. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE IMPACT 
OF WELFARE STATES ON SOCIAL TRUST 
 
There is a clear lack of agreement among scholars about how the quality of 
relationships between citizens and the government affects social capital in general and social 
trust in particular. On the one hand, the welfare state variable can be included in the ‘societal 
theory’ which assumes that country-level characteristics, in this case welfare state 
development can be considered a determinant of social capital levels. There are a number of 
theories that explain why the welfare state may affect institutional or interpersonal trust that 
will be presented later. On the other hand, the theories elaborating on the relationship in 
question also take into account the indirect effects of social policies on social trust which arise 
from welfare state intervention. Both can be systemized in the following way.  
 
 
Table 3.1. : Classification of theories of welfare state effects on social trust6 
 
Theories Assumptions upon 
which the theory is 
based 
Mechanism of 
influence 
Final 
outcome  
‘Civil society 
erosion   
argument’  
 
Social trust is 
dependent on the level 
of development of 
civil society 
 
The welfare state 
discourage civic 
engagement 
Crowding-out  
Moral destruction 
argument  
 
The ability of the 
individual to 
cooperate is based on 
habit and practice 
 
The welfare state 
destroys people’s ability 
to work with one 
another and erodes the 
individual’s sense of 
responsibility 
 
Crowding-out  
                                                 
6
 In total, the vast majority of studies conducted so far are developed around the question of the sign of 
the influence the welfare state development causes on social capital formation. Researchers (advocating for 
either positive or negative relationship between welfare state activities and social capital) base their arguments 
on the assumption that the causal mechanism goes from the state to trust. Recently, this assumption has been 
contested. Uslaner (2000) for instance asserts that the direction of causality is reversed and it is hence not 
welfare state development that determines trust, trust that determines the amount of GDP the state spends on 
social programs. According to him, trusting nations spend more of their total income on governmental programs 
in general and on education in particular. They also have a larger share of their total population employed by the 
government. A similar logic is used by Soroka (2003). To check this assumption however, one needs 
longitudinal data that goes back to the initial formation of the welfare state. Such data are not available which 
makes it difficult to define the direction of causality between the welfare state and social trust. For the purpose of 
our analysis, we rely on the traditional assumption that causality goes from the welfare state to social trust and 
not the other way around.  
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Integration  
argument  
 
The welfare state 
helps to integrate the 
individual into  
society when he or 
she has difficulties 
 
The welfare state 
protects people from 
severe income losses 
and redistributes 
substantial sums from 
the rich to the poor, 
making income 
redistribution more even 
 
Crowding-in 
Institutional 
argument   
(a) Macro-level  
 
 
 
 
 
(b) micro-level  
 
 
The state serves as the 
third party enforcer of 
agreements 
 
 
 
The institutional 
design of the program 
defines the type of 
effect on social trust 
 
 
State institutions 
promote trust through 
reducing the risk 
involved in agreements 
 
Non means-tested 
schemes cause no 
crowding out  compared 
to means-tested schemes 
since they are more 
efficient in reducing 
inequality and 
enhancing the equality 
of opportunities 
 
 
 
Crowding-in 
 
 
 
 
Crowding-out 
and 
Crowding-in 
Synergetic 
argument  
 
The synergy between 
the state and society is 
possible 
 
The  state creates 
incentives for collective 
actions from below 
Crowding-in 
 
 
Thus, it is possible to distinguish between several arguments in the literature regarding 
the relationship in question. The first point of view can be called the ‘civil society erosion’ 
argument, which assumes the dependence of social trust on the level of development in civil 
society. Here, the effect of the welfare state is intermediated through civic engagement which 
stems from the general assumption that civic engagement is the basis for social capital 
creation. This thus suggests that welfare states may discourage civic engagement which 
makes social trust levels go down. In other words, when social obligations become public, 
intimate ties will weaken and civil society, as well as the norms of reciprocity, are crowded 
out. The effect of the welfare state in this case is a kind of indirect effect which arises from 
the ‘network’ theories of social trust formation.  
Alternative explanations of how welfare states affect social trust include the ‘moral 
destruction argument’. This argument is based on the assumption that the ability of people to 
cooperate with each other is based on habit and practice. As such, they suggest that the 
crowding-out effect on social capital will happen if the state starts to undertake activities that 
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are better left to the private sector or to civil society. The crowding-out mechanism is 
explained here by the fact that if the state gets into the business of organizing everything, 
people will become dependent on it and lose their ability to work with one another. 
Alternative mechanisms of the negative relationship between the state and social capital 
assume that state activity erodes an individual’s sense of responsibility for caring about 
family members and friends.  
There are, however, scholars who support the opposite effects of the welfare state. 
They base their argument on the idea that social policy helps to integrate an individual into 
society. As a consequence, these theories can be called ‘integration arguments’.  Some argue 
that high support by the state may result in higher levels of trust. They assume that if 
government guarantees to keep an individual alive and in good health when he or she has 
difficulties, the individual does not feel abandoned and as a result his or her perception of 
failing substantially decreases, which forms the necessary grounds for higher institutional and 
interpersonal trust. The main reasoning here consists in the fact that welfare states make 
people’s lives more secure by protecting them from severe income losses and by 
redistributing substantial sums from the rich to the poor, thereby in a way  artificially making 
the income redistribution more even.  Others use the backward induction mechanism  which 
demonstrates that the shrinking of a welfare state will lead to an increase in uncertainty 
among the population, which may entail a loss of their confidence in the future, thus 
negatively affecting trust levels.  
The fourth argument found in the literature can be called ‘institutional’, which 
emphasizes the role of institutions in inducing pro-social behavior. The institutional argument 
about social capital may be divided into macro-and micro-level theories. The former 
emphasizes the role of the quality of public institutions in generating social trust while the 
latter stresses the dependence of the final outcome on the institutional design of benefit 
schemes.  
More specifically, macro institutional theories assert that efficient state institutions 
promote more trusting societies by reducing the risk involved in agreements. This is due to 
the fact that the state may serve as a third party enforcer of agreements through 
administrations or courts that have the power to impose fines or other penalties or sentences 
and in this way boost social trust. An alternative way for public institutions to influence social 
trust (in particular institutional trust) consists in citizens evaluating the quality of performance 
of these institutions or elected officials.  
The micro-level institutional theories focus on the fact that the particular design of 
welfare state programs may explain the kind of influence they have on social capital. 
Crowding-out is expected in the case of means-tested schemes, while universal non means-
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tested schemes usually have a positive influence on social capital levels. This is because 
universal programs are more efficient in reducing inequality and tend to promote equal 
opportunities.  
The next block of literature on the relationship between social capital and the state 
recognizes the possibility of a synergy between the state and society and can hence be called 
‘synergetic’. Here, for instance, one uses the term ‘political construction,’ which is based 
mainly on the idea of the state creating the incentives for collective actions from below. 
Others suggest that norms of cooperation and networks of civic engagement among ordinary 
citizens can be promoted by public agencies, which can take the form of complementarity or 
embeddedness. In general, these studies demonstrate that the vigor and dynamism of civil 
society can be associated with a strong state.  
We will try to discuss all the selected arguments about the type of influence of welfare 
state on social trusts in more detail.  
 
3.1. The civil society erosion argument  
Network theory states that a vigorous state ruins social capital in general and social 
trust in particular. Kumlin and Rothstein (2007) demonstrate that the analysis of this 
relationship is usually based on Wolfe's assumption7 that the most important prerequisite for 
the accumulation of social capital and for democracy to work is the prevalence of norms of 
reciprocity and networks of civic engagement in the society. According to them, welfare state 
development discourages civic engagement and hence voluntary reciprocity becomes harder 
to create. As a consequence, instead of organizing themselves in associations that reach out to 
support fellow citizens in distress, or that build strong reciprocal ties, citizens in large welfare 
states refer their more unfortunate compatriots to the broad system of social and welfare 
programs (and morally adjust themselves by referring to the high level of taxes they are 
paying). In other words, when social obligations become public, intimate ties weaken and 
civil society and norms of reciprocity are crowded out.  
Based on a similar assumption Stolle and Rochon (1999) analyze the relationship 
between social capital, civic engagement and the state. They use different reasoning for their 
argument, but still base it on network society theories of social trust creation. Stolle and 
Rochon (1999) assert that one of the fundamental assumptions about the connection between 
associations and social capital is that associational memberships produce more social capital 
in weak state settings and in pluralistic civil societies. Likewise, associations may produce 
less social capital in a strong state setting with a more institutionalized and less competitive 
                                                 
7
 See Wolfe, 1989 
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civil society, such as in Germany and Sweden. They emphasize the fact that strong states 
subsidize associational life more and in a more pro-active (visible) way than weak states. The 
authors argue further that while state support may produce an extensive associational network, 
participation in a state-fostered network may also diminish the impact of associations on 
social capital. They refer to Tocqueville, who was already concerned in the nineteenth century 
about the possibility that states would take over the functions of voluntary associations. As a 
result, Stolle and Rochon (1999) conclude that in nations where states have expended their 
activity levels, one may expect more apathy, less involvement, and less of an impact by 
voluntary associations. Their empirical analysis however shows that regardless of institutional 
differences among countries (in their analysis Germany, the United States, and Sweden), they 
find that associational membership creates trust in all three countries. Moreover, the trust 
creation capacity of Swedish and German associations in most sectors is equal to or greater 
than that found in the United States.  
The argument about the effects of the welfare state on social trust through civic 
engagement remains however mainly theoretical in nature. On the one hand, there is little 
empirical research that demonstrates that welfare state activity discourages civic engagement. 
On the other hand, the theory is quite ambiguous about the fact that civic engagement may be 
a determinant of social trust at all (Kumlin and Rothstein, 2007; Newton, 2001; Uslaner, 
2004).   
Moreover, Bode (2006) emphasizes that the classical theory that holds that welfare 
states undermine social trust levels by discouraging civic engagement can be revisited. The 
author focuses on voluntary agencies being partners of the welfare state. His analysis shows 
that during the 20th century, most countries experienced a common development into 
governance regimes exhibiting a tight coupling of civil society and the welfare state in (a) the 
process of planning, providing and supervising social services; (b) system-wide coordination 
via negotiated public-private partnerships and (c) a milieu-based firm involvement of civic 
stakeholders in voluntary action. Bode (2006) however recognizes that they are now in the 
state of continuous dis- and re-organization while the distance between voluntary agencies 
and both welfare states and civil society is growing.  
 
3.2. The moral destruction argument  
The moral destruction argument repeats that welfare states may be detrimental to 
social capital in general and social trust in particular. Fukuyama (2000) presents this causal 
mechanism in the following way. He supports the idea that crowding-out in social capital will 
happen if the state starts to undertake activities that are better left to the private sector or to 
civil society. He explains these effects by the fact that the ability of an individual to cooperate 
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is based on habit and practice. And hence, if the state gets into the business of organizing 
everything, people will become dependent on it and lose their ability to work with one another. 
To some extent, a similar logic was used by De Swaan (1988). He also insists on the negative 
consequences of welfare state development for social capital, arguing that the activities of the 
state erode an individual’s sense of responsibility for caring about family members and 
friends. According to him, the root of the negative relationship lies in an individual’s 
propensity to cede caring activities to the state in the presence of a developed welfare state. 
These studies are again purely theoretical and provide no empirical evidence which would 
either confirm or disprove their argument.  
 
3.2.The integration argument   
There are however several studies that recognize the probability of the opposite 
relationship and try to explain why social policies may enhance social capital formation. They 
all base their argument on the idea that social policies in this way or another help to integrate 
the individual into society. As a consequence, these theories can be called ‘integration 
arguments’. Szreter (2002), for instance, regards social capital as far from being an alternative 
to state and government activity, but as a symbiotic link to it. He argues that the context of a 
prestigious and vigorous state is vitally important for the development of social capital, and 
adds that high support from the state may result in high levels of trust. He further explains that 
if the government guarantees to keep an individual alive and in good health when he or she is 
in difficulty then individual does not feel abandoned but integrated and as a result his 
perception of failing substantially decreases. This forms the basis for high evaluations of the 
government and affects first and foremost an individual’s trust in state institutions. High 
regard for the state and its activities in turn forms the essential cultural, symbolic, 
psychological and experiential preconditions for citizens to respect and trust each other and 
volunteer their time to trusting and cooperative activities. He concludes his discussion with 
the statement that the first task in building respectful social capital in a community is hence to 
restore collective faith in the idea of the state and local government as practically effective 
servants of the community and guarantor of personal security.  
This idea was further developed by Patulny (2005). By using bonding and bridging 
distinctions of trust, the author tries to explain why welfare state activities may enforce social 
capital formation. According to his definitions, bonding is more exclusive and based upon 
rational familiarity, while bridging is more inclusive and based upon norms of civility. Using 
this idea as a framework, he suggests that any type of welfare regime may enhance social 
capital development: universal welfare regimes support bridging social capital, while rational 
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familiarity-based trust (inherent to bonding social capital) must act as a substitute when social 
policies encourage individual and familial reliance.  
A more pragmatic explanation of the positive influence of welfare state development 
on trust was proposed by Knack and Zak (2001). They suggest that one way to build trust in 
society is to reduce income inequality since it tends to ruin the common bonds among 
individuals that are necessary for the formation of generalized trust. Income redistribution 
through different social programs is an effective instrument to reduce inequality and hence 
can also be considered an instrument for raising trust.  
Somewhat similar logic is used by Bjornskov (2005) who points out that the welfare 
state makes people’s lives more certain by protecting them from severe income losses due to 
unemployment and by redistributing substantial sums from the rich to the poor, thereby 
artificially making income redistribution more even. This effect in his opinion would likely 
both reduce social fractionalization and perhaps increase individual’s trust radius, as people 
might perceive the income distribution to be fair. However, he recognizes that it remains an 
open question as to whether the majority of the population in such states would perceive the 
intensive redistribution as ‘fair’, since most citizens would pay higher taxes to finance the 
welfare state.  
Bonoli (2004) also argues that welfare state activities are associated with positive 
influences on social capital while using the backward induction mechanism. He demonstrates 
that the shrinking of welfare states  leads to an increase of uncertainty among the population. 
He uses the German case of Rieste-Rente reform as an example to show that a shift from 
direct state old age provisions to an increased reliance on financial markets results in a general 
uncertainty among people about the future. Uncertainty may also develop as a result of 
imperfect legislation about private pension insurance, which is unavoidable at the early stages 
of shifting from state to private insurance. Consequently, people find it difficult to make 
calculations about their future pensions, which again results in a loss of confidence in the 
future, thus negatively affecting their trust levels. 
These theoretical arguments have been broadly supported by the results of empirical 
analysis although there is little research that is focused on directly analyzing the effects of 
welfare state activities on social capital formation or which at least includes among their 
control variables the welfare efforts usually operationalized through percentage of GDP spent 
on social policies. Delhey and Newton (2003), for instance, suggest that good government is 
an essential structural basis for trust, but the size of the public sector may have a pervasive 
influence on society as a whole, including the private and market sectors. The results of their 
OLS on social trust conducted on the basis of 60 countries are nevertheless inconsistent with 
their expectations – the coefficient on this variable is positive but has a very small value. 
 69 
Their analysis is however based on the assumption of homogeneity of public policies since 
the latter is operationalized through government social spending and represents a single 
indicator.  
Van Oorschot and Arts (2005) obtain similar results. They find no evidence of 
crowding-out effects in European countries in their cross-sectional analysis from the EVS 
data from 1999/2000. At the individual level, explicit crowding-out effects appear only in the 
case of trustworthiness. With regard to other forms of social capital, the findings point out at 
best mixed evidence, but they mostly contradict the crowding-out hypothesis. This research 
partially accounts for the specificity of welfare state regimes by using the dummies outside of 
the level of social spending. But the study does not differentiate between the impacts of 
different social policies.  
To some extent, the study of Knack and Zak (2001) elaborates on the relationship 
between social trust and social spending by checking how amenable trust levels are to policy 
interventions. Their empirical analysis shows that trust can be raised directly by improving 
transportation and telecommunication infrastructure and increasing education, as well as 
indirectly by strengthening formal institutions that enforce contracts and by reducing income 
inequality. This research however does not distinguish between types of re-distributive 
policies that can be considered efficient in their influence on trust since they are treated as a 
single group. 
In the case of European countries, most of the research generally finds positive and 
strong correlations between social expenditures and social capital as a synthetic construct or 
between social spending and one of the social capital elements (Arts et al., 2003; Gaskin and 
Smith, 1995; Salamon and Sokolowski, 2003 in Van Oorschot and Arts, 2005; Van Oorschot, 
2003). This provides a ground for many scholars to recognize the possibility of high levels of 
public obligations being associated with higher levels of social capital while using 
Scandinavian countries as an example (Kumlin and Rothstein, 2007; Rothstein, 2001; 
Rothstein and Stolle, 2003; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2006; Svallfors, 1997). 
These findings are however limited since welfare state development is measured by 
the level of social spending while ignoring the fact that the level of spending does not reflect 
the actual level of benefits. Apart from that, none of the research specifies whether the effects 
of social spending are linear with respect to all social policies or if they can be policy specific.  
 
3.4. The institutional argument   
Macro-level institutional theory argues that the quality of public institutions may 
influence the level of social capital. Some of the scholars accept that this influence can be 
positive, although there are some arguments that say that their effects can be negative since 
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the state substitutes social trust. Moreover, there is also disagreement with respect to the 
mechanisms underlying the relationship between the state’s institutions and social trust.  
The straightforward conclusion about the relationship between the state and trust rests 
on the premise that the quality of the public institutions predefines the level of trust towards 
these institutions. The role of the state is regarded as important for the process of trust 
formation in the study conducted by Khodyakov (2007). His analysis of trust in the Soviet 
Union emphasizes that state institutions may provide people with the resources necessary for 
achieving their goals. “Effective functioning of institutions and especially of the state, 
increases the level of institutional trust. As a result, citizens are more likely to rely on the 
government and its institutions in their everyday life” (Khodyakov, 2007: 123). Trust in 
institutions is dependent on the perceived legitimacy of the institutions, of their technical 
competence, and their ability to perform assigned duties efficiently. According to Khodyakov 
(2007), the inability of the state to provide its citizens with scarce consumer goods and 
services can explain the lack of institutional trust in the Soviet Union.  
The quality of public institutions is thus recognized as essential in determining levels 
of institutional trust. The overview of the literature conducted by Edlund (2006) supports the 
above–mentioned idea as well. Edlund (2006) defines two variants for his idea. The first 
variant focuses exclusively on the role and functioning of political decision-making 
institutions for building political trust in government and welfare policies. In brief, the 
argument is as follows: “The structure of political decision-making institutions critically 
determines policy outcomes. These outcomes in turn shape public perceptions regarding the 
efficacy of the political decision-making institutions and the role of the state” (Edlund, 2006: 
396). In other words, only if the state is affective and caring will it make sense to trust it and 
put people’s welfare in the hands of officials armed with the power of law and vast fiscal 
resources.  
The second variant emphasizes the specific institutions that constitute  welfare. The 
legitimacy of the welfare state’s implementing agencies (hospitals, elderly care, health 
insurance, and pensions) influences public welfare state support. Whether citizens support a 
welfare state depends on whether they trust the welfare state to be capable of delivering 
various public goods and services of sufficient quality.  It is assumed here that popular 
support for a welfare state is dependent on its institutional performance. As an example 
Edlund (2006) emphasizes that one of the reasons the public distrusted state institutions in 
Sweden during the latter half of the 90s was because of cutbacks in social spending as well as 
public discontent with the quality of vital social services.   
The role of the state in generating institutional trust is also successfully summarized in 
the institutional theory which is based on the idea that institutional trust is politically 
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endogenous. More specifically, Mishler and Rose (2001) point out that institutional trust is 
the expected utility of institutions performing satisfactory, “it is a consequence, not a cause of 
institutional performance” (Mishler and Rose, 2001: 31).  Being rationally based, institutional 
trust hinges on citizens’ evaluations of institutional performance. If institutions perform well, 
trust is generated. In the opposite case, the outcome of institutional functioning is ‘skepticism 
and distrust’. Next, they argue that macro-institutional theories rest on the idea that what 
matters in defining trust levels is the aggregate performance of institutions in such issues as 
promoting growth, governing effectively, and avoiding corruption. The output of institutions 
is assumed to determine individual responses. On the other hand, they assert that individual 
evaluations of institutional performance are conditioned by individual tastes and experiences, 
such as whether a person thinks that political integrity or economic growth is more important 
and whether the individual has personally experienced the effects of corruption or the benefits 
of economic growth (Mishler and Rose, 2001). They test these theories on the basis of data 
for 10 post-Communist societies in Eastern and Central Europe.  Their analysis combines 
macro-level indicators of economic and political performance across the 10 countries with 
micro-level survey data on interpersonal and institutional trust, political socialization 
experience and individual performance evaluations. Their results strongly support the 
superiority of institutional explanations of trust. On the basis of their analysis, they make 
propositions on how government can generate public trust in old fashioned way. They can 
earn it by responding promptly and effectively to public priorities, by rooting out corrupt 
practices, and by protecting new freedoms. They can also earn trust through economic 
policies that promise and ultimately provide a better material future for the country as a whole.  
The above mentioned studies thus support the institutional argument that assumes that 
the state and its institutions predefine the level of trust in these institutions. These studies are 
however limited to institutional trust without extending the analysis of the state’s effects on 
interpersonal trust which, according to some scholars, may take place.  
Rothstein and Stolle (2002) for instance argue that the state can positively influence 
social capital levels. They use an institutional-centered approach to argue that social capital 
does not exist independently of politics or government in the realm of civil society. Instead, 
government policies and political institutions create, channel and influence the amount and 
type of social capital. According to them, the capacity of citizens to develop cooperative ties 
and establish social trust is heavily influenced by government institutions and policies. This 
point of view implies that institutional engineering might indeed be used to foster social 
capital. States enable the establishment of contracts in that they provide information, monitor 
legislation, enforce the rights and rules that sanction lawbreakers, protect minorities, and 
actively support the integration and participation of citizens. This discussion is very insightful 
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because it specifies institutional characteristics such as the efficiency and trustworthiness of 
state institutions as influential for social capital creation.  
A similar logic is used by Herreros and Criado (2008) in their discussion of the 
relationship between institutions and interpersonal trust. They demonstrate that institutions 
clearly matter for social trust. An efficient state promotes more trusting societies while the 
impact of institutions on social trust crucially depends on the degree of legitimacy of these 
institutions. Their analysis of the relationship between the state and social trust clearly 
illustrates that the state reduces the risk involved in the agreement. This happens due to the 
fact that the state may serve as a third party enforcer of agreements through administration or 
courts with the power to impose fines, other penalties, or sentences and in this way boosts 
social trust. Their empirical analysis is based on the European Social Survey (ESS) for 22 
European countries and confirms this hypothesis. The results clearly show that the efficacy of 
the state as measured through the Public Institutions Index increases the probability of people 
trusting their fellow citizens.  
Support for the macro-level role of the state in regulating micro-level relations 
between individuals is emphasized in the study conducted by Tillmar and Lindkvist. They 
demonstrate that the leap of faith in the mechanism of trust formation does not happen on 
empty ground. Individuals always do it in a specific context, and thus, their mental processes 
and actions should be seen as embedded. A different context may provide more or less fertile 
soil for the emergence of trust and for forming different reasoning and leap of faith processes. 
Here, formal institutions at a macro-level are highly consequential for trust formation between 
collaborators in micro settings. Government rules and regulations, a system of law and police-
force, as well as their ability to enact rights and obligations and apply sanctions may provide 
strong grounds for trust formation processes. The authors recognize however that trust may 
also be promoted by less formal constitutional institutions, including general cultural features, 
local traditions, and contingencies.  
Kumlin and Rothstein (2007) go even further in their analysis while still containing 
their argument in the frame of the institutional approach. They attempt to answer the question 
of why the trust in other people may be affected by the quality of public institutions and their 
employees. They believe that there must be three psychological mechanisms at work. First, 
people may draw inferences about others’ trustworthiness from how they perceive public 
service bureaucrats. If social workers, local policemen, public health workers, and so on act in 
such a way that they cannot be trusted, why should people in general be trusted? Second, if 
citizens, to get what they themselves deem necessary from public services, have to engage in 
cheating, distorting vital information and other forms of dishonest behavior, why should 
people in general be trusted? Third, if you yourself, to get what you deem fair from public 
 73 
services, have an interest in engaging in questionable behavior, then not even people, such as 
yourself can be trusted, so why should ‘other people in general’ be trusted? 
Apart from the quality of public institutions which may determine the level of social 
trust, the performance of public servants is recognized as essential in generating trust. An 
alternative study of the relationship between formal institutions and trust was conducted by 
Thomas (1998), who refers in his analysis of trust in government to two main groups of 
factors related to state. According to him, trust in government depends on the one hand on the 
performance of elected officials. On the other hand, the decline in trust is due to the general 
public dissatisfaction with government institutions.  
In line with this study, Bouckaert and van de Walle (2003) successively summarize the 
role of the state, its institutions, and its officials in the formation of trust in government. 
According to them, management theories tend to explain the absence of trust in government 
by referring to the poor performance of government systems. In order for trust to be restored 
by improving service quality, public administrative approaches also relate performance and 
trust. The difference is that poor performance is caused by government overload: government 
is not able to meet rising demands or, in some cases, citizens’ demands are simply 
contradictory. The proposed remedy is therefore to manage expectations: government can 
stimulate citizens to change their demands or it can point to the conflicting nature of certain 
demands.  
The institutional theory also allows for negative effects of the state on social capital. 
The contribution of Herreros and Criado (2008) to the analysis of the relationship between the 
state and trust consists in a detailed overview of the opposite statement which asserts that the 
state does not generate trust but actually substitutes trusting relations. They refer to Uslaner 
who argues that trust is not encouraged by making people respect the law: courts may at most 
help to build some forms of ‘strategic trust ’. Ullman-Marhgalit (2005 in Herreros and Criado, 
2008) continues this idea by demonstrating that the state’s enforcement of legally binding 
contracts does not generate trust but in fact relieves society of the need to trust. Thomas (1998) 
supports this idea and argues that one way in which trust can be lost is through extensive use 
of contracts detailing the precise responsibilities of each party in the event of remote or 
unlikely contingencies. Not only is complete planning impossible and costly, extensive 
detailed contracts imply a lack of trust because their purpose is to specify obligations and 
future returns – and thus to align expectations when trust is low. The more contracts are used 
as a substitute for trust, the greater the signal of distrust or lack of trust will be. 
Thus, the macro-level institutional theories provide strong theoretical and empirical 
foundation for understanding why and how welfare state institutions and their employees may 
influence not only institutional trust but also confidence in other people. These studies are 
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exhaustive and provide well-built argumentation on the type of relationship between state 
institutions and social trust. There are however very few studies that employ an empirical 
analysis on the relationship in question since the discussion is dominated by the theoretically 
grounded reasoning with little use of statistical techniques which would confirm the theory.  
The micro-level institutional theories emphasize the effects of the institutional design 
of welfare state programs on social capital. In other words, the particular design of welfare 
state programs may explain the kind of influence they conduct on social capital. Crowding-
out is expected in the case of means-tested schemes while universal non means-tested 
schemes usually assign a positive influence on social capital levels. Rothstein and Uslaner 
(2006) for instance argue that unlike selective social schemes, universal ones may enhance 
trust. This happens first of all due to the fact that such programs are much better at reducing 
inequality than simple redistributive schemes that imply selective policies. Moreover, the 
authors insist that apart from economic equality, one should also take into account the 
equality of opportunities as a determinant of social trust. The universal programs again may 
ensure this since they possess a number of specific characteristics. First, they are delivered 
with less bureaucratic hassle and control. Second, they may create a feeling of social cohesion 
in society. And finally, high quality universal programs may increase the feeling of optimism 
and equal opportunity among large segments of population. This idea is further developed in 
Kumlin and Rothstein (2007). They suggest that welfare states exist along several dimensions: 
one is the level of social spending as proportion of GDP and another is a proportion of 
citizens that are covered by various social programs. A third dimension has to do with the 
many different situations and phases in life in which average citizens are in personal contact 
with public services and welfare state programs. According to them, contact with universal 
welfare state institutions tends to increase social trust, while experiences with needs-testing 
social programs undermine it. Their analysis explicitly shows the negative relationship 
between the number of needs-tested institutional contacts and the levels of social trust based 
on the Sweden SOM survey. 
In their research the authors construct their argument, building on what social-
psychological research calls procedural justice. This research shows that people are concerned 
not only with the final results of personal contacts with public institutions but whether or not 
the process that eventually leads to the final results is fair. Kumlin and Rothstein (2007) 
distinguish between several aspects of procedural justice. These may involve questions of 
whether the individual was received with respect and dignity, whether he or she was able to 
communicate opinions to civil servants, and whether there are signs of discrimination, 
corruption, and /or cheating. They also argue that needs-tested public services may more 
readily give rise to suspicions concerning procedural justice and arbitrary treatment than do 
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universal agencies. In other words, programs based on needs-testing imply a greater scope for 
bureaucratic discretion. Citizens for their part have an incentive and opportunity in this 
situation to withhold relevant information from bureaucrats and to try in various ways to 
convince the latter that they should qualify for the service in question. This easily escalates to 
a vicious spiral of distrust from clients leading to increased control by bureaucrats. Because of 
this complex and controversial decision making process, needs testing and bureaucratic 
discretionary power are often more difficult to reconcile with principles of procedural justice 
compared to universal public services.  
Micro-level institutional theories are also not perfect, although they do provide 
empirical evidence of the negative relationship between means-tested social programs and 
social trust. It however remains unclear whether all means-tested schemes can be detrimental 
to social trust or whether their effects can be policy specific. In other words, not enough 
research has been done to determine whether the effects of means-tested benefits can be 
equalized across social programs or if they can be different depending on the type of social 
benefits.  
 
3.5. The synergetic argument   
The synergy between the state and society in generating social capital is also 
recognized in the series of studies conducted by Fox (1996), Evans (1996), and Heller (1996). 
They do however confine the process of social capital accumulation to the breadth and density 
of representative societal organizations. But since they are seen as an important element in 
developing and reinforcing social trust levels, these studies represent a certain value in 
understanding the way the state influences civic mobilization.  
Fox (1996) distinguishes between two approaches to civic society building: state-
driven and society-driven. The soociety-oriented approach tends to adopt an ‘historical’ 
determinist explanation to social capital formation or stresses social structure, which takes 
political strategies, ideologies, values, and cultures as givens. The state-oriented approach 
emphasizes the centrality of rules and incentives that induce social responses, treating the 
social arena as a residual black box (Fox, 1996). Fox (1996) argues that relying on the state or 
society alone does not explain the origins of institutions and thus cannot resolve the 
reconstruction of social capital, especially in a society with low levels of trust and civic pride 
which are apt to non-democratic, authoritarian regimes. In such circumstances, what he calls 
‘political construction’ may foster social capital creation. In order to overcome these 
limitations, Fox (1996) proposes accounting for the interaction between the state and society.  
To describe patterns of state-society synergy he refers to the ‘political construction’ 
process, which is based on three conceptual building blocks. They include political 
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opportunities, social energy and ideas, and the process of ‘scaling up’ local representation and 
bargaining power. The first conceptual block includes creating positive incentives for 
collective actions from below or buffering the negative sanctions against autonomous 
collective action. The second involves taking actors, their ideas, and motivations into account 
to explain how people respond to positive and negative incentives for collective actions. 
Finally, the third block in the political construction approach highlights the importance of 
organizations whose efforts create opportunities for others to engage in autonomous collective 
action. 
 Fox’s case study in rural Mexico shows that despite the poor stock of social capital, in 
some regions of Mexico the distinct patterns of state-society relations emerge, constituting 
distinct ‘subnational political regimes’ ranging from entrenched regional authoritarian 
redoubts to enclaves of pluralism. Fox (1996) distinguishes between three main causal 
pathways of societal capital accumulation: state-society convergence, local external societal 
groups, and independent emergence. The main pattern of collaborative production of social 
capital between state and societal actors took the form of successful initiatives by middle and 
lower level reformist government officials to recognize and encourage relatively autonomous 
grassroots organizations. It mainly took the form of cooperation between reformists and local 
social groups willing and able to take advantage of an opening from above, involving limited 
but substantive participation in the implementation of government development programs. In 
other words, state reformists created political opportunities, following pressure from local 
groups for securing political, civil, and social rights.  
The second pathway involves external non-government actors that provide support to 
local and regional organizing efforts such as churches, development, and human rights groups. 
The third path is politically more oppositional. Fox (1996) emphasizes that both state and 
external societal allies provide resources for local collective action that can be grouped into 
positive and anti-negative incentives. Positive incentives range from direct individual and 
group material inducements, tangible and intangible rewards for the exercise of leadership, as 
well as an enabling institutional framework and ideological resources that reduce free-riding 
problems. Anti-negative resources in contrast reduce the costs that other external actors may 
threaten to impose on those engaged in constructing autonomous social capital – protection 
from retribution.  
According to Peter Evans (1996), state-society synergy is also possible. Norms of 
cooperation and networks of civic engagement among ordinary citizens can be promoted by 
public agencies and used for developmental ends. The synergy may take the form of either 
complementarity or embeddedness. Complementarity is seen here as the conventional way of 
conceptualizing mutually supportive relations between public and private actors. It suggests a 
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clear division of labor, based on the contrasting properties of public and private institutions. 
The idea of synergy can also be based on embeddedness, that is on ties that connect citizens 
and public officials across the public-private divide. In this framework, he considers it 
possible to create networks that surpass the boundary between public and private and which 
are seen as repositories of developmentally valuable social capital rather than instruments of 
corruption or rent-seeking. 
 An example of complementarity is when effective states enable a rule-governed 
environment, which strengthens and increases the efficiency of local organizations and 
institutions. But here he emphasizes that the state’s contribution to social capital is general 
and distant. Productive informal ties, like market exchanges, require a basic ambience, but 
public agencies are not directly linked to societal actors. He further argues that 
complementarity based on the public provision of intangibles can also take forms quite 
independent of the provision and enforcement of rules. The latter may happen through the 
creation and diffusion of new knowledge and media publicity. In this case, one of the most 
important aspects of the complementarity input is that it enhances the extent to which 
government programs are able to combine social capital formation with the delivery of 
services. His example of Ceara’s successful preventive health program illustrates that the 
government’s blitz of positive media publicity bolstered the health agents’ sense of ‘calling’ 
and made them more willing to engage in the kind of diffuse public service that helped 
generate new trust relations between them and the community. It also affected the way in 
which they were viewed by members of the community, again increasing the likelihood of 
trust relations. Positive impact on social trust formation is seen here as one of the most 
important byproducts of complementarity.  
 Embeddedness is based on the idea that the state can help best by providing inputs 
that local people cannot provide for themselves and then maintaining a ‘hands-off’ stance 
with regard to activities that are within the scope of local action. Social capital is formed by 
making those who are part of the state apparatus more thoroughly part of the communities in 
which they work. The networks of trust and collaboration that are created as a result span the 
public-private boundary and bind state and civil society together. As an example he refers to 
China’s transition success story where they managed to create the dense networks of ties that 
connect state agencies and private capital. “From joint business-government deliberation 
councils to the maze of intermediate organizations and informal policy networks where much 
of the time consuming work of consensus formation takes place”. In this example, social 
capital is formed in networks that are neither public nor private but fill the gap between the 
two spheres.  
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He continues by pointing out that embeddedness and complementarity are not 
competing concepts of synergetic relations but are themselves complementary. He argues 
based on the examples of the government programs in developing countries that if the 
government had limited its role to the provision of the complementary input and assumed that 
local citizens would provide the appropriate responses without the involvement of public 
sector workers in the construction of a set of reinforcing ties, the campaign would almost 
certainly have failed.  
Heller (1996) goes even further in his discussions about state–society synergy, 
demonstrating that a strong state is usually associated with a strong society. His case study of 
Kerala, India shows that successfully pursued social and redistributive development strategies  
are tied to exceptionally high levels of social capital as measured through the density of civic 
organizations. Heller (1996) argues that the vigor and dynamism of civil society is matched 
only by the size and activism of the state. He concludes about the reciprocal link between 
state and social capital by showing that the state and society in Kerala have reinforced each 
other in a manner that supports the synergy hypothesis. State intervention aimed at providing 
public goods and welfare to individuals has been built directly on existing social capital 
resources and has in turn reinforced social capital. The expansion of public health and 
education services has had a crowding-in effect as the competition between public and private 
delivery services has increased overall efficiency. The comparatively corruption free and 
logistically successful provision of low-cost housing, school lunch programs, subsidized food 
and day care have been attributed to the active and informed participation of local groups. 
High civic participation in Kerala is associated with the most developed social welfare system 
in India, the most extensive network of fair price shops and rates of social expenditures that 
continue to be significantly higher than the national average.  
Heller (1996) also discusses the process of welfare state development which fits into 
the power resource model. He argues that the organized militancy of lower class groups 
united under the leadership of the Communist Party eroded traditional structures of 
domination, which cleared the path for state intervention. The bureaucratic-legal capacities of 
the state were activated and extended by mobilization pressure from below. The resulting 
synergy underwrote the politically and administratively daunting tasks of implementing 
structural reforms and building an extensive network of welfare services in an impoverished 
society. The legal and social protections enforced by an activist state in turn heightened 
labor’s capacity for militancy. The most concrete and tangible effect of this synergy was 
redistributive development. He concludes that the most visible product of the synergy 
between a society mobilized along class lines and a democratically accountable state is the 
 79 
efficient and comprehensive provision of social services and the development of human 
capital resources.  
Thus, the different mechanisms of synergy between the state and society in generating 
social capital are widely analyzed in the literature. These discussions are however purely 
theoretical and are based on the case studies conducted in the third world countries. There is 
little empirical evidence that proves that this synergy really exists and that it works in the way 
it was discussed in the literature.  
 
3.6. Defining the drawbacks in existing studies  
Summing up the recent findings leads us to believe that the existing research 
(regardless of its outcomes) possesses a number of shortcomings that can be summarized in 
five main points. 
The first drawback of the research consists in ignoring the possibility of ‘mixed’ 
effects of welfare state activity on social capital. As it was mentioned before, the concept of 
the welfare state includes a set of numerous social policies. Hence, it is plausible to assume 
that certain policies may lead social capital to decline while other policies may enhance the 
development of familial and social values. Therefore, when analyzing them as a whole, the 
total effect can be neutralized or biased by a prevailing policy. This logic is especially clear if 
welfare states are scored on spending. By doing so we assume that all spending counts equally. 
As a result, we ignore the fact that spending actually reflects a number of policies which have 
a specific structure. These policies are different in their impact, outputs, and outcomes and 
each of them affects social capital in its own way. Thus, when analyzing the effect of total 
spending, the changes in social capital are inevitably biased either by the policy absorbing a 
greater share of expenditures or by the policy with the strongest influence.  
The second drawback is ignorance of the notion of targeting. In each welfare state, 
there are policies that are applied exclusively to a certain population group (for instance 
pensioners) and hence only the social capital of this specific group is subject to the direct 
pressure of change. Hence, when analyzing crowding out effects on the basis of the data for 
the whole population, we are not taking into consideration the fact that welfare state 
intervention consists of numerous policies developed to cover certain risks and thus the social 
capital of people experiencing those risks can primarily change. Ignoring this nuance and 
focusing the analysis to the whole population may result in the underestimation of the true 
impact of welfare state development on social capital formation. 
The third drawback consists in ignoring the fact that social spending levels limited to 
the ‘how much’ dimension do not reflect the actual level of benefits received by individuals. 
High social spending may result from the fact that selective benefits are quite high while the 
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coverage rate is quite small. A similar level of total social spending may be obtained in the 
situation of high coverage rates but low benefits level. Hence, when analyzing the ‘how 
much’ dimension we ignore, on the one hand, the coverage rate and, on the other hand, the 
actual decommodification level obtained as a result of state intervention in social 
arrangements. Besides that, intervention by the state in the form of social policies results in a 
certain type of stratification which is not completely reflected by social spending. As Forma 
and Kangas (2002) point out ‘Social expenditures as such do not tell very much about the 
principles or social rights according to which money is actually distributed’. Thus one should 
take account of the decommodification and the nature of the stratification mechanism which 
forms an outcome spectrum in welfare state analysis.  
The fourth drawback consists in ignoring the fact that each policy is designed and 
implemented in a variety of ways and hence each possesses certain characteristics. This 
reflects the historical, institutional, and structural conditions in which the development of 
social schemes takes place. In each country, social benefits are based on the specific features 
resulting in different levels of de-commodification, institutional design, financing source 
structure, and conditions of delivery. To some extent, these differences are accounted for by 
Esping-Andersen’s welfare state regime typology based on a three-dimensional approach 
defined along de-familirization, de-commodification and stratification axes. But this typology 
has some disadvantages. On the one hand, this classification ignores the differences among 
countries by grouping them into a single welfare regime type. This results in the loss of 
information and possible underestimation of the effects de-familirization, de-commodification 
and stratification cause on social trust levels. On the other hand, Esping-Andersen’s 
classification only partially accounts for some dimensions whose effects are often discussed. 
These characteristics are: (1) universal versus categorical welfare programs (non means-tested 
versus means-tested benefit schemes), (2) general tax financing versus contributory financing, 
(3) in-kind versus cash benefits, and (4) active versus passive policies. 
The fifth drawback concerns the fact that the effects of social policies can differ 
across social groups. Social policies are designed in a way that their effects vary across 
different social groups since there are different situations and phases in life in which average 
citizens are in personal contact with public services and welfare state programs. It is difficult 
to contest that the need for social help is defined on the basis of each individual’s situation 
and phase of life in which he or she is in need for public help. Social policy hence differs 
across age, education, minority, and gender groups. These are just several examples of the 
variation of social policies across social groups. The analysis conducted so far concentrates 
mainly on the effects of social spending on the whole population without taking into account 
the fact that the effects of social policy may be group specific. An example here is the study  
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conducted by Herros and Criado (2008) who prove that the effects of the state will be 
different for members of the country’s majority ethnic group than for members of minority 
ethnic group. More specifically, the state’s efficacy has a larger effect on the level of trust in 
majority groups than in minority groups. They explain this difference by pointing out that 
minority ethnic groups are more sceptical about the role of the state: they usually show higher 
levels of distrust in public institutions. Their empirical analysis based on the European Social 
Survey for 22 European countries confirms this hypothesis.  
For the purpose of our analysis, a distinction should be made across the gender axis.  It 
is widely accepted that there is no gender dimension in welfare state classification, while it is 
possible to argue theoretically that there is a gender gap in the effects social policy has on 
social trust.  
 
3.7. Overview and concluding remarks  
 
Based on the known mechanisms of trust formation, we analyze the relationship 
between the welfare state and social trust. Theoretical explanations show that, on the one hand, 
the state can destroy social trust through its negative impact on volunteering, individuals’ 
ability to cooperate, and a collective sense of responsibility. On the other hand, there are 
theories that argue the possibility of synergy between the state and society, which are based 
on the idea that the state can keep the individual integrated when he or she is having  
difficulties, can provide a strong institutional framework within which trust deals can take 
place , and can foster voluntary associations from below.  
Empirical research can also provide controversial results which demonstrate that the 
degree of welfare state development may positively as well as negatively affect trust levels. 
The main feature of the research conducted so far is the fact that most of the studies tend to 
speculate about the possible effects of social policies on social capital without employing 
statistical techniques to check the plausibility of these mechanisms. Furthermore, the few 
empirical studies that exist mostly rely on the use of social spending as a measure of welfare 
state development. This in turn may ignore (1) the possibility of ‘mixed’ effects, (2) the 
notion of targeting; (3) the actual level of decommodification and the nature of stratification 
mechanisms, (4) the fact that each policy is designed and implemented in a variety of ways 
and hence possesses certain characteristics, and (5) the fact that the effects of social policies 
can be group specific.  
This hence gives rise to the need for finding a new operationalization for welfare state 
development which allows us to conduct a cross-sectional analysis to estimate the effects of 
social policy on social trust. We will try to take account of the above-mentioned drawbacks 
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by proposing a new research design based on the idea of the multidimensionality of welfare 
state effects on social trust. This will shift the attention from discussing the 
multidimensionality in social capital to allowing for multidimensionality in operationalizing 
the degree of welfare state development. The dimensions are derived first from the functions 
social policies perform. Second, the outcomes of welfare state activities are taken into account. 
Finally, we will specify social policy characteristics while estimating their effects on social 
trust. A detailed description of the research design is provided in the next section along with 
the hypotheses formulation.  
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Chapter 4: RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA, AND METHODS DESCRIPTION 
 
4.1. Research design and hypothesis formulation  
Our research is based on the assumption that each social program is intended to cover 
certain risks or contingencies and is designed for a certain group of people, namely those 
experiencing these contingencies. Apart from that, we will take into account the fact that state 
intervention in the form of social policies results in a certain level of decommodification, as 
well as a certain form of social stratification. Finally, we assume that each policy possesses a 
number of characteristics which reflect the features of the program’s design and 
implementation, as well as their financing conditions.  
This logic is visualized below (Figure 4.1.) while suggesting a three-fold analysis. 
First, one should analyze the effects of the level of social spending on certain social programs 
on trust indicators among their direct recipients. Second, one should investigate how the level 
of out-sourcing of the individual from the market and the form of social stratification 
influences his or her social trust levels. And third, one can account for how the specific 
conditions of benefits provisions, design, and financing affect their trust indicators. In other 
words, one can derive three axes around which the multidimensionality of social policies is 
formed.  
The first is a functional axis, which takes into account the different functions 
performed by social policies, and forms the functional dimension. The functions are derived 
on the basis of the risk or contingencies which social policies are designed to cover. The 
distinction here applies to the existence of policy specific effects on social trust levels. In 
other words, one should deconstruct social spending on a functional basis to assess the policy 
effects of each specific social benefit scheme.  
The second axis refers to the final outcomes of social policies, namely the level of de-
commodification, stratification, and de-familiarization. It can be called the outcome axis 
around which the outcome dimension is formed. The latter focuses on the effects of welfare 
state outcomes on social trust indicators. The overall approach consists here in deconstructing 
Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime typology (1990) and evaluating the effects of 
decommodification and stratification on social trust levels.8 
The third axis can be called qualitative. It takes account of the different policy 
characteristics in order to study their separate effects on social trust levels. The dimension 
formed around this axis can also be called qualitative and it focuses on the specificity of a 
                                                 
8
 De-familiarization will be omitted from the analysis due to a lack of data.  
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benefit’s design, delivery, and financing. The analysis here is aimed at isolating social 
characteristics and assessing design specific effects on social trust levels.  
These three axes form the basis of the multidimensionality of a social policy’s effects 
on social trust formation. The latter constitutes a clear breakthrough in the analysis of social 
policies on interpersonal and institutional trust levels, which usually consists in relating the 
level of social spending to trust indexes. This new approach allows us to grasp all possible 
effects the welfare state conducts on trust perception from a different prospective and go 
beyond the usual spending level. The latter permits, on the one hand, for describing welfare 
state development in better detail. But this approach also provides ground for a better 
understanding of the mechanisms underlying the relationship between the level of welfare 
state development and social trust formation.  
dimens 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1.: Visualizing the functional, outcome, and qualitative dimensions and 
their two-dimensional interactions  
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Apart from that, the interaction between the defined three dimensions should be taken 
into account. When combining the functional dimension with the outcome dimension, it 
becomes possible to asses the effects of decommodification and the stratification of separate 
social policies on social trust levels among their direct recipients. In other words, the 
interaction between these two dimensions provides outcome specific effects on social trust for 
separate social policies. For instance, one may be interested in assessing how the level of 
decommodification and stratification of pension policy affects interpersonal and institutional 
trust among pensioners.  
Similarly, the interaction between functional and qualitative dimensions can be 
defined. In this case, one can evaluate how the characteristics of distinct social schemes affect 
social trust levels among their direct recipients. In other words, we can assess the design 
specific effects of separate social benefits on interpersonal and institutional trust. As an 
example, one can think about the relationship of means-tested and non means-tested pension 
spending on social trust among pensioners.  
The third interaction provides the most complicated insight into the overlap of welfare 
state dimensions. By projecting the outcome dimension on the qualitative dimension, one can 
assess the outcome specific effects of different social policy characteristics. If the outcome 
dimension is related to the level of decommodification and stratification of social policies and 
the qualitative dimension describes the institutional design of benefit schemes, their 
interaction allows for an assessment on how the level of decommodification and stratification 
of means-tested and non means-tested schemes influences social trust levels.  
 
Specification of the functional dimension  
 
The first two drawbacks can thus be corrected by relating the spending level of certain 
social policies to the trust level of their direct recipients. For the purpose of the analysis, two 
main social provisions will be chosen: pensions and unemployment benefits. The choice of 
these two welfare programs is based on the fact that they are convenient in terms of defining 
their target groups and forming a sub-sample of pensioners and a sub-sample of unemployed 
people for conducting the analysis on the basis of the WVS data. In order to see whether the 
specification of the crowding-out hypothesis through the isolation of the effects of these two 
social policies is reasonable or not, we include total social spending in our analysis. Their 
effect on social trust indicators among the whole population will be used as a benchmark for 
comparison with policy specific effects of unemployment and pension spending on social 
trust levels among their direct recipients. We will thus correct the first and second drawbacks 
deduced from recent studies by separately analyzing the variations in the trust indicators of 
unemployed people, and pensioners in relation to the level of spending on these relevant 
policies.  
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In addition, this approach will allow us to deduce whether the effects of social 
spending on trust levels are policy specific. The latter can be deduced by comparing the 
effects of total social spending on trust levels among the whole population to the effects of 
relevant social spending on trust levels among their direct recipients.  
The logic of the analyses can be depicted as follows: 
 
 
Figure 4.2. The logic of the analysis of the functional dimension 
 
 
The hypothesis for this part of the analysis can be formulated as follows: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1. If the crowding-out hypothesis holds at the aggregated level, then 
countries with higher social spending will have lower indicators of social trust among their 
population. The same should be true for both forms of trust:  interpersonal and institutional, 
and for all sub-samples: the whole population, pensioners, and  the unemployed.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: If the crowding-out hypothesis holds at the individual level, then 
higher levels of social spending will be associated with lower levels of interpersonal and 
institutional trust among the whole population, pensioners,  and the unemployed.  
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Specification of the outcome dimension  
 
Apart from defining the functional dimension, one should take account of the level of 
an individual’s outsourcing from the market and the form of the social stratification that 
results from social policy implementation. In other words, one should consider the third 
drawback. The correction of this drawback is done by separately analyzing the effects of each 
dimension of Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime typology (1990) on social trust levels. The 
structure of our analysis can be depicted as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. The logic of the analysis of the outcome dimension 
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as those predominantly based on employment-related social insurance. Hence we assume that: 
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On the other hand, in order to avoid the loss of information resulted in grouping 
countries to welfare regime types, we will analyze the effects of decommodification and 
stratification coefficients on trust indicators directly. The dimension of de-familiarization is 
omitted from the analysis due to the fact that there are no available data measuring the de-
familiarization level. We anticipate that: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 4: Lower levels of trust will be found in countries with higher levels of 
decommodification if the crowding-out hypothesis is true. This must hold for both levels of 
analysis: aggregated and individual, and for both forms of trust: interpersonal and institutional.   
We also expect that: 
HYPOTHESIS 5: Highly stratified societies must be associated with lower levels of social 
trust indicators for both levels of analysis: aggregated and individual, and for both forms of 
trust: interpersonal and institutional.  
 
Specification of the qualitative dimension  
 
In addition, we will relate the above-mentioned four characteristics of social policies 
to trust levels in order to see how the specific features of design and provisions of social 
benefits affect trust indicators in order to correct the fourth drawback.  
The logic of the analysis can be visualized as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. The logic of the analysis of the qualitative dimension 
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There is not literature in all cases that explains how the specific characteristics of  the 
welfare state mentioned above affects trust indicators. The only exception is the distinction 
between universal and selective (categorical) welfare states, which emphasize that universal 
welfare states promote equality of opportunities and equal treatment of all citizens, from 
which we can deduce that their effects on social trust must be positive (Rothstein, 1998; 
Rothstein, 2001). For the purpose of this analysis, this characteristic of social policy will be 
taken. The selection of this characteristic is due to the fact that the effects of institutional 
design on social trust is fully theoretically elaborated in the literature, which allows one to 
formulate  expectations and a hypothesis, which can be done as follows:  
HYPOTHESIS 6: Spending on non means-tested benefit schemes should be 
positively associated with social trust indexes while spending on means-tested benefit 
schemes should be negatively associated with social trust scores.  
 
Specification of the gender gap in social policy effects  
 
Finally, we will account for the fifth drawback by separately analyzing the effects of 
social spending on social trust by gender. We will first elaborate on the theory to form 
expectations about how social policies may differ in their impact on social trust among the 
two sexes. Even at the intuitive level, it can be expected that a welfare state’s effects are more 
positive for men than for women. The hypothesis for group specific effects can be formulated 
as follows:  
HYPOTHESIS 7: Social trust indexes among men will be more positively associated 
with social spending than those among women.  
 
4.2. Data source  
The main data source is the World Values Survey (WVS) that contains measures 
reflecting people’s attitudes and beliefs in a wide range of social domains. The World Values 
Survey is a unique resource in the social sciences. The first survey was coordinated from 
twenty-one nations and conducted in the early 1980s by the European Values group. The 
second wave of surveys, done in the early 1990s, expanded the pool to forty-two nations, 
including many of the post communist states in Eastern Europe. The third wave, in the mid-
90s, included fifty-four nations and expanded the data to several nations in the developing 
world. The fourth wave of the WVS included representative national surveys examining the 
basic values and beliefs of people in more than sixty-five societies on all six inhabited 
continents, containing almost 80 percent of the world’s population.   
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An international network of social scientists, coordinated by an international 
directorate, carried out the project. Most surveys are funded from national sources and are 
conducted by leading survey research firms. An international board develops the survey 
questions, which are translated into the national language by each research institute. The data 
are then assembled into a single data set and made available to the international research 
community.  
We will use the data from the most recent wave9. An exceptional feature of the 1999-
2002 WVS is the range of nations included in the survey. Our sample will include the 
following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, the UK, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United States.10 The choice of countries was based on data availability 
pertaining to country-level characteristics. On the basis of this data set, two additional sub-
samples are formed:11 the first for pensioners and the second for the unemployed. Each of 
them contains only retired people or people that were unemployed at the moment the survey 
was conducted12 respectively. 
 
4.3. Methods description  
The analysis of the welfare state’s effects on social trust is conducted at two levels - 
individual and aggregated – for the original sample containing all respondents regardless of 
their activity status, as well as for each of the sub-samples: pensioners and the unemployed.  
At the aggregated level we will assess the relationship between the countries’ average 
levels of interpersonal trust and trust in institutions and the level of their relevant social 
spending while controlling for the countries’ characteristics. The analysis is conducted 
separately for the whole population, pensioners, and the unemployed. Since the number of 
cases at the country level is limited to 18, we are restricted to using the correlation between 
relevant social spending and trust, while sequentially controlling for only one of the country-
level variables.  
The individual level analysis attempts to assess the effects of relevant social spending 
on the level of social trust of individuals while controlling for the personal characteristics of 
                                                 
9
 The most recent wave of surveys at the time of this project was in 1999-2002. The other reason for choosing 
this wave is an attempt to use more recent data for the decommodification and stratification scores to trust 
indexes.  
10
 It should be noted that the data for some countries included in the survey stem from the previous wave in 
1994-1998 due to a lack of data for the last wave. These countries are: Australia, New Zealand, Norway, and 
Switzerland.   
11
 The formation of sub-samples for pensioners and the unemployed is conducted on the basis of the WVS 
question about the current activity status of the respondent (employed, unemployed, pensioner, etc). 
12
 The pooled sample contains 25,257 cases whereas the sub-samples of retired and unemployed people have 
5,013 and 1,162 cases respectively.  
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the respondents. A multilevel analysis is used to account for observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity at the country level. The main arguments for using multilevel modelling rest on 
the idea that the data represent a clear hierarchy nested within countries. Hence, if utilizing 
traditional individual-level statistical tools for hierarchical data, one encounters at least two 
statistical problems (Luke, 2004). First, all of the un-modeled country information ends up 
being pooled into the single individual error term of the model and hence individuals 
belonging to the same country will presumably have correlated errors, which violates one of 
the basic assumptions of multiple regression. Second, by ignoring the existence of the upper 
level, one assumes that the regression coefficients apply equally to all countries, thus 
propagating the notion that processes work in the same way in different countries which is not 
always true. 
This study is based on a cross-national analysis of the relationship between different 
indicators of welfare state development and social trust levels. We use a multi-level logistic 
regression to check for policy specific effects between relevant types of social spending and 
interpersonal trust.13 A multi-level linear regression analysis is applied to detect the direct 
influence of social spending on respondents’ indicators of institutional trust.14 
 
The multi-level analysis will be defined on the basis of the following standard 
equation: logit [π (x)] = log (π (x) / (1 - π (x)) = ß0 + ßi Xi + ε i (Agresti, 1996) while taking 
into account both variations at the individual and country levels. The final model will take the 
below-given form and will be used for each of the target groups (pensioners and the 
unemployed) as well as for the whole population: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R_S_Spendingj – is relevant social expenditures, Xij – is a set of individual-level 
control variables, moj –is variance at the second (country) level, εij –is variance at the first 
(individual) level. We are interested in the estimate of the coefficient on the R_S_Spendingj 
variable, which will measure an average change in log of odds of having high rather than low 
interpersonal trust when relevant social expenditures increase by 1% while controlling for 
                                                 
13
 The choice of the logit was based on the fact that interpersonal trust is a dichotomous variable. 
14
 The choice of this method was based on the fact, that institutional trust can be considered a continuous 
variable. 
 
Log (π (more trusting)/ π (less trusting))ij = ß0 + ß1 R_S_Spendingj+ ß2 Xij+  moj+ εij, 
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individuals’ characteristics. The countries’ characteristics are not controlled for due to the 
small number of cases at the second level. We limit our analysis to fixed effects and do not 
study random effects since studying random effects goes beyond the scope of our analysis.  
Our expectations can be defined in technical terms as follows: if the crowding-out 
hypothesis holds, then we will obtain a negative sign on this coefficient. Moreover, if our 
assumption about the existence of policy specific effects is plausible, then we will have a 
different sign or at least different values on the coefficients of spending in the equations for 
pensioners and the unemployed compared to the equation for the whole population. 
 
The same logic is used to analyze the outcome and qualitative dimensions. More 
specifically, we substitute the relevant social spending with the measure of the level of 
decommodification and stratification. Support for the crowding-out hypothesis is obtained 
when the coefficients on these variables have a negative sign.  
For the qualitative dimension, we will substitute relevant social spending with the 
measure of universal versus categorical welfare programs (non means-tested versus means-
tested benefit schemes). Support for the crowding-out is obtained in the case of having a 
negative sign for the relevant variables.  
 
To assess the effects on institutional trust, the following linear model will be used:  
 
 
 
 
 
R_S_Spendingj – is relevant social expenditures, Xij – is a set of individual-level 
control variables, moj – is variance at the second (country) level, εij – is variance at the first 
(individual) level. Again, we model only fixed effects while random effects are not included 
in the model. As in the previous case, this can be explained by the fact that we are not 
interested in studying how the effects of individual level variables differ across countries but 
rather on the effects of country level variables, namely welfare state development, which can 
be done through fixed effects. Moreover, we do not include other country level covariates due 
to the fact that the number of cases at the second level is too small.  
The coefficient on R_S_Spending will measure an average change in the institutional 
trust score which is associated with a 1% change in relevant social expenditures when 
individuals’ characteristics are held constant. Our expectations can be formed as follows: 
crowding-out in institutional trust occurs if the sign on the coefficient of relevant social 
 
Institutional_Trustij = ß0 + ß1 R_S_Spendingj+ ß2 Xij+  moj+ εij 
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spending is negative. Moreover, the difference in the value and/or sign on this coefficient for 
the sub-samples will indicate the presence of policy specific effects.  
The same logic is used in order to assess the effects of the outcome and qualitative 
dimensions.  
 
The operationalization of the models will be done as follows: 
 
Dependent variables 
As it usually appears in the literature we distinguish between two types of social trust: 
interpersonal trust and trust in institutions. Interpersonal trust is defined on the basis of the 
following question: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or 
that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?’ A positive answer to the first part of 
question is interpreted as a high level of trust, and is assigned a value of 1. The opposite 
answer is treated as a low level of trust, and has a value of 0.  
 
Trust in institutions is a synthetic variable constructed on the basis of a range of 
questions concerning people’s confidence in various institutions. The answer to each question 
is measured on a four-scale basis varying from ‘a great deal’ to ‘none at all.’ For our 
dependent variable, we have selected the following institutions: the police, parliament, civil 
services, the social security system, the health care system, and the justice system. Van 
Oorschot (2006) shows through a factor analysis that all of them load on the same construct 
and the new scale has a quite high reliability level (0.80). We came to the same conclusion 
while repeating the factor and reliability analyses. The new variable ‘institutional trust’ was 
calculated by summing-up scores of construct parts so that the new scale had values varying 
from 6 to 24. However, for the ease of interpretation the values are recorded in a range from 1 
to 19 reflecting ‘no confidence’ to ‘high confidence’ in the selected institutions respectively.  
 
 
 Independent variables 
The main independent variable is social spending, which explicitly reflects the level of 
welfare state intervention in societal arrangements. We distinguish between total social 
spending, 15  social spending on public pensions, 16  and social spending on unemployment 
                                                 
15According to the definition of Eurostat (source of data), total expenditures on social protection include: social 
benefits, which consist of transfers, in cash or in kind, to households and individuals to relieve them of the 
burden of a defined set of risks or needs; administration costs, which represent the costs charged to the scheme 
for its management and administration; other expenditures, which consist of miscellaneous expenditure by social 
protection schemes (payment of property income and other). The functions (or risks) are: sickness/healthcare, 
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schemes, with each being measured as a percentage of GDP. In order to avoid the impact of 
cyclical fluctuations in GDP over the past years and the difference in economic performance 
across countries, we will calculate the average indicators of relevant social spending for the 
period starting from 1990 to 1998 which was the year preceding the survey. The main source 
of data for the European countries is the Eurostat website (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu, 
European System of Integrated Social Protection Statistics). This data source provides 
information on total social spending and social spending by functions. For non-European 
countries the additional information source is 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/54/35385805.xls for pension expenditures and 
http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/default.aspx?datasetcode=SOCX_AGG for spending on 
unemployment benefits.  
 
In addition, welfare state development is operationalized through welfare regime types. 
The grouping of countries is based on Esping-Andersen’s typology (1990): Scandinavian 
countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) form social democratic welfare regimes. 
English-speaking countries (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the United Kingdom 
and the United States) represent liberal regimes. Continental European and Mediterranean 
countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland) as 
well as Japan are grouped into a distinct type of conservative welfare regimes.  
 
The decommodification level is operationalized through both the decommodification 
index and the benefit generosity index. The former is a replication of the analysis of 
decommodification scores represented in the “three worlds of capitalism.” The latter takes 
into account the drawbacks of Esping-Anderson’s methodology and represents the level of 
generosity of social benefits. Both indicators were calculated by Scruggs and Allan (2006b) 
and made available to the public in their publications. We also use their stratification indexes 
for operationalizing stratification levels in the countries of interest. The indexes were again 
obtained by replicating Esping-Andersen’s analysis of stratification levels (Scruggs and Allan, 
2006a).    
The operationalization of the interaction between decommodification and the 
functional dimension is done by distinguishing between the decommodification levels of 
pension and unemployment policies. The main source for these decommodification scores is 
Bambra (2006).  
                                                                                                                                                        
disability, old age, survivors, family/children, unemployment, housing, and social exclusion not elsewhere 
classified. 
16
 Pensions include old age, disability and survivor pensions as well as early retirement benefits. In addition, the 
data are split between means-tested and non means-tested pension schemes measured as a percentage of GDP. 
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The division of welfare expenditures between means-tested and non means-tested 
expenditures is operationalized through the relevant social spending on means-tested schemes 
and non means-tested schemes measured as a percentage of GDP. The main source of 
information is the Eurostat web-site (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu, European System of 
Integrated Social Protection Statistics). A division is also made between pension and 
unemployment non means-tested and means-tested schemes while using the same source of 
information.  
 
Control variables  
Country wealth is measured through GDP in purchasing power standards per capita 
calculated as an average for 1995-1999 (source: Eurostat website: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu, Eurostat Structural Indicators, 19-05-2007,  and 
http://swivel.com/data_sets/show/1004852, 19-05-2007). Income inequality is operationalized 
through the ratio between the total income of those in the top 20% income group and those of 
the bottom 20%. The ratio is averaged out through the period from 1995 – 1999 (source: 
Eurostat website, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu, Eurostat Structural Indicators, 19-05-2007). 
We measure the level of economic ‘confidence’ in a country by averaging its unemployment 
rate over the period 1996-1999 (source: Eurostat website, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu, 
European Labour Force Survey, 19-05-2007). We operationalize corruption through the 
perceived index of corruption annually published by Transparency International 
(www.transparency.org, 19-05-2007).17 The percentage of Protestants living in each country 
is calculated from the World Values Survey. The fractionalization level is operationalized 
through the fractionalization index calculated by Alesina et al. (2003) 
(http://www.stanford.edu/~wacziarg/downloads/fractionalization.xls).   
 
The effects of volunteering are calculated by constructing a dummy that has a value of 
1 if an individual volunteers for at least one of the social welfare services (for the elderly, 
handicapped, or deprived people) or is involved in local community actions on issues like 
poverty, employment, housing, racial equality, third world development and human rights, the 
environment, ecology, and animal rights, or participates in voluntary organizations concerned 
with health, women’s movements, peace movements, or youth work. In the opposite case, the 
variable takes a value of 0, which means no volunteering and is used as a reference category. 
                                                 
17
 The index taken for 1999 has higher values for the countries with less corrupt behavior and low values for 
those with higher corruption levels.  
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We have also constructed a dummy to describe the individual’s propensity for socializing by 
using the WVS question about personal habits in meeting friends or colleagues. Those  who 
spend time with friends or colleagues outside the workplace at least once or twice per month 
are considered more sociable. If the frequency of socialization is less than that we see those 
individuals as less sociable and take this group as a reference category. Household income is 
measured on the basis of the ten-point scale used by survey participants in the WVS to rate 
their income status and is divided into five groups forming five quintiles. Unemployment is 
controlled in our analysis by a dummy with other employment status as a reference category 
(1=unemployed, 0=other). We also include dummies for Catholics and Protestants with all 
other religions labelled as ‘other’. As a reference category, we use a group of non-religious 
people. Religiousness in our analysis is an ordinal variable constructed on the basis of the 
frequency of church attendance. Education is measured by the highest degree reached by the 
individual and described on the basis of an 8-degree scale and categorized in three groups: the 
first comprises those with the lowest education levels, the second is for those with moderate 
education levels, and the third is for those with the highest education levels. We 
operationalize the age variable by calculating the actual age of the respondents (in years) at 
the moment the survey was conducted and by creating three groups: the first one comprising 
those between 15 and 29, the second of those between 30 and 44, and the third of those aged 
45 and older. To control for the gender of respondents, we have constructed a dummy with 
the following values: 1 for males and 0 for females.  
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Chapter 5: THE WELFARE STATE AND SOCIAL TRUST: A DESCRIPTIVE 
ANALYSIS  
 
5.1. Levels of interpersonal and institutional trust in OECD countries 
Before proceeding to the analysis of the effects welfare state development has on 
social trust formation, it is plausible to discuss trust level variation in the selected countries. 
The analysis reveals that the average level of interpersonal trust in 18 OECD countries 
represents a satisfactory value, equal to 0.41 out of 1, while the fluctuation among countries 
slightly exceeds 50% of the average score. When looking at the country case analysis, it 
becomes visible how different interpersonal trust indexes are among the chosen countries. 
The figure given below illustrates that out of 18 countries, Scandinavian countries can be 
considered highly trusting nations: the percentage of trusting people in Denmark, Sweden, 
Norway and Finland is around 60. These findings confirm the vast literature on the corporatist 
and participatory nature of the economic and political system of Northern Europe. At the 
same time, it also confirms a general opinion about the outstanding level of trust in the 
Scandinavian countries, which suggests that Scandinavian nations are outliers in all types of 
social capital discussions.  
 The Netherlands is also highly trusting. New Zealand follows Finland with about 50% 
of people who give a positive answer to the trust question.  The rest of the countries show 
little variation in the percentage of trusting people, which fluctuates on average between 30 
and 35 percent, being almost twice as less as the Scandinavian nations. 
 France was found to be the least trusting nation with slightly more than 20 percent of 
the population believing that other people can be trusted. The latter is difficult to explain. 
There is no economic and political instability in France, which is marked by foreign 
interventions, waves of refugees and immigrants, or periods of civil war and dictatorships. 
However, it is possible to assume that the development of civil society in France as well as in 
other countries with low trust levels is a slow process, which may explain the low trust levels 
there. In France, for instance, only 19.1 percent of people are members of different 
organizations. The same is also true for Italy and the United Kingdom where membership in 
organizations hardly exceeds 20 percent, compared to social democratic countries where the 
figure is around 80 percent.  
The findings are generally consistent with the results provided by other studies, which 
usually emphasize that the lowest levels of social capital can be found in the Mediterranean 
countries while the highest can be found in the Scandinavian nations (Frane, 2008; Van 
Oorschot and Arts, 2005).  
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Figure 5.1.: Variation of interpersonal trust in OECD countries  
(Source: World Values Survey) 
 
The analysis of the share of trusting populations by welfare regime type confirms the 
results obtained in the country case study. In social democratic regime types, about 63 percent 
of respondents believe that other people can be trusted. Surprisingly, liberal welfare regime 
types precede conservative types in the ranking, showing that on average the share of trusting 
people is slightly higher in the former than in the latter. The difference is however negligible: 
38.3 percent of the population is trusting in liberal regimes while the latter score equals 35.3 
percent in continental regimes.  
The analysis of the average level of institutional trust scores does not provide a clear 
distribution. In total, the average value of institutional trust among selected countries equals 
10 while the variation across nations constitutes about 30 percent of the average value. In 
Denmark, Austria, and Finland the institutional trust level reaches almost 12. In Italy, the 
confidence in institutions slightly exceeds 8 (out of 19), while the rest of the nations are 
situated somewhere in between:  trust in the rest of the countries varies between 10 and 11. 
 
 99 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
De
nm
ar
k 
Au
str
ia
Fin
lan
d
Ire
lan
d 
Sw
ed
en
 
Ne
the
rla
nd
s 
Fra
nc
e
Be
lgiu
m
 
Ge
rm
an
y UK Ita
ly
country
in
st
itu
tio
n
al
 
tr
u
st
 
le
v
el
 
Figure 5.2.: Variation of institutional trust in OECD countries  
Source: World Values Survey  
 
If we move to the welfare regime typology, we see less fluctuation in trust levels 
compared to the case of interpersonal trust. Social democratic regimes are at the top of the 
ranking with average institutional trust levels equal to 11.31. Liberal welfare regime types are 
in the middle with a value of 10.44 (out of 19). It is followed by conservative welfare regime 
types where the average institutional trust score equals 10.05.  
One should note that liberal countries reveal high levels of institutional and 
interpersonal trust. This result is observed despite the market liberalism that prevails in those 
countries. Christoforou (2004) explains this paradox by the fact that social groups and 
organizations within the economy’s sphere of voluntary activities work to supplement state 
welfare services, which creates an environment she calls ‘mixed economy welfare’ or 
‘welfare pluralism’.  
Special attention should be given to the analysis of the confidence people have 
towards the social security system. Although the general tendency coincides with that of trust 
in institutions, there are some specificities in the distribution of trust and mistrust among the 
selected nations. Scandinavian countries, along with Austria, Belgium, France, and the 
Netherlands, show a great deal of trust in their social security systems. Germany and Ireland 
are a bit behind but still have high amounts of confidence in welfare institutions. The United 
Kingdom and Italy close the ranking as the least trusting of their respective social security 
systems. 
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Table 5.1.: Distribution of trust and mistrust towards social security systems in 
18 OECD countries   
 
Country 
Confidence in social security system 
High Moderate Little None 
Australia - - - - 
Austria 17 50 29 4.0 
Belgium 14 55 24 7 
Canada - - - - 
Denmark 9 58 30 3 
Finland 8 62 26 4 
France 13 53 24 10 
Germany 3 43 45 9 
United Kingdom  4 30 50 16 
Ireland 12 46 36 6 
Italy 6 28 47 19 
Japan - - - - 
Netherlands 9 55 32 4 
New Zealand - - - - 
Norway - - - - 
Sweden 4 46 45 5 
Switzerland - - - - 
United States  - - - - 
Source:  World Values Survey 
 
The descriptive analysis of trust distribution in the selected 18 countries provides 
results which are in line with the existing findings. Social democratic countries come first in 
the level of both forms of social trust: interpersonal and institutional. They are followed by 
the liberal and continental welfare regime types which vary quite a bit in the case of 
interpersonal trust and negligibly in the case of institutional trust. It should be also noticed 
that the gap between continental and liberal countries is not as big as was expected.  
 
5.2. Changes in social trust levels over time 
As can be easily deduced from the research overview presented above, the theory 
explaining causal mechanism in the relationship between welfare state development and 
social capital formation is quite controversial. The empirical studies seeking to prove a 
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positive or negative direction are however more contradictory and ambiguous. The problem 
stems from the fact that there is no agreement among scholars in not only the direction of the 
relationship between these two variables of interest but also in the direction of social capital 
change over the last few decades. Putnam (1995, 2000) claims for instance that there is a 
decline in social capital levels over the period from 1930 to 1998 in the United States. He 
distinguishes four socio-economic/demographic factors explaining this trend18 without taking 
account of the effects of the welfare state.19 However, Putnam emphasizes the need to explore 
creatively how social policies infringe on social capital formation. Moreover, he recognizes 
their potential dubious impact: on the one hand, public policy may destroy highly effective 
social networks and norms while, on the other hand, some social policy, like the agricultural-
agent system, community colleges, and tax deductions for charitable contributions, may 
encourage social capital formation. 
Paxton goes further in his analysis than his predecessors by distinguishing between 
two components of social capital: trust and associations (Paxton, 1999) with trust being 
further divided into trust in institutions and trust in individuals. His analysis shows some 
decline in trust in individuals over the period from 1975 to 94 (about 0.5% drop per year), but 
no general decline in trust in institutions and no decline in associations. He does not analyze 
the effects of public policies either, but his contribution consists in attempting to explain the 
lack of agreement among scholars about the possible trends of social capital by the presence 
of a gap between the concept of social capital and its measurement. The research conducted 
later settled this problem by presenting social capital as a multidimensional concept and 
analyzing the dynamics of each component separately. 
Uslaner (2000-2001) comes to the same conclusion concerning the dynamics of 
interpersonal (generalized) trust found by Paxton. According to his calculations, over the past 
four decades the share of Americans who believe that most people can be trusted plummeted 
from 58% in 1960 to 36%. He demonstrates that this negative dynamics can be explained to 
some extent by the rise of Christian fundamentalism among believers accompanied by a 
simultaneous growth of the ‘unchurched’ in American society. But the main negative effect 
on social capital should have stemmed, in his opinion, from the increased pessimism among 
Americans about their future produced by the rise of income inequality.  
The same tendency of social capital over the last two decades was found by You Jong-
sung (2005) in Korea. But again, he explains this negative trend only with political and 
                                                 
18
 Among the key factors explaining this decline, he distinguishes between the movement of women into the 
labor market, increased mobility of the people, other demographic transformations (fewer marriages, more 
divorces, fewer children, lower real wages and so on), and the technological transformation of leisure. 
19
 There are several studies that either contest this tendency (Ladd, 1996) or try to explain it with other factors 
(Costa and Kahn, 2003) 
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economic factors without considering social policies as a potential threat to social capital 
formation. 
 In European countries, the dynamics of social capital usually appears to be more 
favorable. Hall (1999) find no erosion in social participation in Britain, but in line with 
Uslaner, he suggests that overall levels of social trust declined between 1956 and 1990. He 
cites three main factors20 that positively affect social capital in Britain, among which he 
mentions government actions, especially those having to do with the delivery of social 
services. The impact of government policies is however restricted to encouraging and 
sustaining voluntary community involvement by directly funding these activities through 
local or central authorities. Welfare state activities are hence largely ignored in his research.  
No decline in social capital was found in the other three European countries: 
Switzerland (Freitag, 2001), Finland (Siisiainen, 1999) and the Netherlands (De Hart and 
Dekker, 1999). But linking these trends in social capital to the social policies existing in their 
countries was not the subject of the analysis in those studies. 
Others argue that it is impossible to track changes in social capital at all. They ask the 
following question: if as Putnam argues, social capital is a phenomenon of long duration, how 
can it be quickly eroded? Schuller, Baron, and Field (2000) explain for instance that there is 
no logical requirement for temporal symmetry. In other words, it is not impossible for 
something which has developed incrementally over a long period of time to be summarily 
destroyed.  But inherent to the analysis of factors such as trust is the difficulty of discerning 
movement over time and isolating it from the range of other factors which in a long timescale 
is bound to present.  
Hardin (2006) also supports this idea. He asserts that the decline of trust in the United 
States and elsewhere is of too short a duration (a little more than four decades) to yield strong 
secular conclusions. The data on European nations other than Sweden and the United 
Kingdom are of a much shorter duration. There are other data, often much less focused, that 
tell us something about the long term trend, but making sense of these is sufficiently difficult 
and has spawned a large industry and many conflicting views.  
The World Values Survey provides data over the last two decades which to some 
extent represent too short a period to draw robust conclusions. Nevertheless, we use these data 
to describe at least a short term trend of interpersonal and institutional trust among the 
selected 18 nations. The results obtained give mixed evidence about the fluctuation of trust 
levels over the last two (or in some cases even fewer) decades.  In Australia, for instance, the 
                                                 
20
 Two other factors which may explain the absence of decline over the last decades are educational policy (a 
radical transformation in the educational system marked by a massive expansion of both secondary and 
postsecondary education) and changes in class structure of British society (driven by economic and political 
developments that have altered the distribution of occupations and life situations among the population).  
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share of people who positively answered the trust question slightly declined over the period 
from 1981 to 1998. The same tendency was found in France, the United Kingdom, and 
Switzerland. An especially sharp decline appeared in the United Kingdom, where the share of 
trusting people in the population dropped from 43.1 percent in 1981 to 28.9 percent in 1999.  
In Austria, Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, the percentage of 
the trusting population increased over the analyzed period. A particularly strong tendency of 
positive change was registered in the Netherlands: from 44.8 percent in 1981 to 60.1 percent 
in 1999. An almost equal increase was also found in Denmark: from 52.7 percent in 1981 to 
66.5 percent in 1999.  
Mixed results were found in the remaining countries: Belgium, Canada, Germany 
Ireland, and Italy. In these countries, the change in trust levels show some fluctuation: first, it 
increases over a short period, which is followed by the sudden drop in trust levels. In Canada 
for instance, trust increased from 1981 – 1993, when the share of the trusting population rose 
from 48.5 to 53.1 percent. But over the next decade it dropped to 37.0 percent. In Finland, the 
trend of trust indexes indicate a completely different trend. It shows a sharp drop in the 
percentage of the trusting population from 62.7 to 48.8 percent, but over the next 5 years it 
increased to 57.4 percent.   
 
Table 5.2.: Changes in interpersonal trust levels from 1981 – 2004  
 
Country 
Most people can be trusted, %  
(1) 
1981 - 1984 
(2) 
1989 - 1993 
(3) 
1994 - 1998 
(4) 
1999 - 2004 
Australia  48.2 - 40.0 - 
Austria - 31.8 - 33.4 
Belgium  29.2 33.5 - 29.2 
Canada 48.5 53.1 - 37.0 
Denmark  52.7 57.7 - 66.5 
Finland - 62.7 48.8 57.4 
France 24.8 22.8 - 21.3 
Germany  32,3 37.9 41.8 31.9 
United Kingdom   43.1 43.7 29.6 28.9 
Ireland  41.1 47.4 - 36.0 
Italy 26.8 35.3 - 32.6 
Japan 41.5 41.7 42.3 43.1 
Netherlands  44.8 53.5 - 60.1 
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New Zealand - - 49.1 - 
Norway 60.9 65.1 65.3 - 
Sweden  56.7 66.1 59.7 66.3 
Switzerland  42.6 37.0 - 
United States 40.5 51.1 35.9 36.3 
Source: World Values Survey 
 
A similar analysis of this trend is impossible for trust in institutions since the question 
about confidence in the healthcare system was only asked in the last wave. Instead of 
analyzing the synthetic indicator, the analysis of its elements will be done to observe the 
change in their levels. The first element, the confidence in social security system, represents a 
special interest for us. Again, this analysis is not possible for all countries since the data for 
some of them are either not available at all or available only for one wave. For those countries 
where the question about confidence was asked in both waves, one can derive two groups: the 
fist comprises those where a drop in the confidence level was found, the second includes 
those where a slight increase in the share of trustors in social security systems was observed. 
The former includes Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and the 
Netherlands. One should mention here that Germany represents an exceptional case in these 
groups of countries since the share of trustors decreased over the decades from 65.2 to 46.2 
percent. The second group includes three countries: Belgium, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom, where a slight increase in the share of trustors in social security was observed. The 
increase was however so small that the change is almost irrelevant: in Sweden from 46.0 to 
49.9 percent, in the United Kingdom from 32.5 to 34.7 percent, and in Belgium from 66.0 to 
68.9 percent.  
 
Table 5.3.: Changes in confidence in social security systems from 1989 - 2004 
 
Country 
Share of people having ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of confidence in 
the social security systems. 
 (2) 
1989 - 1993 
 (4) 
1999 - 2004 
Australia    -   - 
Austria  67  66 
Belgium   66  68 
Canada  61  - 
Denmark   69  67 
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Finland  74  70 
France  69  66 
Germany   65  46 
United Kingdom    32  34 
Ireland   59  58 
Italy  37  34 
Japan  43  - 
Netherlands   68  64 
New Zealand  -  - 
Norway  48  - 
Sweden   46  49 
Switzerland  -  - 
United States   52  - 
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey 
 
The change in the confidence in civic services, the police, parliament, and the juridical 
system shows different trends. The common trend in all of them is however the fact that in 
different countries the fluctuation of trust elements happened in a different way: in some of 
them, there was a decline in confidence indicators, in others – an increase. In other words, 
there is no single pattern that explains the change in confidence levels over time for the 
selected countries.  
An analysis of the confidence in civil services reveals three main groups of countries 
(see Appendix 1). The first group consists of Australia and France, where there was a clear 
decline in trust indicators over the analyzed period. The second group includes Denmark, 
Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, and Sweden, where confidence levels increased somewhat, 
although in some of the countries, this increase was too small to suggest a rise in indicators of 
institutional trust elements. Austria, Belgium, Canada, and the UK constitute the third group 
of countries, which can be characterized by no change in confidence in civil services. Their 
indicators remain almost unchanged during the analyzed period. Apart from these distinct 
groups, there are some countries, where the trend of change had a non-linear shape. Germany 
and the Netherlands are good examples: confidence levels in civil services tend to first 
increase but later decrease. In Norway, the fluctuation of confidence levels showed the 
opposite trend: it first increased and then declined.   
The confidence of people in parliament reveals similar trends (see Appendix 2). Again, 
there is no clear pattern of change that can adequately apply to all countries. Australia, Austria, 
France, Ireland and Japan are all characterized by a decrease in the share of the population 
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who have a lot of confidence in the parliament. Contrary to the countries mentioned above, 
there are also those where a clear increase in confidence occurred. Among the latter, Denmark, 
Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden should be mentioned. Belgium and the United Kibgdom 
belong to those countries where some increase in confidence in parliament was immediately 
followed by a decrease and thus no clear trend was obvious. The opposite fluctuation, 
characterized by an initial decrease in the trusting population followed by an increase, was 
found in Canada, Finland, Germany,  and Norway. In some of them, particularly in Canada, 
Germany, and Norway, the rise in the share of trusting people was not enough to off-set the 
initial decrease.  
Newton (2001) analyzes the reasons for the decline of trust in institutions in Finland 
where trust in parliament fell from 65 percent in 1980 to 34 percent in 1991. He specifies that 
the main reason for this loss in institutional trust was of declining economic and political 
situation in the country. In 1990 Finland fell into a deep economic recession in which 
unemployment grew, government deficits tripled, taxes increased, and services and wages 
were cut. In the same period, huge amounts of money fled the country and interest rates 
soared. Business bankruptcies multiplied while open conflict developed between the 
government and the central bank. A cabinet minister resigned and another minister was found 
guilty of corruption and expelled from parliament. Although social trust remained high, 
confidence in parliament and other public institutions collapsed. This led him to conclude that 
the problems of decline of institutional trust lay in political events.  
Change in confidence levels towards the police show more or less clear fluctuations 
(see Appendix 3). There are two distinct groups of counties, which combine those nations 
where there is a clear decline in trust and those where there is a clear increase in confidence in 
the police. More specifically, a decline in confidence was found in Australia, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Norway. A rise trust towards the police was found in 
Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, and Italy. Belgium, Japan, and Sweden 
cannot be assigned to either of these groups since their indicators tend to fall and then rise 
with the final indicators being less than the initial ones.  
Confidence in the Justice system follows the trends described above (see Appendix 4): 
on the one hand, there is again no single pattern of change inherent to all countries; on the 
other hand, the change in many of the selected counties is too small to infer about a decline or 
rise in confidence levels.  In Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the United 
Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway, the data provide evidence of some decline trust 
in justice system. An especially sharp drop was found in Australia, where the share of trustors 
declined from 60.5 percent in 1981 to 34.7 percent in 1994. Austria represents a case with a 
slight increase in the share of trust: the percentage of people who answered positively to the 
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question increased from 58.4 percent in 1989 to 68.1 percent in 1999. The data for other 
counties show some fluctuation in the confidence level over the selected periods. In Finland 
for instance, a slight increase in the share of trustors was followed by an equally slight 
decrease so that the overall share of trustors remained almost unchanged. In Germany, Ireland, 
Japan, and Sweden, the trend was the opposite: some drop in the share of trustors was 
followed by an increase, however in some countries (Sweden) the initial level of confidence 
was not attained in the end.   
The analysis thus provides some evidence of fluctuation for both forms of trust: 
interpersonal and institutional. The common aspect for all of them is the fact that there is no 
single pattern that describes trust changes from 1981 – 2004 in all 18 selected countries. In 
some of them, the decline in the share of trusting populations was found, in others some 
increase was present. There are also countries which are characterized by a sharp fluctuation 
of trust levels within the period pointing out either the fact that trust may change within short 
periods as a result of economic, political, or social changes, or the problems of representation 
in the data for the selected countries.  
The interesting aspect here is the relationship between interpersonal and institutional 
trust. Newton (2001) suggests that the relationship between these two types of trust is rather 
asymmetrical: healthy stocks of political capital cannot be built up in nations lacking social 
capital, but it also cannot dwindle rapidly in countries with well developed interpersonal trust. 
In the long run, the two are likely to adjust to one another in the sense that higher levels of 
social capital tend to be associated with higher levels of political (institutional) trust.  
The results thus indicate that interpersonal trust is stable over the analyzed period, 
while institutional trust may vary substantially within a short period of time. There is however 
no single pattern that the change of institutional trust follows. Both increases and decreases of 
trust levels were detected in the analysis.  
 
5.3.Social trust and social expenditures: a descriptive analysis 
Before proceeding to the preliminary analysis of the relationship between social trust 
and social expenditures, it is worth investigating the level of social spending and its 
fluctuation over the last two decades. The figure given below illustrates social spending on 
average from 1990 – 2000 in 18 OECD countries. There is no clear trend in the level of social 
expenditures distribution. Scandinavian and continental countries are among those with the 
highest social spending. English speaking countries represent the least generous in terms of 
social expenditures. Japan closes the ranking with total social spending almost half in the 
countries situated at the top of ranking.  
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Figure 5.3.: Social expenditures averaged from 1990-2000.  
Source: own calculations based on OECD data (http://www.oecd.org/statisticsdata/ 20-04-2007) 
 
When analyzing social expenditure levels by welfare regime type (Appendix 5), the 
data provide evidence that support the expectations. Social democratic regimes are 
characterized by the highest level of social expenditures – around 27.4 percent of GDP from 
1990 – 2000. In the countries belonging to the liberal welfare regime type, the level of social 
spending is substantially lower, slightly exceeding 17 percent of GDP. Conservative welfare 
regimes are situated in between with social expenditures from 1990 -2000 equal to 22 percent.  
When tracking the change in the level of social spending in the selected countries 
(Appendix 6), one should mention that the general logic of the trend is similar to what one 
expects. From 1980 – 1990, there was an expansion of social expenditures in all countries 
which continued in some of them up to the mid 1990s. This expansion was followed by a 
curtailment of social spending throughout the 1990s and resulted in a decrease in public 
expenditures on social policy. It is however impossible to analyze how this affected social 
trust levels due to the lack of longitudinal data for social trust.   
One can nevertheless link social trust indexes to social expenditure levels in a static 
point of time. In doing this, one obtains results that point to the existence of a certain 
relationship between the two variables of interest. In the case of interpersonal trust, there are 
three distinct groups of countries which almost correspond to Esping-Andersen’s welfare 
regime typology. The first group combines Scandinavian nations and the Netherlands where a 
high level of social spending is associated with a high level of interpersonal trust. The second 
group of countries represents those belonging to conservative regime types and where a 
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relatively high level of spending is associated with relatively moderate trust levels. The 
exceptional case here is France where, in spite of relatively high social expenditures, the level 
of social trust remains low. The third group comprises countries with liberal welfare regimes 
as well as Japan that have low social spending and moderate interpersonal trust levels.   
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Figure 5.4.: Relating interpersonal trust to social expenditures 
Source: own calculations based on OECD (http://www.oecd.org/statisticsdata/ 20-04-2007) and the World 
Values Survey  
 
A similar relationship is seen in the case of institutional trust. Figure 5.5. points to the 
existence of three distinct groups of countries with social spending levels corresponding to 
certain institutional trust levels. The first group combines Scandinavian countries and Austria, 
where high levels of social spending are associated with high levels of institutional trusts. The 
second group of countries includes those belonging to continental welfare regime types that 
have relatively high levels of social spending as well as relatively moderate levels of 
institutional trust. The third group of countries represents liberal welfare regime types, where 
low levels of social spending are associated with the lowest levels of confidence towards 
institutions. The exception here is Italy and Ireland, which show the opposite trend. In Italy, 
high levels of social expenditures are found to be associated with very low institutional trust 
Sweden  
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levels. In Ireland, on the contrary, low levels of public spending are linked to high levels of 
institutional trust almost equal to those in Scandinavian countries.  
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Figure 5.5.: Relating institutional trust to social expenditures 
Source: own calculations based on OECD (http://www.oecd.org/statisticsdata/ 20-04-2007) and the World 
Values Survey  
 
Similar results can be obtained when clustering countries according to their levels of 
social trust. The hierarchical cluster analysis based on the method aimed at detecting the 
nearest neighbor provides results which to some extent reflect Esping-Andersen’s typology. 
Conservative countries including Belgium, France, and Germany together with the United 
Kingdom form a distinct group which differs in trust levels from the rest of Europe. 
Scandinavian nations, together with the Netherlands and Austria, can also be combined in a 
separate cluster which does show some in-group variation of social trust levels. These two 
groups are quite distant from each other, but are located as nearest neighborhood families. 
Italy is situated relatively far from them, forming a distinct group with its own variations in 
trust levels. The latter supports the need to isolate South-European countries from the rest of 
Europe in analyzing the trust levels. The absence of the liberal group can be explained by the 
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fact that only the United Kingdom and Ireland were included in the analysis due to a lack of 
data on institutional trust in other countries with liberal welfare regimes.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.6.: Hierarchical cluster analysis of social trust  
 
Source: Own calculations based on the WVS  
 
 
Thus, the cluster analysis reveals that there is a certain grouping of countries on the 
basis of their social trust levels that coincides to some extent with Esping-Andersen’s welfare 
regime typology. Hence, there must be some association between the level of welfare state 
intervention in social arrangements and the trust behavior of individuals. The descriptive 
analysis thus confirms this hypothesis but, in order to draw decent conclusions about the 
dependence of social trust scores on the level of welfare state development, one should move 
to an exploratory analysis which would allow one to control for possible spurious and 
interpretation effects of individuals’ and countries’ characteristics.  
When empirically relating the level of interpersonal and institutional trust to total 
social spending, we obtain results which again advocate for the presence of a certain 
relationship. A multilevel analysis that includes only one variable at the second level, namely 
total social spending, provides the following results:  
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Table 5.4.: A multi-level analysis of the effects of social spending on social trust  
 Institutional trust Interpersonal trust 
Total social spending  0.057*** 
 
0.043*** 
Variance at level 1 
(individual level) 
9.522 - 
Variance at level 2 (country 
level)  
0.339 0.333 
Source: Own calculations based on the WVS  
 
The results lead one to believe that social spending has positive effects on both forms 
of social trust if not controlling for the country- or individual level characteristics are not 
controlled for. An increase in total social spending by one percent increases institutional trust 
by 0.057 units and increases the odds of trust by 4.4 percent. The values are not that high but 
still assume a positive relationship between social trust and social spending, which requires a 
further investigation of these effects. Moreover, controlling for the level of social spending 
reduces variance at the country level from 0.672 to 0.339 for institutional trust. For 
interpersonal trust, this decrease in variance is less substantial: from 0.335 to 0.333, pointing 
out that in the case of interpersonal trust, macro-level characteristics play a weaker role in 
defining its levels.  
The lack of longitudinal data poses a problem for analyzing the relationship between 
welfare state development and social trust formation. The static view in this case gives us a 
limited understanding about the dependence of trust levels on the intervention of the state in 
social interactions. But even a static analysis points to the existence of a certain relationship 
between social spending and the level of both types of social trust: interpersonal and 
institutional. To conduct more inquiry into the nature and strength of this relationship, one 
should proceed to an exploratory analysis, which will allow us to draw conclusions about the 
kind of effects social policy conducts on social trust.  
  
5.4.Overview and concluding remarks  
This chapter analyzes the level of interpersonal and institutional trust among the 
selected countries as well as its change over time. The analysis shows that the average value 
of both interpersonal as well as institutional trust is highest in social democratic welfare 
regimes and is followed by liberal welfare regimes, with conservative welfare regime sclosing 
the ranking. However, when analyzing institutional trust, one reveals less fluctuation 
compared to the case of interpersonal trust. The analysis of the changes in interpersonal trust 
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from 1981-2004 provides evidence that points to fact that there is no single pattern followed 
by all selected countries. In Australia, France, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland, the 
share of people who positively answered the trust question slightly declined over the period 
from 1981 – 1998. In Austria, Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, the 
share of the trusting population increased over the analyzed period. Mixed results were found 
in the remaining countries: Belgium, Canada, Germany, Ireland, and Italy, where the trend of 
trust change shows some fluctuation. First, it increases over a short period followed by a 
sudden drop in trust levels. The same pattern was found when analyzing the fluctuation of 
institutional trust over the selected period. For those countries, where the question of 
confidence in public welfare institutions was asked in all waves of the survey, one can derive 
two groups: the first comprises those where a drop in confidence levels was found (Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and the Netherlands), the second includes 
those where a slight increase in the share of trustors was present (Belgium, Sweden and the 
UK). 
When linking social trust indexes to social expenditure levels in a static point of time, 
the results point to the existence of a certain relationship between the two variables of interest. 
Scatter plots allow us to visualize three distinct groups of countries which almost correspond 
to Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime typology. The analogous results were obtained when 
using a hierarchical cluster analysis, which provided a grouping of countries similar to 
welfare regime typology. When relating social spending to social trust levels, we discovered a 
certain correlation between these variables. Moreover, inclusion in the multilevel model of 
social spending explains large share of variation in social trust, especially at the country level.  
The descriptive analysis is not however based on the idea about the 
multidimensionality in operationalizing welfare state development. The analysis of the effects 
of each dimension on social trust should thus be undertaken to estimate possible effects 
welfare states can have on social trust levels. This analysis will be provided in the next three 
chapters, which will relate different measures of welfare states development to social trust 
indexes. The first step in performing this analysis will consist in disaggregating total social 
spending on a functional basis, which will allow us to see whether or not the effects of social 
policies can be policy specific.  
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Chapter 6: POLICY SPECIFIC EFFECTS OF WELFARE STATES’ IMPACT ON 
SOCIAL TRUST: THE FUNCTIONAL DIMENSION 
 
 
6.1. Introducing a functional spectrum in social trust analysis  
Welfare states differ in many characteristics and are all based on certain principles 
within which social policies are conducted. Their policy preferences were developed in the 
countries’ specific institutional, political, historical, cultural, and economic conditions, 
resulting in different levels and structures of benefit packages (Flora, 1986; Bonoli, 2004). 
Generally speaking, each country has its own specific preferences in choosing from the 
standard range of policies that would insure not only individual well-being but also societal 
prosperity. Hence, when measuring the welfare state as a single indicator, one blurs the 
difference in the structure of social policies and automatically assumes their ‘linearity’ or 
equivalence in their impact on social capital. Certainly, one may distinguish the difference in 
the impact on social trust produced by child-care provisions or training programs for the 
unemployed or passive provisions of unemployment benefits. They all affect social capital in 
different ways through different indirect mechanisms leading to different directions of change. 
Child-care provisions for instance allow women to combine employment and motherhood and 
hence work even when they have small children (Esping-Andersen, 2001). Employment 
means additional income in the household which is usually associated with high levels of 
social capital (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Putnam, 2000; Uslaner, 2002a,b) as well as with a 
broader personal network, which also enhances social capital development (Lin, 2000a,b). 
Obligatory training programs for unemployed people allow them to directly increase their 
social capital through gaining knowledge (an important determinant of social capital 
according to Fukuyama (2000), Knack and Zak (2001)), as well as indirectly through helping 
them feel integrated and less pessimistic about their future. Passive unemployment benefits 
replace the lost source of income, affecting to some extent the individual’s perception of his 
current situation and his expectations concerning the future that again can influence his trust 
level. It is difficult to find theoretical research that explicitly supports our argument, but even 
at the intuitive level, one can deduce the conclusion that each social policy affects social 
capital through specific direct or indirect mechanisms, which differ in strength, direction, and 
duration. Therefore, if not distinguishing the possible diversity of effects welfare state activity 
may produce on social capital, one may face several problems which were outlined earlier.  
However, some explanations should be delivered, in order to understand the 
mechanisms underlying crowding-out effects in two selected social provisions (pensions and 
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unemployment benefits). In the case of the whole population, crowding-out is expected due to 
the erosion of volunteering, which is a basic explanation for crowding-out effects. In the case 
of pensioners and the unemployed, the mechanism is quite different. The explanation of these 
mechanisms is based on the idea that social trust can be considered an attitudinal variable and, 
hence, the theory of attitude formation and change can be employed for describing the 
mechanism that underlies the crowding-out effects in trust among unemployed and retired 
people.  
Attitude is usually defined as the view of an individual on a specific phenomenon, a 
state of things or an object in real life (Blomberg and Kroll, 2002). There are several factors 
that affect an individual’s attitude. First of all, the attitude arises as a consequence of the ideas 
of the desirable – the values internalized by the individual. Or in other words, attitudes can be 
seen as expressions of underlying values. Values are seen here as fundamental and constant 
ideas about what is desirable in principle, and are not connected to any specific phenomena in 
real life. 
 Another factor that influences attitudes towards welfare state systems is self-interest. 
Attitudes are interpreted here as expressions of the aspiration of individuals and groups to 
maximize their self-interests. These two approaches – values and self-interests - seem to 
complement each other. One can easily assume that the individual, when taking up a position 
on a certain issue in real life, takes into consideration his or her values as well as his or her 
self-interests. Moreover, both theories presume that attitudes may change over time.  
Finally, Blomberg and Kroll (2002) define the third group of factors which might 
claim responsibility for changes in attitudes. They refer to Sihvo and Uusitalo (2000), who 
discuss different theoretical approaches that stress the impact of an economic crisis on the 
attitudes of the population. This group comprises three different approaches, each of which is  
related to an individual’s perception of recent changes in welfare states.  
A first approach stresses the consequences of people’s perception of economic decline; 
if a person feels that his or her personal economic situation is being threatened (directly or 
through increase taxation) his or her willingness to take the common good into consideration 
through contributing to the welfare system will be negatively affected. A second theoretical 
approach is concerned with the impact on attitudes of the population of influential groups 
such as politicians, political parties, and other organizations, and their interpretation of the 
state of the economy and their views on the interplay between social policy and the economy. 
A third approach deals with the impact on attitudes of actual changes in the welfare system. 
Sihvo and Uusitalo (2000 in Blomberg and Kroll, 2002) assume that the synchronous effects 
of more people using the system and a lowering of the level of social security that can result 
from an economic crisis might lead to changes in attitudes towards the system. Blomberg and 
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Kroll (2002) present other assumption based on different reasoning. They assert that cuts in 
services are thought to result in a vicious circle of cutback policies: the lowered standard of 
public services results in growing dissatisfaction, which in turn leads to more positive 
attitudes towards alternative service—providers and a growing pressure to privatize, which 
results in a further lowering of the standard of public services and thus to even greater 
dissatisfaction and negative attitudes towards  public services.   
We will try to explain the mechanism of trust formation using the attitudinal theory 
presented above. In the case of unemployed people, the effects of the welfare state on trust 
levels provide the possibility of crowding-out effects. This may happen despite the fact that 
the values of individuals with respect to providing support for the unemployed show support 
for state intervention. It is possible to claim that most people base their considerations on the 
view that the unemployed must be in one way or another supported by the state. For instance, 
Matheson and Wearing (2002) look to ISSP data to illustrate the fact that about 52.6 percent  
of Australians, 74.3 percent of Germans, 87.5 percent of Norwegians, and 48.0 percent of 
Americans declare that the state should assume the responsibility to look after the 
unemployed.  This reflects the common view that the risk of becoming unemployed is quite 
high for any individual. Moreover, as Rothstein (1998) shows, individuals tend to 
overestimate the risk of entering unemployment, which results in the vast support of 
unemployment programs even if they are based on means-testing.  
An analysis of the value component does not however reveal the mechanism of 
crowding-out effects. What is responsible for crowding-out here is precisely the self-interest 
of individuals. Higher unemployment benefits can encourage people to stay unemployed 
longer, while being unemployed is negatively associated with social capital. Unemployment 
brings relative poverty and creates sentiments of discrimination and injustice, which lead to 
distrust towards people, collective action and society as a whole. Goul Andersen (2002) 
shows that labour market marginalization is related to low political trust levels, which can 
easily be extrapolated to interpersonal trust. Moreover, he illustrates that under the conditions 
of unemployment, there is a polarization between insiders and outsiders in the labor market, 
which also leads to problems with collective action. Christoforou (2004) also demonstrates 
that unemployment is an important factor in deciding the level of social capital, pointing out 
that unemployment creates a strong disincentive for group membership. She argues that the 
unemployed lack the income to afford group membership or they spend their plentiful leisure 
time seeking jobs and securing a source of minimum income rather than participating in 
groups. Additional factors affecting the individual’s incentive to participate when facing 
unemployment might lie in sentiments of distrust he or she develops towards other social 
groups and society as a whole, which are considered to have deprived him or her of 
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opportunities for employment and self-development. She refers also to Brehm and Rahn who 
confirm the negative impact of being unemployed on an individual’s sentiments of 
interpersonal trusts.  
As far as the third factor group is concerned, one can hardly apply it to the case of the 
unemployed, since the alternatives to state support of individual welfare during 
unemployment hardly exist. To sum up, the attitudinal theory may provide the mechanisms of 
crowding-out effects for unemployed people. The latter consists in the desire of unemployed 
people to stay in unemployment and get unemployment benefits as long as possible when 
these allow one to secure decent living standards without entering the labor market. The latter 
will lead to the erosion of both forms of social trust due to the fact that unemployment 
negatively affects trust levels. 
As far as pensioners are concerned, the mechanism of crowding-out effects takes a 
different form which is not easy to describe. Both values and self-interests point out rather the 
existence of a positive relationship between pensions and interpersonal trust. The value of 
people towards pension systems can be articulated as follows: retired people should be 
supported by the state. Matheson’s and Wearing’s (2002) calculations based on ISSP data 
clearly illustrate this opinion. More precisely, they show that the vast majority of the 
population consider that securing the well-being of retired people must be the task of the state. 
In particular, 93.2percent of Australians, 92.6 percent of Germans, 97.8 percent of 
Norwegians and 82.5 percent of Americans declare that it is the government’s responsibility  
to look after retired people.  
The positive effects of pensions on trust towards public institutions might be 
supported by the fact that for a great number of retired poeple, pensions constitute their main 
source of income. Empirics for instance show that the share of public pensions in total gross 
household income of all pensioner households amounts to about 80 percent. More precisely, 
this share amounts to 80.9 percent in France, 83.3 percent in Germany, and 75.2 percent in 
Spain (Bönker, 2005).  
Self-interests might affect attitudes towards public institutions in the same way as 
values. This seems to be a result of the fact that everybody is at risk of retirement to the same 
degree. In other words, retirement is unavoidable and, hence, people must form positive 
attitudes towards the public pension system forming the ground for positive effects of 
pensions on institutional trust , which in turn affects interpersonal trust among  individuals.  
Up to now the question about the mechanism of crowding-out in trust levels remains 
open. Values interpretation and self-interests articulation leave no room for the negative 
impact of pensions on trust levels. Here, this is the effect of the third factor of attitudes 
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change that can be responsible for the negative influence on trust levels, namely that of 
economic crises factors.  
The data used stem from the survey conducted in 1999-2000 – the years of the 
constant debates about the need to transform the institutional settings underlying pension 
systems in almost all countries included in the analysis. They were also years of rapid and 
sometimes drastic reforms in pension systems that resulted in the reduction of pension levels 
or the tightening of entitlement conditions. Moreover, it should be noticed that the changes in 
pension systems and the debates that accompanied them were larger in countries where 
pension expenditures were higher. Furthermore, Adelantado and Cuevas (2006) demonstrate 
that countries that used to allocate the most resources to public expenditures and social 
protection expenditures are those that have cut back the most and where income inequality 
and the risk of poverty have increased the most. This logic can be easily applied to pension 
spending. This can be grounds for negative attitudes by the pensioners towards the welfare 
state in general, and the pension system in particular. To adjust Blomberg and Kroll’s (2002) 
statement, the logic of reasoning is as follows: constant reduction in pensions and changes in 
entitlement conditions produce negative attitudes towards pension systems. More specifically, 
lowered standards of public services result in growing dissatisfaction among the population, 
which in turn leads to more positive attitudes towards alternative sources, namely to 
privatized pensions. This dissatisfaction with the pension system is supported by the fact that 
pensioners are among those who are least satisfied with their income. As the WVS data show, 
the level of income satisfaction among retired people equals 3.7, almost half than of the fully 
employed (6.2), or partially employed (5.5). Even students are more satisfied with their 
income than pensioners (the satisfaction score for students equals 4.6). The dissatisfaction of 
retired people with their income may also have some side-effects on their trust levels towards 
the pension system in particular and public institutions in general. They may create incentives 
for the middle and upper classes to search for social security in the private sector (Forma, 
2002), reflecting the undermined confidence towards public welfare state institutions. This 
dissatisfaction with welfare state institutions is also supported by Goul Andersen’s findings 
(2002) which show that old-aged pensioners have the most negative attitudes towards the 
welfare state.  
The effects of recent changes in pension levels and the conditions of their delivery 
may thus ruin an individual’s level of trust towards the national pension system and public 
institutions. The latter in turn contributes to the negative experience of people which may also 
negatively affect an individual’s trust towards other people.21  
                                                 
21
 Rothstein and Stolle (2003) for example find that confidence in institutions has a large effect on interpersonal 
trust. Jamal (2007) also argues that those individuals who feel existing political institutions are adequate in 
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We try to correct for the existing drawbacks by analyzing the effects of pension and 
unemployment policies on social trust of their direct recipients.  This analysis will allow us to 
draw two main conclusions. First, it will show whether pension and unemployment policies 
result in crowding-in or crowding-out effects on social trust. Second, we will be able to see 
whether the effects of the welfare state operationalized as a single indicator through total 
social spending as percentage of GDP are equal to those of pension and unemployment 
policies. If there is a difference, owe can speak about policy specific effects.  
 
 
6.2.Policy specific effects: a descriptive analysis 
Before proceeding to the analysis, it is worth seeing whether the level of social trust in 
both of its forms among pensioners and unemployed people is different from that calculated 
on the basis of the whole population.  
The analysis of the level of interpersonal and institutional trust among subgroups of 
pensioners and the unemployed provides no clear results. The level of interpersonal trust 
tends to be on average lower among pensioners than among the whole population. To some 
extent, this contradicts the expectations and the theory that asserts that older people have 
higher levels of trust which is attributed either to the age or cohort effects.  
The unemployed are characterized by lower levels of interpersonal trust than the 
whole population and pensioners. This confirms our expectations since unemployment tends 
to erode social capital due to making unemployed people feel at a disadvantage compared to 
others, which destroys their trust levels. However, the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark are 
an exception, where the level of interpersonal trust among the unemployed is incredibly high 
and exceeds that of both the whole population and pensioners.  
                                                                                                                                                        
representing their interests are more likely to trust others. Because individuals feel that existing political 
institutions can protect their interests, they are more likely to feel secure in trusting others. In other words, 
representative institutions can create the foundation for trust. When citizens feel their rights are protected 
through legal institutions they are more inclined to trust others.  
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Figure 6.1.: Interpersonal trust levels among the whole population, pensioners, and 
the unemployed  
Source: World Values Survey  
 
Institutional trust has a different distribution, which leads us to think that it differs 
in the mechanism of its formation from interpersonal trust. Institutional trust tends to be 
higher among pensioners than among the whole population, which is consistent with the 
theory mentioned above. The unemployed are last in the comparison of trust levels since 
they tend to have the lowest levels of trust. The exception here is the Netherlands and 
Sweden, which are characterized with indexes of institutional trust that exceed trust scores 
among the whole population and pensioners.   
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 Figure 6.2.: Institutional trust levels among the whole population, pensioners, and 
the unemployed  
Source: World Values Survey  
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A descriptive analysis of the relationship between trust and relevant social spending 
provides mixed results. For the OECD sample, there is evidence that advocates for the 
presence of crowding-out effects, but it happens only in the case of pension spending. The 
relationship between pension spending and both forms of trust among pensioners is negative 
and statistically significant. The correlation indexes here appear to be negative but with have 
rather low values, indicating that higher spending on pension policy entails a decline in the 
level of both forms of trust among pensioners. In the rest of the cases: for the whole 
population and the unemployed, we find a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between relevant social spending and trust levels among their direct recipients, indicating the 
presence of crowding-in effects. It is also worth mentioning that for interpersonal trust the 
correlation coefficient calculated on the basis of the whole population is equal to that 
computed for the sub-sample of the unemployed. In the case of institutional trust, the latter is 
however more than half of the former. This allows us to conclude at this early stage that the 
effects of welfare states on social trust are policy specific.  
 
Table 6.1.: Correlation between relevant social spending and social trust among the 
whole population, pensioners, and the unemployed in OECD countries.  
 R e l e v a n t  s o c i a l  s p e n d i n g 
 
Total social 
spending 
 
 
Social spending on 
pensions 
Social spending on 
unemployment 
 
 
 
 
 
0.054*** 
 
0.068*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.073*** 
 
-0.097*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.059*** 
 
0.156*** 
 
Whole population 
 
1. Interpersonal trust 
 
2. Institutional  trust 
 
Pensioners 
 
1. Interpersonal trust 
 
2. Institutional trust 
 
Unemployed 
 
1. Interpersonal trust 
 
2. Institutional trust 
 
 
Source:  Own calculations based on the World Values Survey  
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Thus, the descriptive analysis shows that the relationship between relevant social 
spending and social trust is policy specific. The correlation coefficients for the whole 
population take different values from those calculated for the sub-population of the 
unemployed and pensioners. Hence, one should speak about crowding-in effects when 
analyzing the relationship between welfare state development and social trust formation. At 
this early stage, the results mostly advocate about positive effects that social spending has on 
both forms of social trust.  
 
6.3. Relevant social spending and social trust: an aggregated-level analysis 
Aggregated level analysis refers to the relationship between the level of relevant social 
spending in the selected countries and the average level of social trust among their population. 
The analysis is conducted by calculating the correlation between social spending and social 
trust for the selected sub-samples, while sequentially controlling for country-level 
characteristics.  
 
Table 6.2.: Correlation between relevant social expenditures and social trust, controlled for 
country-level characteristics22  
 
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey  
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 * - 10% ,  ** 5%, *** 1% and less  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlatio
n between 
relevant 
social 
expenditur
es and 
social trust 
 
 
 
Controlled for 
Percentage 
of 
protestants  
 
Wealth 
 
 
Income 
Inequality  
 
Corruption  
 
Fractionaliz
ation  
Whole population 
 
1. Interpersonal trust 
 
2. Institutional trust 
 
 
 
0,325** 
 
0,289* 
 
 
0.145* 
 
0.071 
 
 
0,319 
 
0,456 
 
 
-0,279** 
 
-0,679* 
 
 
0,359 
 
0,038** 
 
 
0.436 
 
0.218 
Pensioners 
 
1. Interpersonal trust 
 
2. Institutional trust 
 
 
 
-0,273* 
 
-0,550* 
 
 
-0.159 
 
-0.523* 
 
 
-0273 
 
-0,258 
 
 
-0,458* 
 
-0,678** 
 
 
-0,089 
 
-0,218* 
 
 
-0.135 
 
-0.550* 
 
Unemployed 
 
1. Interpersonal trust 
 
2. Institutional trust  
 
 
 
 
0,365* 
 
0,728** 
 
 
 
 
 
0.438* 
 
0.325 
 
 
0,434 
 
0,478* 
 
 
 
0,098* 
 
0,289** 
 
 
0,269 
 
0,202* 
 
 
0.569 
 
0.319 
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The analysis of the crowding-out hypothesis through the functional dimension 
provides results that advocate for the crowding-out effects in social capital. The correlation 
between relevant social spending and social trust is positive in the case of the whole 
population and the unemployed. When relating pension spending to the average trust levels 
among pensioners, the relationship appears to be negative. The latter allows us to conclude 
two things. First, in the case of pension spending, there is a clear case of crowding-out. 
Second, the effects of social spending are policy specific.  
When sequentially controlling for country-level characteristics, the correlation 
between relevant social spending and social trust among their direct recipients loses its 
strength, remaining in many cases statistically insignificant. In particular, controlling for 
income inequality greatly influences the relationship in question. In the case of the whole 
population, the relationship between institutional trust and total social spending becomes 
negative when income inequality is held constant and it also remains statistically significant. 
The same happens in the case of pensioners for both interpersonal and institutional trust, with 
both cases being statistically significant. For the unemployed, the relationship remains 
positive but becomes much weaker while still being statistically significant. It can be 
interpreted that the effect of social spending on social trust is absorbed by the inequality 
variable, which means that the impact of social spending is mediated through the reduction of 
inequality. This can be considered evidence for the integration argument, which emphasizes 
that welfare states raise social trust levels by keeping individuals socially integrated and by 
reducing the income inequality. 
Another interesting point that arises from controlling for inequality is the fact that the 
direct effect of total social spending and pension spending on social trust is negative. This 
means that social spending crowds out social trust when their redistributive effect is 
controlled for. In other words, if reduction of inequality is controlled for, social spending 
tends to erode social trust. However, the mechanism of this erosion still remains unclear. The 
only option is to use the existing theory, which emphasizes that crowding-out happens 
through the destruction of civic engagement or through the erosion of people’s ability to work 
with one another. It seems that the civil society erosion argument or the moral destruction 
argument hold true as well, although we possess no empirical analysis that proves this 
assumption.  
An interesting conclusion can also be inferred from the results of controlling for the 
corruption level. In most cases, correlation coefficients between relevant social spending and 
social trust lose their value when controlling for corruption levels and it is especially obvious 
in the case of institutional trust. It suggests that people develop their trust, especially towards 
 124 
public welfare state institutions, based on their performance, in particular taking into account 
the level of corruption. Thus, the effect of welfare states on social trust also goes through the 
corruption level in public welfare state institutions. If they are considered to treat people 
equally, they form the necessary grounds for the positive evaluation of public welfare state 
institutions, which results in higher levels of trust towards them. This is a confirmation of the 
macro-level institutional theory, which emphasizes the importance of the quality of the 
performance of public institutions in the process of trust formation.  
The other country-level covariates also conduct some effect on the relationship 
between relevant social spending and social trust. Controlling for the percentage of 
Protestants living in the country mainly reduces the value of the coefficients. However, they 
remain negative when relating pension spending to social trust among pensioners. The same 
influence on the relationship in question is found in the case of the wealth variable. When 
controlling for the level of GDP, a negative sign is seen in the correlation between pension 
spending and social trust among pensioners. 
Controlling for fractionalization levels results in positive correlation coefficients for 
total social spending and social trust among the whole population, and for unemployment 
spending and social trust among the unemployed. A negative correlation is still obtained for 
pension spending and social trust among pensioners, which is statistically significant for 
institutional trust.  
The aggregated level of analysis already provides evidence that supports the idea of  a 
multidimensionality in welfare state activities. Moreover, our results are in line with the 
expectations of policy specific effects. The latter can be concluded from the fact that the 
values of correlation coefficients calculated based on data for the whole population differ 
substantially from subsamples of pensioners and the unemployed. Hence, in order to reveal 
the true relationship between welfare states and social trust, one should relate relevant social 
spending to trust indicators among their direct recipients. In addition, our analysis points to 
the fact that not all social policies erode social trust. Some of them may actually enhance trust 
levels among certain groups of the population, as seems to be the case among the unemployed. 
Another conclusion that can be drawn on the basis of the aggregated- level of analysis 
is the idea that the effects of social policy on social trust have dubious nature. Welfare state 
smay enhance social trust formation by reducing income inequality and guaranteeing a good 
performance of welfare state institutions. Relevant social spending may also crowd out social 
trust by discouraging civic engagement or ruing an individual’s habit to cooperate.  
Therefore, the aggregated-level analysis provides some evidence that supports the 
crowding-out hypothesis. Such cases are however very few, while partial correlation 
coefficients mostly advocate either for the absence of influence or for the positive influence of 
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relevant social spending on social trust levels. Crowding-out is mainly found in pension 
spending, which means that pension spending erodes social trust among pensioners. It should 
be noted that in most cases, partial correlation coefficients are not statistically significant, 
which can be attributed to a small number of cases at the aggregated level.  
 
 
6.4. Relevant social spending and social trust: an individual-level analysis 
The individual-level analysis is based on the expectations that the crowding-out 
hypothesis can be extrapolated to both pension and unemployment policies. The mechanism 
of crowding-out for the selected social provisions was explained in the light of the attitudinal 
theory.  The expectations can be deduced from Hypothesis 2 and can be thus formulated as 
follows:  
 
Hypothesis 2.1.: In the case of the whole population, we expect that higher levels of social 
spending will be associated with lower levels of interpersonal and institutional trust among 
individuals. The moral destruction theory or civil society erosion theory can be used to 
explain why crowding-out takes place. 
 
Hypothesis 2.2.: In the case of pensioners, higher levels of pension spending are anticipated 
to be associated with lower levels of both forms of trust among pensioners. The recent 
changes in the level of pensions and their entitlement conditions are assumed to increase 
uncertainty, which causes  crowding-out in social trust among pensioners.  
 
Hypothesis 2.3.: In the case of the unemployed, higher levels of unemployment spending are 
expected to be associated with lower levels of social trust among the unemployed. The 
crowding-out mechanism is expected to realize itself through the self-interest element. One 
can expect that higher unemployment spending encourages the unemployed to stay outside 
the labor market, while being unemployed is negatively associated with social trust levels.  
In other words, we expect that the relationship between relevant social spending and 
social trust must be negative if the crowding-out hypothesis holds. If the empirical analysis 
provides positive relationship, we can talk about crowding-in effects.  
The empirical results are summarized in Table 6.1. The analysis of the relationship 
between social spending and social capital at the individual level provides evidence that has 
its own peculiarities. First of all, it should be noted that one must analyze the relationship 
between social trust and relevant social spending separately for interpersonal and institutional 
trust, since they differ substantially in their determinants. In spite of this difference, the 
 126 
effects of relevant social spending on interpersonal and institutional trust are found to be 
identical.  
In the case of both forms of trust, we find crowding-out effects only when relating 
pension spending to social trust levels among pensioners, while crowding-in effects are seen 
for total social spending and unemployment spending.  
More specifically, an increase in total social spending by 1 percent of GDP tends to 
increase the odds of interpersonal trust by 5.4 percent if other variables are kept constant. The 
figure is small, but still advocates for the presence of a positive relationship between 
interpersonal trust and total social spending. A positive effect is also obtained for institutional 
trust. An increase in total social spending by one percent increases institutional trust by 0.044 
points. It seems that the moral destruction theory and civil society erosion theory that suggest 
crowding-out effects do not hold true. However, it remains difficult to explain the mechanism 
of crowding-in effects. At the macro-level, the integration theory that emphasizes the role 
social spending plays in reducing income inequality can be used to explain the positive impact. 
At the micro-level, the positive impact stems from the fact that the state keeps individuals 
socially integrated when he or she has difficulties, which reduces the feeling of failing. On the 
other hand, providing individuals with alternative sources of income, when they experience 
social risks, helps to reduce feelings of being disadvantaged compared to others. Moreover, 
the government support contributes to others feeling more optimistic about the future. These 
factors create the necessary conditions for higher trust in the state and, therefore, they enhance 
institutional trust. This also serves as a precondition for trusting other individuals more, since 
more optimism and less probability of failing strengthens pro-social behavior and positively 
affects interpersonal trust levels.  
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Table 6.3.: The regression of individual-level and country-level variables on social trust  
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey  
 
 Institutional trust   
 
             Interpersonal trust 
Whole 
population 
Pensioners Unemployed 
people 
Whole 
population 
Pensioners Unemployed 
people 
Relevant social 
spending  
Total 
On pensions 
On 
unemployment  
 
 
0.044*** 
 
 
 
-0.044** 
 
 
 
 
0.696*** 
 
 
0.053*** 
 
 
 
-0.059*** 
 
 
 
 
0.328** 
Volunteering  
 
0.133*** 0.449*** 0.318 0.238*** 0.366*** 0.160 
Sociability 
 
0.4333 0.312*** 0.122 0.231*** 0.422*** 0.001 
Religion 
Atheist  
Catholic  
Protestant  
Other  
 
 
Ref/category  
0.456 
0.633 
0.290 
 
Ref/category  
0.380*** 
0.763*** 
0.582*** 
 
Ref/category  
0.539* 
1.145*** 
0.821* 
 
Ref/category 
 -0.150*** 
0.073** 
-0.213*** 
 
Ref/category  
-0.455*** 
0.047** 
-0.049* 
 
Ref/category  
-0.602*** 
-0.052 
0.134* 
Religiousness 
 
-0.155*** -0.104*** -0.256*** -0.025*** -0.054*** 0.019 
Gender  
 
0.122** 0.195** 0.038 0.071*** 0.066 -0.115 
Age 
15-29 
30 – 44 
45 – more  
 
 
Ref/category 
-0.134* 
0.166** 
 
 
Ref/category 
-1.378 
-0.786 
 
Ref/category 
0.088 
0.253 
 
Ref/category 
0.151*** 
0.158*** 
 
Ref/category 
0.510 
0.682 
 
Ref/category 
0.069 
0.302*** 
Education 
Lower 
Middle  
Upper  
 
 
Ref/category 
-0.062 
0.116** 
 
Ref/category 
-0.286 
-0.103 
 
Ref/category 
0.498** 
-0.129 
 
Ref/category 
0.106*** 
0.707*** 
 
Ref/category 
0.185*** 
0.548*** 
 
Ref/category 
0.008 
0.788*** 
Unemployed  
 
-0.393*** Not 
applicable  
Not 
applicable  
-0.283*** Not 
applicable  
Not 
applicable  
Income 
1st  qu.  
2nd qu. 
3rd qu. 
4th qu. 
5th qu. 
 
 
Ref/category 
0.134** 
0.089 
0.100 
0.064 
 
Ref/category 
0.150 
0.374*** 
0.292 
-0.219 
 
Ref/category 
0.636** 
0.628** 
0.033 
-0.699 
 
Ref/category 
0.054 
0.211*** 
0.428*** 
0.586*** 
 
Ref/category 
0.233*** 
0.291*** 
0.656*** 
0.836*** 
 
Ref/category 
-0.020 
0.229 
0.288 
0.983*** 
Variance at the 
first (individual) 
level  
 
9.266 
(0.111) 
10.011  
(0.440) 
10.654 
(0.541) 
Not 
calculated  
Not 
calculated  
Not 
calculated  
Variance at the 
second (country) 
level  
 
0.151 
(0.012) 
0.157 
(0.100) 
0.163 
(0.171) 
0.247 
(0.164) 
0.178 
(0.053) 
0.385 
(0.204) 
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Taking the functional dimension into account shows the presence of crowding-out 
effects, which happens in the case of pension spending. Moreover, this negative relationship 
remains statistically significant for both forms of trust. The coefficient on pension spending 
suggests that an increase in pension spending by one percent leads to a decrease in the odds of 
trusting others by 5.8 percent. In the case of institutional trust, this decrease equals 0.044 
points. This negative sign for pension spending effects comes as a surprise. Taking into 
account the role pensions play in the lives of retired people, as well as the fact that pensioners 
can be regarded as the net beneficiaries of social security systems, one expects that the 
relationship must be positive. The explanation for this negative sign can be provided based on 
the theory of attitude formation and change. The effects of recent changes in pension levels 
and conditions of their delivery may ruin an individual’s level of trust towards national 
pension systems and towards public welfare institutions. The constant introduction of changes 
to pension systems may increase uncertainty about future pensions and their level, which 
negatively affects people’s perception of the state and  the performance of its institutions.  
Moreover, negative effects may also stem from the fact that pensioners could regard what 
they get from social security systems in the form of pensions as less than what they paid 
during their work history. These factors in turn may contribute to negative experiences of 
people , which entail negative consequences for an individual’s trust in others.  
The relationship between unemployment spending and both forms of trust among the 
unemployed turns out to be positive. Moreover, this relationship is statistically significant 
with large values for both interpersonal and institutional trust. In particular, an increase in 
unemployment expenditures by one percent tends to increase the odds of trust among the 
unemployed by 38.8 percent if other variables are kept constant. An analogous change in 
unemployment spending increases institutional trust by 0.696 points. It seems that the value 
component plays a crucial role here in defining trust levels. The fact that the state provides 
people temporarily out of the labor market with an alternative source of income must 
positively affect their trust towards public welfare institutions and other people in general. 
The mechanism of self-interest discussed earlier is blocked here.  
There are two questions that arise here. The first is why the effects of social policy on 
social trust are different for the two social provisions. The underlying logic of the answer to 
this question is that there is a difference in perceived risks between pension and 
unemployment policies and, as a result, a different nature of coverage by the redistributive 
activity of the state. In the case of unemployment policy, the risk of becoming unemployed is 
temporary and can be eliminated with the help of the state. In between, the state supports the 
individual without a job. Hence, trust in welfare institutions is quite high, which results in a 
positive relationship between unemployment expenditures, institutional trust, and 
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interpersonal trust. In the case of pension policy, the risk of retirement can be regarded as 
unavoidable, with the state just compensating for the lack of a source of income without any 
probability of eliminating it completely. The relationship between pension policy and social 
trust is hence not positive. 
Second, the difference between the effects of relevant social spending may result from 
different influence mechanisms that underlie the relationship between the state and the 
individual. Pension policy supports individuals exclusively through providing pensions, 
which varies from guaranteeing a minimum income to maintaining living standards acquired 
when working. Hence, the relationship between pension spending and social trust among 
pensioners is mediated exclusively through income.  It should also be noted that now pension 
policy is surrounded by uncertainty about its future levels and the question of whether 
pensions will be paid at all as current debates show. The latter also negatively affects people’s 
trust in public welfare institutions and, to a lesser extent, people’s confidence in other people.  
Unemployment policy affects social trust levels through completely different 
mechanisms which rest on a variety of policy instruments used by the state to combat 
unemployment. The latter includes increasing an individual’s education level, precipitating 
job search through public placement offices, supporting an individual’s living standards 
through unemployment benefits, providing subsidies for firms employing people without jobs, 
etc. These mechanisms influence not only the income level of unemployed people but also 
underlie a range of other types of interactions between the state and the individual. The 
individual is to a lesser extent dependent on the state in financial terms, but to a greater degree 
on its activating measures, which form positive attitudes for the unemployed towards the 
welfare state.  
The question related to this is about indirect effects social polices have on social trust. 
It should be taken into account that the effects of welfare states on trust are multi-faceted. 
They are not limited to the direct influence measured by coefficients on social spending 
variables, but also have an indirect effect through other individual-level as well as country-
level characteristics. As such, these characteristics enter the model as intervening variables, 
controlling for which allows indirect effects to be detected. Among such variables, income 
inequality, education level, and household income are the most important.  
There are many studies that emphasize that redistributive policies reduce income 
inequality and, as such, social categorization. The latter leads people to feel more integrated in 
society which positively influences their trust level.  
Apart from inequality, the welfare state influences an individual’s disposable income, 
which also predicts trust. The effects of income are insignificant for institutional trust but very 
important for trust in other people. The influence of income is of utmost importance for 
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pensioners and to some extent the unemployed, for whom social benefits are usually the main 
source of income.  
Moreover, the state engages actively in educating people through financing secondary 
and higher education or organizing re-education and different types of workshops. As such, it 
contributes to the individual level of education, which is one of the main predictors of social 
trust, especially in the case of interpersonal trust. The role of education is very important in 
the case of unemployed people.  
Finally, it is possible to ask whether this approach of isolating the target groups of 
specific social policies entails the risk of receiving biased results due to the over-
representation of people with certain characteristics. As far as the effects of selected 
determinants for social trust show, their direction and strength are almost always in line with 
the results obtained on the basis of the whole sample23 and are generally consistent with the 
theory. An interesting nuance here (which is rarely or ever mentioned in the literature) is that 
interpersonal trust and institutional trust slightly differ in their determinants.  
Higher levels of social trust are found more often among people involved in volunteer 
activities, as well as among more sociable individuals. Religiousness can also be considered a 
strong determinant for both forms of social trust. The type of religion however influences 
institutional and interpersonal trusts differently. Catholics are found to have more trust in 
institutions compared to non-religious people, but their interpersonal trust levels are lower 
than among people without any religion or Protestants. Protestants show higher levels of 
institutional trust compared to non-religious people for both interpersonal trust and 
institutional trust. Other religions tend to have less confidence in other people but more trust 
in institutions compared to non-religious individuals.  
With age people tend to become more trusting towards public institutions, as well as 
towards other individuals. Moreover, this relationship appears to be non-linear. In the case of 
interpersonal trust, people aged 30-44 have more trust than those aged 15-29. People aged 
over 45: their trust levels are almost equally higher compared to those aged 15-29. For the 
institutional trust we found that people aged 15-29 have more trust than those aged 30-44. But 
people aged over 45 have higher trust indexes than younger people.  
Income tends to also have a positive impact: wealthier people show higher levels of 
interpersonal trust. This effect is still positive although not statistically significant in the case 
of confidence in public welfare institutions. For interpersonal trust, income effects are non –
linear, but there is an increase in trust levels for each quintile. For institutional trust, there is 
                                                 
23
 However, in the sub-samples, the non-significance of coefficients is found more often, which is mostly due to 
a smaller number of cases in the sub-samples compared to the pooled sample for the whole population. 
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still a positive effect which slows down when satisfaction with income goes up. Nevertheless, 
most coefficients appear not to be statistically significant for institutional trust.  
The influence of gender is found to be statistically significant in all cases. Males seem 
to have higher trust levels than females on average. As it always appears in the literature, 
unemployment negatively affects levels of interpersonal trust and institutional trust. 
Education also conducts some influence on social trust indexes but its direction differs across 
trust forms. More educated people show more confidence in other individuals. In the case of 
institutional trust, the impact of the education is non-linear. Moderately educated people have 
lower indicators of trust in institutions compared to less educated people, although this effect 
is not statistically significant. But highly educated people have higher institutional trust 
indexes compared to less educated people.   
In general, the results obtained allow us to say that in discussing the welfare state’s 
effects on social capital formation, it is necessary not only to refer to total social spending, but 
to analyze policy-specific effects. Our analysis provides evidence that suggests that even if 
total spending may deliver some support for the crowding-in hypothesis, not all social policies 
have a positive influence on social trust levels. 
The multidimensional approach thus advocates that we may have crowding-out effects 
in some cases. In particular, pension spending negatively affect levels of both forms of trust, 
especially institutional trust. In the case of unemployment spending, one should refer to 
crowding-in effects, especially for interpersonal trust. It seems that the effects of 
unemployment benefits as the main source of income outweigh negative effects of the self-
interest component, enhancing positive attitudes towards welfare states institutions and other 
people.  
Thus, the empirical analysis shows that the effects of welfare state activities can result 
in a drop in confidence levels. It is also obvious that welfare state effects can be policy 
specific. In other words, one should accept that policy effects are not linear across social 
provisions and each of them has its own specific mechanism of influence resulting in different 
levels of interpersonal and institutional trust.  
 
 
6.5. Overview and concluding remarks 
 This chapter analyzes the functional dimension which is defined based on the 
functions social polices perform. Functions are derived on the basis of the risks or 
contingencies that social policies are designed to cover. The analysis is conducted by relating 
relevant social expenditures to the levels of institutional and interpersonal trust among their 
direct recipients. Relevant social expenditures include pension and unemployment spending 
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that are linked to social trust levels among pensioners and the unemployed. The results are 
compared to those calculated based on the pooled sample for the whole population and total 
social expenditures. The analysis provides evidence of the existence of policy specific effects. 
Mixed results were however obtained in the case of the crowding-out hypothesis. An 
aggregated level of analysis supports crowding-out only for pension spending while positive 
effects are found for unemployment spending. Moreover, the aggregated-level of analysis 
suggest that effects of social spending on social trust mainly go through reduction of income 
inequality, which supports integration argument. If redistributive effects of welfare state 
activities are controlled for, the direct effect of social spending on social trust becomes 
negative, which can be explained by the civil society erosion or the moral destruction 
arguments. The individual level of analysis provides similar evidence. Crowding-out can be 
expected in the case of pensioners for both forms of social trust, while crowding-in effects can 
be found in the case of total social spending and unemployment spending. An explanation of 
these effects among pensioners and the unemployed is provided based on the attitudinal 
theory of trust formation.  
The analysis presented in this chapter does not intend to provide theoretical 
explanations of welfare state effects on social trust. Instead, we focus on discussing the 
empirical results of our cross-sectional analysis. Only a few explanations of the mechanisms 
of crowding-out and crowding-in effects are delivered, which do not provide a complete 
picture. Moreover, additional arguments are needed to explain why relevant social spending 
can differ in their effects on social trust. This must become a subject for further research that 
should take a form of qualitative studies rather than quantitative studies to make the 
explanation of mechanisms underlying the phenomenon under study possible.  
Moreover, the desegregation of total social spending on a functional basis still relies 
on using relevant social spending. This however neglectes the fact that this measure of 
welfare state development does not reflect the actual level of decommodification of 
individuals from the labor market. The need hence consists in introducing an outcome 
spectrum in the social trust analysis which will be done in the next section.  
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Chapter 7: DECOMMODIFICATION AND STRATIFICATION EFFECTS ON 
SOCIAL TRUST: THE OUTCOME DIMENSION  
 
 
7.1. Introducing an outcome spectrum in social trust analysis  
An overview of literature on the relationship between the state and social capital 
allows us to draw certain conclusions, which open up further research. The analysis of 
literature provides evidence that points out the lack of empirical analysis of the effects social 
policies have on social trust. The studies are mainly theoretical and speculate on the kind of 
relationship in question while rarely employing quantitative methods of analysis to check the 
plausibility of the ideas underlying the relationship.   
The studies on the crowding-out hypothesis are an exception here, since they usually 
include an empirical analysis on the impact social spending has on social trust. However, 
these studies tend to operationalize welfare state development through social spending 
measured as a percentage of GDP. This approach is false, since it does not reflect the actual 
level of support welfare states provide to individuals since the level of social spending 
depends not only on the amount of social benefits paid but also on the level of coverage rate. 
The same level of spending can thus be obtained in countries with higher benefit levels but 
smaller coverage rates or in countries with lower benefit levels but higher coverage rates. 
Moreover, this measure of welfare state development does not fully reflect the dynamics of 
state intervention in the form of social policy since an increase in the level of spending can 
also result from the fact that the number of eligible recipients increased while benefit levels 
remained unchanged.  
The traditional way of operationalizing welfare state development thus fails to 
measure the extent to which the state affects individual well-being. It completely ignores the 
micro-level foundations that underlie such macro-level measures as social spending, since it is 
completely detached from the extent to which social spending allows the outsourcing of 
individuals from the market.  On the other hand, social spending reflects the process of state 
intervention than its outcomes. The need therefore consists in introducing an outcome 
spectrum in the analysis of welfare state effects.  This problem is to some extent solved in the 
studies that are based on including dummies for Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime typology 
(Van Oorschot and Arts, 2005). Such an approach usually demonstrates that social democratic 
welfare regimes have higher levels of social trust compared to conservative and liberal 
regimes. But this measure is not perfect either since it still remains unclear whether it is the 
level of benefit generosity or the type of social stratification resulting from the organization of 
social rights that is responsible for the variation in social trust across welfare regimes. It 
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should not be forgotten that Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime typology is itself a 
multidimensional concept, which is created along dimensions of decommodification, 
stratification , and de-familiarization. 
The general logic of the analysis thus triggers the need to find a new way of 
operationalizing welfare states, which would more accurately approximate the degree of their 
development while still being directly linked to the outcomes of intervention in societal 
arrangements at the micro-level. Such a measure can in our opinion be obtained by 
decomposing Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime typology into two dimensions and directly 
relating each dimension to social trust indexes. These dimensions are decommodification and 
stratification that both assess the effects on social trust of the degree of outsourcing of 
individuals from the market, and the stratification mechanism. The main advantage of this 
approach consists in measuring the development of welfare states through their outcomes, 
which brings a new spectrum to the study of welfare state effects on social trust.  
Moreover, we also intend to check how the level of decommodification for the 
selected social provisions affects trust indexes among their direct recipients. It will directly 
contribute to the methodology of the analysis of social capital and will require the 
reconsideration of all the previous findings if welfare states effects are found to be policy 
specific.  
 
7.2. Decommodification and social trust levels  
In the previous analysis, we used social spending as a primary empirical basis for 
evaluating welfare state activities. However, it should be noted that spending does not provide 
a sufficient indication of a welfare state’s effects on individual life chances. The tendency in 
the recent literature consists rather in using the welfare regime typology constructed by 
Esping-Andersen. The latter is grounded in the two key welfare characteristics: the degree of 
decommodification and social stratification.   
Decommodification stems from the idea that the mainsprings of modern capitalism lie 
in the process by which both human needs and labor power become commodities. As a result, 
an individual’s well-being tends to depend on the relationship to the cash nexus. Esping-
Andersen (1990) recognizes however that commodification itself would have negative 
consequences on labor force reproduction as well as destroy the relationship between the 
demand and the supply of labor force. In other words, if a labor force is nothing more than a 
commodity, it will likely destruct (Esping-Andersen, 1990). It happens because the 
commodification of both wants and people weakens individual workers. This lies in the fact 
that the labor force as commodity has some peculiarities. First, it cannot be sold with delays 
since workers must survive and reproduce both themselves and the society they live in. 
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Moreover, as commodities, workers are captive to powers beyond their control by social 
contingences such as illness or business cycles. Apart from that, free competition among 
workers may put pressure on wages, whose level may not reach the point enough for 
reproduction. Finally, without decommodification, workers are incapable of the collective 
action required for labor-movement development.  
There is hence pressure for decommodification as a precondition for system survival 
as such. The concept in Esping-Andersen’s definition refers to the degree to which individuals 
or families can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independent of market 
participation (Esping-Andersen, 1990). This conflict was evolved around the question about 
the degree to which market immunity is permissive, that is, the strength, scope and quality of 
social rights. He distinguishes between conservative, liberal, and socialism responses to 
commodification.  
The hallmark of conservative ideology is the idea that the commodification of 
individuals is morally degrading, socially corrupting, atomizing, and anomic. Individuals are 
not meant to compete or struggle, but to subordinate self-interest to recognized authority and 
prevailing institutions. He distinguishes between several models here: feudal, corporativist, 
and etatist. He further specifies that feudal ideals are strongly antagonistic to the commodity 
status: markets do not matter and wage labor is only marginally important for human well-
being. Corporate societies emerged among artisans and craftsmen as a means to close ranks 
and monopolize entry, membership, prices and products. Later, they were often transformed 
into mutual societies. Etatist tradition is motivated by social integration, the preservation of 
authority, and the battle against capitalism. He concludes that etatist conservatism saw in 
social rights a solution to the ‘social question’.  
Esping-Andersen sees the conservative foundations of social rights as the historical 
origins of modern social policy. He asserts that in almost every country, it was a conservative 
tradition that gave rise to the first systematic and deliberate attacks on the commodification of 
labor. There are two reasons for this. First, these conservative forces feared that the 
development of liberalism, democracy, and capitalism would destroy the institutions upon 
which their power and privileges were based. Second, the pre-commodified status of workers 
was a model that was already available and also present in the heyday of laissez-faire: it was a 
response that came naturally and claimed considerable legitimacy. He elaborates by saying 
that guilds had the chance to be transformed into mutual societies, the capitalist companies 
offered a menu of social benefits outside of the work contract, and paternalism was not 
something that was especially contradictory to the entrepreneurial spirit (Esping-Andersen, 
1990).  
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The second form is liberalism. The general assumption of liberalism holds in Esping-
Andersen’s view in that the market is emancipator: it is the best possible shell for self-reliance 
and industriousness. If not interfered with, he writes, its self-regulatory mechanisms will 
ensure that all who want to work will be employed and will thus be able to secure their own 
welfare. Private life may be wrought with insecurity and danger, poverty or helplessness is in 
principle unlikely. Yet if it occurs, this is not the system’s fault but merely a consequence of 
an individual’s lack of foresight and thrift. In all such cases, the liberal dogma is forced to 
seek resources in pre-capitalist institutions of social aid such as the family, church and the 
community. However, Esping-Andersen emphasizes that liberalism recognizes to some extent 
the rationale of social intervention. It does so only in the principle of public goods, and finds 
two acceptable answers for the system. One is to transfer a modified version of the old 
poverty laws into a framework of means-tested social assistance which ensures that non 
market income is reserved for those who are unable to participate in the market. Another was 
a preference for privately organized insurance in the market and public social insurance, 
which would perform like its private-sector kin by pegging entitlements and benefits to 
employment, work performance, and contributions.  
The third form is socialism which, according to Esping-Andersen, has a close kinship 
with the corporative conservative tradition with regard to embryonic policies of de-
commodification. He shows that early labor movements were largely built around unions, 
mutual-aid societies, and sometimes a political party. However, soon the scope and quality of 
social rights were seen as a precondition for the larger struggle of socialists and not merely 
the fruits of its final success. It was through this strategic realignment that socialism, he 
emphasizes, eventually embraced the welfare state as the focus of its long-term project. It is in 
this sense that social democracy becomes synonymous with welfare stateism.  
Esping-Andersen characterizes the socialist decommodification strategy with two 
features. First, they focus their policies on upgrading benefits and minimizing social stigma. 
The other characteristic of socialist decommodification is the attempt to use universal 
coverage for social rights. As a result, what characterizes all early social policies is the notion 
of basic or minimal social rights: installing strong entitlements at fairly modest benefit levels 
and typically limiting it to the core areas of human need (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The 
distinctive principle of decommodification in the socialist view is hence the idea that the 
status of welfare clients should impose no decline in living standards, even over an extended 
period of time, allowing for a strengthening of individual independence.  
In his empirical analysis of decommodification, Esping-Andersen distinguishes 
between three main groups on the basis of a combined decommodification score for the three 
programs (pension, sickness, and unemployment) in 18 OECD nations. Based on how nations 
 137 
cluster around the mean, he distinguishes between the following groups of countries: Anglo-
Saxon nations were all found at the bottom of the ranking, the Scandinavian countries were 
placed at the top. In between these two extremes, he places the continental European countries; 
some of them (especially Belgium and the Netherlands) however fall closer to Nordic 
countries. In other words, a low level of decommodification is found in countries with a 
history dominated by liberalism. In social democratically dominated welfare states, the level 
of decommodification is highest. Finally, conservative countries are in the middle, where 
social rights are extended outside the market, but there is a stronger accent of social control 
than in the case of social democracy. These results are supported by the data presented below 
which provide levels of decommodification and benefit generosity indexes. Both indexes are 
calculated by Scruggs and Allan (2006b) by replicating Esping-Andersen’s analysis for 18 
OECD nations. The benefit generosity index is calculated by applying the general method of 
scoring the countries used by Esping-Andersen. The main difference with the 
decommodification index is that they use different data for replacement rates, duration limits, 
qualifying periods, waiting, and coverage for three social programs: unemployment, sickness, 
and pensions. The data upon which both indexes are calculated are provided in their 
publication (Scruggs and Allan, 2006b). 
 
Table 7.1.: Decommodification and Benefit generosity indexes by welfare regime type 
   Mean value 
 
St. deviation 
Social democratic   Decommodification 
index  
36.2 4.02 
Benefit generosity 
index  
33.1 3.67 
Liberal  Decommodification 
index  
18.2 4.38 
Benefit generosity 
index  
21.9 2.21 
Conservative  Decommodification 
index  
28.75 2.21 
Benefit generosity 
index  
27.5 4.69 
 Source: Scruggs and Allan (2006b) 
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The table shows that both indexes support Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime typology. 
The index is highest for social democratic welfare regimes. Conservative regimes come next 
with an index level somewhat less than for Scandinavian countries. Liberal welfare regimes 
close the ranking with the lowest index levels out of the three groups. It should be noted that 
the benefit generosity index varies less across welfare regime types compared to the 
decommodification index, but it still repeats the distribution across nations found in the case 
of the benefit generosity index. We will use the benefit generosity index for the analysis since 
it reflects more accurately decommodification levels in the selected countries.  
The relationship between decommodification levels and trust indicators will be 
examined again at both the individual and aggregated levels. The aggregated level analysis 
relates the average level of social trust indicators across the countries to their level of 
decommodification, while sequentially controlling for country-level characteristics.  
At the aggregated level, the results provide evidence that advocates for the presence of 
crowding-in effects in social trust formation of both forms. More specifically, interpersonal 
and institutional trust is found to positively correlate with benefit generosity indexes. 
Moreover, this relationship is statistically significant for both interpersonal and institutional 
trust. However, it should be noted that controlling for country level characteristics changes 
the relationship under analysis in a different way.  
If we sequentially control for country-level characteristics, the correlation between 
decommodification scores and social trust loses its strength and remains in many cases 
statistically insignificant. In particular, controlling for income inequality strongly influences 
the relationship in question. Income inequality variable is most influential out of all five 
covariates. More specifically, when controlling for income inequality levels, the positive 
relationship between decommodification scores and institutional trust becomes negative and 
also remains statistically significant. In the case of interpersonal trust, the relationship loses 
completely its strength. It again can be considered proof that the effects of decommodification 
on social trust are absorbed by the inequality variable, which means the effects of welfare 
states are mediated through the reduction of inequality. This should be again regarded as 
evidence of the integration argument, which emphasizes that welfare states raise social trust 
levels by keeping individuals socially integrated and by reducing income inequality levels.  
 
 
 
 
 139 
Table 7.2.: The correlation between decommodification levels and social trust, 
controlling for country-level characteristics24  
 
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey 
 
Another interesting point that arises when controlling for inequality is the fact that the 
direct effects of decommodification are negative for institutional trust. This means that 
welfare states crowd-out institutional trust when their redistributive effect is controlled for. 
However, the mechanism of this erosion still remains unclear here. As in the previous case, it 
is possible to say that the effects of welfare states on social trust hence are at least dubious. 
Decommodification levels boost social trust through the reduction of income inequality. On 
the other hand, it erodes trust levels by de-motivating social networks.   
An interesting conclusion can also be drawn when controlling for corruption levels. In 
the cases of institutional trust, the correlation coefficients with decommodification scores lose 
their value when controlling for this country characteristic. It shows that people form trust in 
public welfare state institutions mainly based on their performance, while particularly taking 
into account corruption levels. The effects of welfare states on social trust thus have to do 
with the characteristics of an institution’s performance. If they are considered to treat people 
equally, it forms necessary grounds for the high evaluation of public welfare state institutions, 
thus resulting in higher trust in them. This can also be considered a confirmation of the 
macro-level institutional argument, which emphasizes the importance of the quality of 
performance by public institutions in the process of trust formation.  
The other country-level covariates conduct some influence on the relationship between 
decommodification levels and social trust. Controlling for the percentage of Protestants living 
in a country reduces the value of the coefficients but the correlation coefficients are not found 
                                                 
24
 * - 10% ,  ** 5%, *** 1% and less  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation 
between 
decommodi
fication 
indexes  
and social 
trust 
 
 
 
Controlled for 
 
Fractionali
zation  
 
Wealth 
 
 
Income 
Inequality  
 
Corruption  
 
% of 
Protestants  
Benefit generosity 
index  
 
1. Interpersonal trust 
 
2. Institutional trust 
 
 
 
 
 
0.535** 
 
0.569* 
 
 
 
 
0.732** 
 
0.459 
 
 
 
 
0.451* 
 
0.339 
 
 
 
 
 
0.019 
 
-0.359* 
 
 
 
 
0.408* 
 
0.037* 
 
 
 
 
0.518 
 
0.279 
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to be statistically significant. The same influence on the relationship in question is found in 
the wealth variable. When controlling for the GDP of a country, a positive sign is present for 
both forms of trust, although it only remains statistically significant for interpersonal trust. 
Controlling for fractionalization rends the relationship insignificant in terms of institutional 
trust. For interpersonal trust, it remains significant and even increases its value somewhat.  
Thus, the aggregated-level analysis advocates for the presence of crowding-in effects, 
which remain statistically significant even after controlling for some country-level variables. 
Decommodification hence tends to be positively associated with social trust, even while 
controlling for fractionalization, wealth, and corruption. In the rest of the cases, the effects are 
not statistically significant. The negative relationship in question is found only when 
controlling for income inequality.   
 
Before proceeding to the individual level analysis of decommodification effects, we 
will analyze the relationship between welfare regime types and social trust levels. If the 
crowding out hypothesis holds true, then we expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 3.1.: in social democratic welfare regimes, the level of social trust will be lower 
than in conservative and liberal regimes, 
 
Hypothesis 3.2.: in conservative welfare regimes, the level of both forms of trust will be 
lower than in liberal regimes. 
 
The results again provide evidence that suggest that higher levels of trust can be found 
in countries that spend more on social welfare programs. In the case of institutional trust, we 
find that in conservative welfare regimes, confidence is usually 0.832 units lower compared to 
Nordic countries, when all other variables hold constant. In liberal welfare regimes, this 
difference increases to 0.981. In other words, institutional trust levels in liberal countries 
appear to be on average 0.981 units lower than in social democratic countries.  
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Table 7.3.: Interpersonal and institutional trust by welfare regime type  
 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey  
 
 
 Institutional trust   
 
             Interpersonal trust 
 
 
 
 
-0.832*** 
-0.981*** 
Ref/category  
 
0.135*** 
 
0.421*** 
 
 
0.048 
0.128 
0.224 
 
-0.155*** 
 
0.120** 
 
 
Ref/category 
-0.130* 
0.175** 
 
 
Ref/category 
0.054 
0.132** 
 
-0.376*** 
 
 
Ref/category 
0.140* 
0.092 
0.113 
0.071 
 
9.267 (0.111) 
 
 
0.223 (0.017) 
 
 
 
 
-0.830*** 
-0.981*** 
Ref/category 
 
0.267*** 
 
0.394*** 
 
 
-0.192*** 
0.038 
-0.020 
 
-0.030*** 
 
0.068** 
 
 
Ref/category 
0.159*** 
0.177*** 
 
 
Ref/category 
0.112*** 
0.705*** 
 
-0.263*** 
 
 
Ref/category 
0.066* 
0.217*** 
0.423*** 
0.575*** 
 
not calculated  
 
 
0.140 (0.013) 
 
WELFARE 
REGIME TYPE 
Conservative  
Liberal  
Social democratic  
 
Volunteering  
 
Sociability 
 
Religion 
Catholic  
Protestant  
Other  
 
Religiousness 
 
Gender  
 
Age 
15-29 
30 – 44 
45 – above  
 
Education 
Lower 
Middle  
Upper  
 
Unemployed  
 
Income 
1st  qu.  
2nd qu. 
3rd qu. 
4th qu. 
5th qu. 
 
Correlation at level 
1 
Correlation at level 
2 
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For interpersonal trust the relationship has the same nature. Conservative welfare 
regimes are found to be less trusting of others: the odds are 56.4 percent less than in social 
democratic states. This difference becomes bigger when comparing liberal and Scandinavian 
countries: the odds of trusting tend to be 62.6 percent less in Anglo-Saxon countries 
compared to Nordic countries.  
Therefore, the analysis of social trust levels by welfare regime type provides results 
that point out that social democratic countries with generous social rights and higher levels of 
decommodification are associated with higher levels of trust of both forms. Conservative 
welfare regimes have lower levels of interpersonal and institutional trust, but still higher than 
in liberal countries. The results should however be interpreted with some caution since the 
difference between welfare regime types consists not only in the level of decommodification 
but also in the way social benefits are designed, implemented, and financed. It is thus possible 
to assume that this difference is die not to welfare regime type but to the way welfare regimes 
organize and deliver social benefits, which reflects the principles on which the provision of 
social rights occurs. 
Another danger in the welfare regime typology for the analysis of social trust is that 
this typology reflects the combined effects of decommodification and stratification. It is 
difficult to infer based on welfare regime dummies whether the positive difference in favor of 
social democratic welfare systems is a result of higher decommodification or if is just the 
effect of stratification, which reflects the nature of social rights. 
The third drawback of the welfare regime dummies approach is the critique that this 
typology is not perfect. Baannik and Hoogenboom (2007) for instance demonstrate that 
Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime typology is to some extent inconsistent. Orloff (1993) 
argues that the gender dimension is poorly accounted for in Esping-Andersen’s welfare 
regime typology and criticizes the power resources analysts’ understanding of citizenship and 
their analytic scheme for describing social policy regimes. Bonoli (2001) concludes that 
Esping-Andersen’s approach is just part of the quantification tradition, which reflects the 
‘how much’  dimension and completely ignores the ‘how’ dimension.    
Finally, the fourth drawback is that there is much variation in decommodification 
scores even among similar welfare regimes, which can be inferred from the high value of 
standard deviation provided in Table 7.1. There is thus a certain loss of information, when 
combining countries among welfare regime type.  
It is hence plausible to directly relate decommodification levels to social trust indexes. 
Our expectations are based on an extrapolation of the classical crowding-out hypothesis. In 
particular, we expect (Hypothesis 4) higher levels of social trust to be found in countries with 
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lower decommodification levels. In other words, an increase in benefit generosity levels 
should lead to a decrease in both forms of social trust.  
The results of the empirical analysis are provided in the table below. 
 
 
Table 7.4.: Influence of decommodification levels on social trust indexes 25 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey 
 
The individual-level analysis provides empirical evidence that again advocates for the 
presence of crowding-in rather than crowding-out. Benefit generosity enhances both forms of 
trust. An increase in the level of benefit generosity by one point leads to an increase in 
institutional trust by 0.088 points when other variables are constant. In the case of 
interpersonal trust, a one point increase in the level of benefit generosity entails a 3.45 percent 
increase in the odds of trusting.  
Thus, the analysis provides results that advocate for crowding-in effects.  Welfare 
states measured through decommodification levels have positive effects on social trust 
formation. Higher decommodification levels lead to higher levels of social trust. When 
countries spend more on outsourcing individuals from the market, they directly and indirectly 
increase their trust levels. It however remains unclear through which mechanisms the effect 
materializes. We do not control for country-level covariates due to a small number of cases at 
the second level. We cannot hence infer about the nature of the effects decommodification has 
on interpersonal and institutional trust.  
What can be also mentioned here is that in spite of the widely supported crowding-out 
hypothesis, an alternative measure of welfare state development provides similar results. As 
in the case of total social spending, we find that public social arrangements reinforce trust 
                                                 
25
 The coefficients on the control variable are not reported since they are given in Table 7.3. 
 Institutional trust   
 
             Interpersonal trust 
Benefit generosity index  
 
Benefit generosity index  
 
Benefit generosity  
Index  
 
 
0.088*** 
 
0.034*** 
Variance at the 
individual level  
9.273 (0.111) Not calculated  
Variance at the 
country level  
 
0.298 (0.028) 0.196 (0.013) 
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levels in society. Public policy helps build necessary preconditions for high regards about the 
state, which lies at the roots of higher trust in public welfare institutions. Social policy also 
contributes to creating a favorable environment that enhances trust in other people. In a 
stronger state, people might feel more secure, which leads to more pro-social behavior.  
The question that arises here concerns generalizing the positive effects of 
decommodification for all social provisions. It is plausible to assume that the effects can be 
policy specific due to the existence of the functional dimension. An additional analysis should 
hence be conducted to investigate the interaction between the outcome and the functional 
dimensions in order to specify whether or not  the effects of decommodification can be policy 
specific. In the case of policy specific effects, the coefficients on decommodification 
calculated for pension and unemployment policies will differ from the general 
decommodification index. The analysis is conducted for pensioners by directly relating 
decommodification scores for pension policy to trust levels among pensioners. On the other 
hand, we relate the level of decommodification of unemployment policy to trust levels among 
the unemployed.  
It should be noted that welfare regimes strongly differ from each other in putting a 
different emphasis on decommodifying people that experience the two social risks: 
unemployment and retirement. The general logic of decommodifying remains valid: 
Scandinavian welfare regimes provide the highest level of decommodification (13.2. for 
pension and 9.7 for unemployment policies), liberal regimes limit it to the minimum (7.7. for 
pension and 6.0 for unemployment policies), while conservative regimes are situated 
somewhere in between (11.1.  for pension and 8.2. for unemployment policies).26  
These figures also illustrate a different emphasis that welfare regimes put on pension 
and unemployment policies. In trying to find a balance between these two social provisions, 
the countries usually end up guaranteeing higher levels of decommodification to pensioners 
than the unemployed, which reflects the common view that pensioners are more deserving of 
public support than the unemployed. More specifically, Scandinavian states provide 
pensioners with higher decommodification levels, while giving the unemployed a lower level 
of outsourcing from the market (but still the highest in Europe). The same tendency is present 
in conservative welfare regimes, although the overall level of decommodification is lower for 
both pensioners and the unemployed. Liberal states rely heavily on the market to ensure low 
levels of decommodification for both social provisions, making almost no distinction between 
pensioners and the unemployed in securing their levels of decommodification. 
 
                                                 
26
 Own calculations based on Bambra (2006) 
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 Table 7.5.: Decommodification levels for pension and unemployment policies and 
social trust: an aggregated analysis.  
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey  
 
 
The aggregated level of analysis does not provide statistically significant results that 
allow for credible inferences. What can be said is that the level of decommodification of 
pensions causes a crowding-out of interpersonal trust that disappears when controlling for 
corruption, fractionalization, and the percentage of Protestants living in a country. 
Institutional trust among pensioners tends to positively co-vary with the decommodification 
levels of pensions, even after sequentially controlling for all five covariates.  
Relating the decommodification levels of unemployment policies to social trust levels 
among the unemployed shows a positive correlation. Only when controlling for the level of 
income inequality does the positive correlation turn negative, which points to the presence of 
crowding-out effects.  
Again, out of the five covariates, income inequality is the most influential variable. It 
seems that all positive effects of decommodification on social trust stem from the 
redistributive effects of social policies. The general logic assumes that in countries, where 
redistributive effects are higher, levels of social trust are also higher. As in the previous case, 
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0.059 
 
 
 
 
 
0.326 
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0.135 
 
 
 
 
 
0.374 
 
0.064 
 146 
we see a negative relationship between decommodification and social trust after isolating the 
effects of income inequality. But again, it is difficult to explain the mechanisms of these 
effects.  
The individual level of analysis also advocates for the presence of policy specific 
effects. When disaggregating total decommodification levels on a functional basis, we see a 
positive relationship, such as in the case of the cumulative decommodification score. Both 
pension and unemployment policies show a positive relationship between their levels of 
decommodification and institutional trust. Moreover, this positive effect is much larger for 
pension and unemployment policy than for the cumulative decommodification score. Higher 
decommodification levels hence tend to enhance confidence in public welfare institutions. It 
is plausible to assume that decent levels of outsourcing of individuals from the market 
provides necessary grounds for a positive evaluation of state intervention in the form of social 
policies, which in turn forms higher regards about public welfare state institutions and more 
confidence in them. The specification of decommodification levels on a functional basis 
hence provides more evidence of crowding-in effects.  
 
 Table 7.6.: Policy-specific effects of decommodification for two social provisions27   
 
Source: Own calculations based on the WVS  
 
Policy-specific effects are also present in the case of interpersonal trust. The total level 
of decommodification is initially found to positively correlate to interpersonal trust levels. 
This is however not true for pension and unemployment policies. They both show a neutral 
relationship to trust levels among their direct recipients. The specification of 
decommodification on a functional basis does not confirm the positive influence that 
                                                 
27
 The coefficients on control variables are not reported since they are referred to in Table 7.3 
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Decommodification 
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Decommodification 
indexes for 
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0.350*** 
  
-0.011 
 
 
 
 
0.106 
 
Variance at the 
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9.986 (0.257) 10.640 (0.539)  Not calculated  Not calculated  
 
Variance at the 
country  level  
0.440 (0.098) 0.264 (0.209)  0.294 (0.073) 0.376 (0.178) 
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decommodification may have on interpersonal trust. The neutral relationship at least excludes 
the possibility of crowding-out effects that decommodification levels may have on confidence 
in other people.  
The question that arises is why the effects of decommodification are different for the 
two social provisions. They are stronger for unemployment policy as opposed to pension 
policy. The underlying logic of the answer consists in the different levels of redistributive 
effects between the two social provisions on the one hand, and the different perception of 
decommodification by different social groups on the other.   
The first argument is based on the idea that redistributive effects are not identical 
across social provisions. Since unemployment policy more positively correlates to social trust 
levels, it is logical to assume that redistributive effects of the latter will be stronger than for 
pensions. The calculation provided in Table 7.5 indeed supports this assumption.  
When controlling for income inequality levels, the initial correlation between 
decommodification levels and social trust changes. For instance, when controlling for 
redistributive effects of pensions, the correlation between decommodification and 
interpersonal trust changes from -0.109 to -0.394. In the case of unemployment benefits, this 
change is much stronger: from 0.420 to -0.035. Redistributive effects of unemployment 
benefits are thus larger compared to pensions. The same is also true for institutional trust.  
The second explanation that an understanding of why the decommodification of 
pensions is less positive stems from the different perceptions of decommodification levels 
among different social groups. One should take into account not the actual level of 
decommodification, but rather the perceived one. It is possible to assume that pensioners 
might consider their pensions and hence the decommodification level the pensions are 
associated with as not high enough. They compare what they get with what they paid to the 
pension system during their work history. They also regard their pensions as much less than 
what they contributed, which can be deduced from the fact that pensioners have the most 
negative attitudes towards welfare states (Goul Andersen, 2002). On the other hand, they 
compare their income when being pensioners with what they had while working. In this case, 
pensioners are again negative since, as the WVS data show, pensioners are the least satisfied 
with their income among all social groups. Their satisfaction with income equals only 
3.7 ,whereas the working population have a much higher score (6.2). The data also show that 
income drops considerably when moving to retirement. In Germany for instance, the 
household income of pensioners was only 29,000 euros in 2002, while it amounted to 41,500 
for civil servants, and 37,000 for the employed. (Huinink and Schröder, 2008). This negative 
approach might greatly affect trust in both people and public institutions. The unemployed are 
more positive in both respects. The absence of an alternative source of income and relatively 
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higher satisfaction with unemployment benefits might contribute to the fact that the 
unemployed perceive the decommodification level guaranteed by unemployment benefits as 
high. This is also supported by the perception that what they pay to unemployment is much 
less than what they get from the state while unemployed.  
Nevertheless, these results are to some extent controversial. The fact that the 
decommodification of unemployment benefits is associated with more positive effects on both 
forms of trust is inconsistent with the data. Pensions provide much higher levels of 
decommodification than unemployment benefits as can be easily deduced from the table 
below. The positive effect of pensions on social trust must be hence stronger than the 
decommodification effect of unemployment benefits.  
 
Table 7.7. Decommodification indexes for pension and unemployment policies  
 
Country 
Decommodification index 
Pension policy Unemployment policy 
N. Zealand  9.1 4.0 
Italy 9.6 5.1 
Japan 10.5 5.0 
France 12.0 6.3 
Finland 14.0 5.2 
Belgium 15.0 8.6 
Denmark 15.0 8.1 
Sweden 17.0 7.1 
Source: Bambra (2006) 
 
The table explicitly illustrates that almost always, the decommodification levels for 
pensions is much higher compared to those for unemployment benefits. The positive effects 
must hence be stronger for the former than for the latter. This is however not the case. A 
possible explanation for this is the fact that the positive effects of decommodification found in 
Table 7.4are not linear and slow down as decommodification levels go up. We do not intend 
to check this and leave this argument as an assumption rather than our hypothesis.  
Therefore, the specification of decommodification levels on a functional basis 
provides results that advocate for the presence of policy specific effects. Thus, the analysis of  
the outcome dimension cannot be limited to the decommodification that all social policies 
guarantee; it must be disaggregated on a functional basis and related to trust levels among 
their direct recipients. But it should be emphasized that the disaggregation of the cumulative 
decommodification score does not provide any evidence of crowding-out. In the worst 
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scenario, the estimation points to a neutral relationship between decommodification levels and 
social trust scores.  
The analysis also advocates that even if pension spending has negative effects on 
social trust revealed in the functional dimension, the outcome dimension does not support 
these findings. The levels of decommodification of pension policy have a positive effect on 
institutional trust and a neutral effect on interpersonal trust among pensioners. Other findings 
are in line with the results obtained in the functional dimension.  
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7.3. Stratification and social trust levels 
 
 
Many welfare state scholars focuse their attention on social policy expansion and 
retrenchment in advanced capitalist democracies measured to a large degree through social 
expenditures. This focus results in a lack of emphasis on how social policy structures society 
(Scruggs and Allan, 2006a). This question is central to the analysis provided by Esping-
Andersen (1990). The main objective is to show that welfare programs of similar ‘size’ (in 
terms of commitments) can produce very different outcomes overall. This approach exposes 
an additional dimension with which one can classify welfare states beyond efforts or 
generosity. This dimension refers to stratification effects of welfare states.  
According to Esping-Andersen (1990), welfare states are key institutions in the 
structuring of class and social order, while their organizational features help determine the 
articulation of social solidarity, division of class, and status differentiating. He distinguishes 
between three different traditions in stratifying society, each of which is inherent to the three 
welfare regime types.  
 
Conservative Social Stratification  
Conservative welfare states have been historically associated with a strong state, a 
significant role for religion in society, and ‘an old style’ corporatist economic order (Esping-
Andersen, 1990). Conservative welfare regimes are defined by Esping-Andersen (1990) as 
loathe to combine social levelling and class antagonism brought about by capitalism. The 
unifying scheme is that traditional status relations must be retained for the sake of social 
integration. This model of welfare is rooted in the specificity of state development with its 
tradition in feudal manorial societies of welfare state structure.  
In promoting propositions for policy introduction, leaders desire the primacy of 
etatism with the purpose of chaining workers directly to the paternal authority of a monarchy. 
The paternalism of the state strongly influenced two areas of social policy. One is endowing 
civil servants with extraordinarly lavish welfare provisions to reward or guarantee their 
loyalty to the state. Another legacy of paternalism is found in the evolution of social 
assistance. More specifically, poor relief was more humane and generous than in countries 
with liberal regimes.  
According to Esping-Andersen (1990), a major alternative to etatism is corporatism. 
The unifying principle of conservatism is fraternity based on status identity, obligatory and 
exclusive membership, mutualism, and monopoly of representation. Corporatism seeks to 
uphold traditionally recognized status distinctions and use these as organizational nexus for 
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society and the economy (Eping-Andersen, 1990). Corporatism also influenced the social 
policy design either because of state recognition of particular status privileges or because 
organized groups refused to be part of a more status-inclusive legislation, thereby emerged a 
tradition of constructing a myriad of status-oriented social insurance schemes – each with its 
peculiar rules, finances, and benefits structure and each tailored to exhibit its clientele’s 
relative status position (Esping-Andersen, 1990).  
Corporatism did not contradict either to visions of the church. For the Catholic church, 
corporatism was a natural response to its preoccupation with preserving the traditional family, 
its search for viable alternatives to both socialism and capitalism, and its beliefs in the 
possibility to organize harmonious relations between social classes. Corporatism inserted 
itself easily into the Catholic subsidiarity principle. The main idea was that higher and larger 
levels of social collectivity should intervene only when a family’s capacity for mutual 
protection was rendered impossible (Esping-Andersen, 1990).  
As a result, social policy in conservative welfare regimes was designed to preserve 
existing status differences in society. Faced with the potential for instability introduced by the 
emergence of modern capitalism, social policy became a way to reinforce a ‘natural’ social 
order. Thus, despite the fact that conservative welfare regimes were characterized by higher 
levels of social expenditures, the contents of social policy was designed to reinforce the 
existing order.  
 
Liberal Social stratification  
While conservative social policy attempted to preserve traditional patterns of social 
stratification, liberal welfare regimes sought the opposite. Classical liberals reasoned that 
traditional social patterns constrain individual freedom and that a free market affords 
individuals the ability to realize their potential without the fetters imposed by the pre-existing 
social hierarchies of church and state alike.  
According to Esping-Andersen (1990), the goals of liberalism were the abolishment of 
estates, monopolies, and absolutism in order to create conditions for individual emancipation, 
freedom, equal opportunities and healthy competitiveness. He further specifies that the main 
role was given to the market that produced stratification, while the state had no right or reason 
to interfere in the results produced in the marketplace. They were recognized as mirrored 
efforts, motivation, adeptness, and self-reliance.  
Social policy was minimized in liberal regimes since it was equated with undesirable 
stratification outcomes: paternalism and etatism, dependency on the state, and the 
perpetuation of pauperism. The internal reasoning of liberalism was the dogma that the state 
had no proper reason for altering stratification outcomes produced by the market. Ideally, it 
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was understood that without a state or monopolies, there would be no classes: just a web of 
freely acting individuals equal before the law, the contract, and the cash nexus. (Esping-
Andersen, 1990)   
Esping-Andersen (1990) emphasize that liberalism’s universalistic ideals were 
contradicted by the dualism and social stigma it promoted in practice. More specifically, 
liberal states established a punitive and stigmatizing poor relief for market failures. This 
humiliating approach in poor relief was preserved even when liberalism moved towards 
modern income-tested social assistance. Mean-tested relief was meant to be the residual 
element of liberal social policy. The real core was understood to be individual insurance in the 
market, while social policy would only parallel market outcomes.  
However, liberalism had great difficulties applying this conception to state policy.  As 
Esping-Andersen (1990) writes, its enthusiasm for the need-tested approach, targeting the 
state aim only at the genuinely poor resulted in social stigma and dualism. An alternative 
approach to organize an individual’s welfare through private insurance also contributed to 
class dualisms. It occurred due to the fact that private welfare logically replicated market 
inequalities, while prevailing mostly among the upper-class. Esping-Andersen (1990) 
concludes that liberal social insurance schemes reproduce the profile of stratification of the 
market while promoting private protection for the more fortunate.  
In designing social policies, liberal regimes manifested themselves in programs that 
encourage more extensive interaction with the market for income maintenance and insurance 
against risks posed by illness and especially old age. In other words, in choosing the emphasis 
on public versus private remedies to social risks, liberal regimes had a strong tendency to 
favor the latter approach.  As a result, liberal regimes represented a curious mix of individual 
self-responsibility and dualism: society is divided into two groups with one embracing those 
who unfortunately rely on stigmatizing relief, while the second includes privileged people 
capable of deriving their welfare from the market (Esping-Andersen, 1990).  
 
Social democratic stratification  
The third welfare regime type is the social democratic model which is oriented on 
construction solidarity among workers. In their struggle for labor solidarity, socialists faced 
two main obstacles. On the one hand, they had to fight corporatism along with the paternalism 
of employers and the state. They also had to oppose against the atomizing, individualizing 
impulse of the market (Esping-Andersen, 1990). On the other hand, the serious obstacle to 
solidarity laid, as Esping-Andersen (1990) specifies, in the social divisions institutionalized 
through earlier conservative and liberal reforms. The abolishing of the old poor law was 
priority number one for politicians. The main task was to design such a policy that both 
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addressed the real need for social relief and would help the socialist movement come to power. 
The question revolved around contending principles of solidarity. One approach was to build 
a corporatism model. A second approach was to place the social question in the hands of the 
trade unions and win concessions through collective bargaining. Both approaches were 
however unlikely to produce broad solidarity.  
The socialist movements turned to the third alternative, which assumed that the 
movement itself become the provider of workers’ welfare. This became especially possible 
with the extension and consolidation of democratic rights. Esping-Andersen (1990) explains 
that parliamentarism presented the socialists with new reformist vistas but also imposed upon 
them the necessity to mobilize solid electoral majorities, which the getto strategy would 
almost certainly fail to produce. Universalism did not collapse even in the wake of middle-
classes. The solution was to combine universal entitlements with high earnings-graduated 
benefits, thus matching welfare state benefits and services to middle class expectations. In this 
way, they attained broader equality through non-market mechanisms (Esping-Andersen, 
1990).  
Thus, the social democratic welfare state was designed to promote universalism since 
it equalized the status, benefits, and responsibilities of citizenship and because it helped build 
a political coalition.  
 
By reflecting different stratification goals Esping-Andersen (1990) provides three 
separate indexes of stratification – conservative, liberal, and socialist – with the expectation 
that welfare states scoring highly on one dimension are unlikel to score highly on other 
dimensions. The component measures that comprise each index are successfully described by 
Scruggs and Allan (2006a). 
Conservative social stratification is reflected by two indicators that illustrate the status 
differences and the privileged position of the state in conservative welfare regimes. The 
corporatism variable records the segmentation of public pension programs based upon major 
occupational categories. The second measure - etatism – reflects the level of pension 
expenditure for government employees as a percentage of gross domestic product (Scruggs 
and Allan, 2006a). 
Liberal social stratification is measured through three indexes that reflect the extent to 
which market solutions are emphasized in social policy. The first indicator measures the 
relative importance of normal means-tested poor relief as a share of overall public social 
expenditures. In the area of pensions, the ratio of private pensions to total pensions measures 
the public-private mix. Similarly, private health spending as a share of total health 
expenditures attempts to do the same with health care (Scruggs and Allan, 2006a). 
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Socialist social stratification is defined by two measures. Universalism is measured by 
the average portion of the workforce eligible for benefits in three social insurance programs: 
unemployment, sickness, and old-age pensions. Benefit equality measures are based on the 
ratio of basic benefits to maximum allowable benefits averaged over the same three programs 
(Scruggs and Allan, 2006a).  
The stratification indexes replicated by Scruggs and Allan (2006a) are reported in the 
table below.  
 
Table 7.8.: Stratification indexes by welfare regime type 
 
 
Source: Calculations based on Scruggs and Allan  (2006a) 
 
It is clear from the table that liberal regimes score heavily on liberal measures 
compared to insignificant levels on socialist and conservatist measures. The same is true for 
conservatism. Countries, included in this group, score strongly on conservatist measures and 
to a limited degree on socialist measures and to some extent on liberal measures. Countries 
belonging to social democratic regimes score highly on socialist measures and also tome 
extent on liberal and conservatist measures.  
An aggregated level of analysis of stratification effects provides mixed results. In 
conservative welfare regimes, there is a positive and statistically significant correlation 
between levels of stratification and institutional trust. In the case of interpersonal trust, the 
relationship is negative but not statistically significant, which suggests that the effect of 
stratification is neutral. As in the previous case, controlling for income inequality rends the 
relationship negative, which is only statistically significant for interpersonal trust. In 
conservative welfare regimes, social policy hence affect social trust mostly through the 
reduction of income inequality, which is an effective instrument in raising trust levels among 
 Scores on 
Conservatism Liberalism Socialism 
Social democratic  
 
4.5 5.9 5.4 
Liberal  
 
1.0 8.1 4.3 
Conservative  
 
6.4 5.7 3.1 
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individuals. When controlling for fractionalization, wealth, and percentage of Protestants 
living in countries, the relationship becomes negative, especially for interpersonal trust. The 
direct effect of stratification on social trust is hence negative, although it does not appear 
statistically significant in any of the cases. Only when controlling for corruption are the direct 
effects of stratification on social trust positive and statistically significant. Interpersonal trust 
is thus very sensitive to how fairly public institutions treat individuals, which is surprisingly 
less important for defining institutional trust in conservative welfare regimes.  
In liberal welfare regimes, the direct correlation between stratification scores and 
social trust is positive for institutional trust and negative for interpersonal trust. Controlling 
for all five covariates changes the value of correlation coefficients, although the significance 
test failed in all cases. What is surprising here is that the effect of income inequality is weaker 
due to the fact that social policy is less effective in reducing income inequalities in liberal 
welfare regimes. The strongest impact stems from controlling for corruption. The latter can be 
explained by the prevalence in liberal countries of means-tested benefit schemes and thus, 
how public institutions treat potential recipients becomes crucially important.  
In social democratic welfare regimes, the relationship between stratification scores and 
social trust is positive for both forms of trust, but only statistically significant for 
interpersonal trust.  Although the universal approach of socialism can be considered most 
effective in reducing income inequality, we do not find a strong impact of this covariate on 
the relationship in question. Controlling for income inequality slightly changes the value of 
partial correlation coefficients. What matters here most is the way public institutions operate, 
especially in the case of institutional trust. More effective institutions, which can be observed 
from the general trend of a country’s wealth and the level of corruption in these institutions, 
trigger higher regards towards them. The relationship between interpersonal trust and 
stratification scores is less affected by the efficiency of public institutions. In general, it 
should be noted that this relationship remains positive even after controlling for all five 
country-level covariates. In social democratic welfare regimes, the effects of stratification 
scores on interpersonal trust are hence positive in most cases.  
Thus, the aggregated level analysis point to the fact that the crowding-out hypothesis 
hold true when controlling for income inequality. In the rest of the cases, the relationship is  
positive suggesting that stratification of any type leads to an increase in both forms of trust. 
We can also obtain a negative sign, but the relationship under analysis remains statistically 
insignificant, which advocates for the absence of crowding-out effects. These results greatly 
contradict our expectations. One might expect a negative sign for liberal stratification scores 
and a positive sign for conservative and social democratic stratification scores.  
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Table 7.9.: The correlation between stratification indexes and social trust, controlling 
for country-level characteristics  
 
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey  
 
The aggregated level of analysis thus provides results that point out that the direct 
relationship between social trust and stratification scores can be negative in some cases, 
although it is rarely statistically significant. This should however be interpreted with some 
caution since the small number of cases at the aggregated level could be responsible for the 
failure of the significance test in providing positive outcomes.  
At the individual-level of analysis, our expectations are based on the assumption that 
certain types of stratification may lead to crowding-out in institutional and interpersonal trust. 
If the classical crowding-out hypothesis states that social trust should be lower in the 
countries with more developed social obligations, one can expect:  
Hypothesis 5.1.: Higher scores on social democratic stratification should be associated with 
lower levels of both forms of social trust. 
Hypothesis 5.2.:  Conservative stratification scores are expected to negatively correlate with 
levels of interpersonal and institutional trust.  
Hypothesis 5.3.: Higher liberal stratification scores are expected to positively correlate with 
social trust indexes.  
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between 
stratification 
levels  and 
social trust 
 
 
 
Controlled for 
 
Fractiona
lization  
 
Wealth 
 
 
Income 
Inequality  
 
Corruption  
 
% of 
Protestants  
 
Conservative  
 
1. Interpersonal trust 
 
2. Institutional trust 
 
 
 
-0.175 
 
0.571* 
 
 
 
-0.332 
 
-0.283 
 
 
-0.153 
 
0.065 
 
 
-0.552** 
 
-0.451 
 
 
0.412* 
 
0.208 
 
 
-0.224 
 
-0.158 
Liberal  
 
1. Interpersonal trust 
 
2. Institutional trust 
 
 
 
-0.044 
 
0.571* 
 
 
 
0.188 
 
0.224 
 
 
 
-0.072 
 
0.348 
 
 
0.194 
 
0,152 
 
 
-0.305 
 
-0.283 
 
 
 
-0.013 
 
0.125 
Social democratic  
 
1. Interpersonal trust 
 
2. Institutional trust 
 
 
 
0.487** 
 
0.314 
 
 
 
0.316 
 
0.107 
 
 
 
 
0.434 
 
-0.052 
 
 
0.396 
 
0.396 
 
 
0.324 
 
-0.128 
 
 
 
 
0.359 
 
0.217 
 157 
With respect to individual-level stratification effects on social trust, we obtain results 
that are not fully in line with our expectations (see table below).  
 
Table 7.10.: The influence of stratification on trust levels: an individual-level analysis28 
 Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey 
 
For interpersonal trust, crowding-out can be expected in the case of liberalism and 
crowding-in in the cases of conservatism and socialism. The conservative approach to 
organizing welfare aimed at preserving existing class structures affects interpersonal trust 
positively. More specifically, an increase in conservatist measures by one point increases the 
odds of trusting others by 5.23 percent. It does not matter that the welfare is provided with the 
aim of reproducing the class structure of society. People might consider it fair that welfare 
institutions support individuals based on their work history or place in the social structure, 
since it positively affects an individual’s trust in other people. The class-related approach is 
hence relatively successful in organizing welfare provisions to members of society. What 
becomes more important for interpersonal trust is the fact that an individual is supported by 
the state when he or she experiences social contingencies. The mechanisms through which it 
does so are less important. Interpersonal trust is thus very sensitive to the presence of state 
support as such rather than to the kind of stratification that results from state intervention.  
Socialism was also found to lead to crowding-in effects: an increase in socialist 
measures by one point tends to increase the odds of trusting by 9.53 percent. The effect is thus 
almost twice as strong than for conservatism, which is quite modest but still advocates for the 
presence of a positive influence. An approach aimed at supporting individual independence is 
hence more productive of interpersonal trust than that aimed at preserving the existing class 
structure. What is important for interpersonal trust is how equally individuals are treated. 
                                                 
28
 The coefficients on control variables are not reported since they coincide with those in Table 7.3.  
 Institutional trust   
 
             Interpersonal trust 
Conservatism  Liberalism Socialism  
 
Conservatism  Liberalism Socialism  
 
 
Stratification 
indexes  
Conservatism  
Liberalism  
Socialism  
 
 
 
 
-0.071*** 
 
 
 
 
0.193*** 
 
 
 
 
 
0.190*** 
 
 
 
0.051*** 
 
 
 
 
-0.022*** 
 
 
 
 
 
0.091*** 
Variance at 
individual level 
 
9.275  
(0.111) 
9.271 
(0.111) 
9.272 
(0.111) 
Not  
calculated  
Not 
calculated  
Not 
calculated  
Variance at 
country level 
 
0.285  
(0.020) 
0.434 
(0.031) 
0.224 
(0.016) 
0.125  
(0.007) 
0.184 
(0.112) 
0.265 
(0.017) 
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Only in a society where all individuals are subject to the same treatment can trust in other 
people thrive. Since socialism guarantees equality in both input and output, it is very effective 
in producing high trust indexes. Equality is provided as the input since people are treated 
equally without taking into account their position in the class structure when defining access 
to, and the amount of, benefits. Equality is also provided as the output, since the convergence 
of individuals’ welfare at higher levels is the desired outcome of social democratic regimes. 
The absence of apriori or posteriori stratification in welfare state provisions is a vital 
instrument for building trusting societies.  
In the case of liberalism, the total effect is negative, which suggests that liberal social 
policy leads to the erosion of interpersonal trust among individuals. It is not however clear 
whether the total effect is the result of the impact of stratification or of the institutional design 
of welfare state systems. It is reasonable to assume that socialist measures largely reflect the 
universal approach to organizing the delivery of social provisions, while the liberal one 
reflects means-testing principles of organizing an individual’s welfare. In any case, it is clear 
that creating a dualism in society can ruin interpersonal trust. This is due to the fact that 
interpersonal trust is very sensitive to two aspects. First, it can be ruined by stigmatizing 
individuals. If access to social provisions is based on the principle of creating a stigma for 
those experiencing social risks, people may feel unequal. Moreover, the cliental of welfare 
states feel inferior to other individuals, who can generate personal welfare without the state’s 
help. Creating a stigma through entitlements to social provisions thus ruins social trust in 
other people. The same result can appear through another similar process, namely, through 
isolating those in need in a distinct group. As Rothstein and Stolle (2001) argue, this can 
create distrust for ‘problem’ people towards the rest of the population and also the trust of 
other people towards the needy. Interpersonal trust is thus considerably influenced by how to 
treat ‘problem’ people.  
This also points out that the effects welfare states have on social trust cannot be fully 
outweighed by the fact that the state provides individuals with financial support. The 
organization of welfare provisions for individuals plays a crucial role in defining the level of 
interpersonal trust in society. If social provisions are aimed at preserving existing class 
structures, their effect on interpersonal trust becomes less positive. If their aim is to somehow 
punish an individual experiencing social risks by stigmatizing him or her, the positive effects 
turn into negative.  
In the case of institutional trust, the results suggest the possibility of crowding-out for 
conservatism and crowding-in for liberalism and socialism. An increase in the measures of 
conservatism by one point decreases institutional trust by 0.071 points when individual 
characteristics are kept constant. Conservative stratification hence tends to negatively 
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influence confidence in public welfare state institutions, which are aimed at preserving 
existing class structures. The general principle of organizing an individual’s welfare based on 
an individual’s work history and an individual’s placement in the social structure might 
produce negative effects on trust in public welfare institutions. In order to explain this, one 
should bear in mind the fact that confidence in public institutions essentially depends on the  
way of their functioning on society and social order. In conservative welfare regimes, 
economic well-being is heavily dependent on the place of individuals in the social structure. It 
reproduces the existing social order through welfare provisions without providing easy  
upward class mobility. Welfare state institutions thus perpetuate class differences, which 
makes people feel unequal. Such institutions produce negative attitudes towards them which 
results in low levels of institutional trust. Another reason for the negative effects of 
conservative approach on institutional trust might stem from the fact that conservatism uses 
selective principles to organize welfare provisions. The existence of different funds for 
different professions or social groups entails treating people differently. This again can create 
distance between groups of people in society and, as a result, lower trust in public welfare 
institutions.  
What is surprising is that an increase in the measures of liberalism leads to an increase 
in institutional trust by 0.193 points, which goes against general logic that assumes that 
means-testing and stigmatizing ruin individuals’ confidence in public institutions. It is 
plausible to infer here that the fact that the state provides an individual with financial aid 
outweighs the negative impact of the way this welfare is provided. For institutional trust, it is 
not important that people have to go through bureaucratic hassle and control to obtain social 
benefits. It is also not important that the needy are isolated in a distinct group and stigmatized 
as recipients of social benefits. What is important for institutional trust is that these 
institutions help individuals when they are having difficulties. It is important that they are not 
left alone when they are out of the labor market. The welfare state becomes a partner in 
securing well-being even if it creates a dualism in society. Moreover, liberalism creates equal 
conditions for all applicants for public help and hence it treats all those in need equally, since 
they all have to go through means-tested procedures. In addition, each of them is entitled to 
the same package of benefits that stem from the same public funds which creates quasi 
‘equality’ among the recipients of social benefits.  
Positive effects are also obtained for socialist measures: an increase in the socialist 
index by one point is associated with an average increase of 0.190 points in institutional trust. 
Providing individuals with welfare on a universal basis can be considered an instrument of 
increasing institutional trust.  The strong influence of socialism may also stem from the fact 
that socialist social policy is aimed at the creation of an egalitarian society, in which 
 160 
individuals are not only equal but also independent from the labor market. It suggests that the 
convergence of individuals’ welfare is a strong predictor for trust in public welfare 
institutions. This becomes even more important when this convergence happens at a high 
level. Furthermore, equal access to welfare provisions provided on a universal basis enhances 
trust in public welfare institutions. Finally, individual independence from family ties and the 
labor market guaranteed by the welfare state might be another reason for the high evaluations 
of the institutions in which the provisions of welfare are embedded. 
Institutional trust is thus more sensitive to how individuals are treated. If they are 
treated equally by the system, they tend to express higher confidence in public welfare 
institutions. This occurs even if this is a ‘negative equality’, which means that those in need 
are subject to the same bureaucratic hassles and control as in liberal welfare states. If equality 
is disturbed and social benefits depend on the place of an individual in the social structure as 
in conservative welfare states, then people are unlikely to be trusting towards these 
institutions because they perpetuate the existing social order. What is also important for 
institutional trust is the fact that an individual is supported by welfare states, whereas how this 
support is organized becomes inferior and secondary for the process of generating 
institutional trust in society. This supports the integration argument that emphasizes the 
importance of the support of individuals by welfare states in the case of need.  
The specification of the outcome dimension reveals the fact that in some cases, 
crowding-out is present in the relationship between social policy outcomes and social trust 
levels. More specifically, the generosity of social spending that guarantees high levels of 
decommodification usually leads to crowding-in effects in interpersonal and institutional trust.  
Stratification affects social trust elements in a different way. Preserving the existing class 
structure inherent to conservative welfare regimes negatively influences institutional trust but 
positively affects interpersonal trust. The stigmatizing approach of liberal welfare states 
erodes interpersonal trust but boosts institutional trust. Finally, socialism’s universal approach 
leads to crowding-in effects in both forms of social trust.  
 
 
7.4. Overview and concluding remarks 
This chapter studies the outcome effect of social policy, which forms the outcome 
dimension. The first sub-chapter provides arguments in favor of the introduction of an 
outcome spectrum in the social trust analysis. The analysis is conducted by relating the level 
of decommodification and stratification in the selected 18 OECD countries to interpersonal 
and institutional trust indexes among their populations. The aggregated level of analysis 
advocates that the integration and institutional arguments are valid in explaining the effects of 
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welfare state development on social trust formation. The results obtained at the individual 
level of analysis provide mixed evidence. First, welfare regimes’ dummies show that both 
forms of trust are lowest in liberal welfare regimes, highest in Scandinavian countries, and 
moderate in continental Europe. When directly assessing the impact of decommodification on 
trust levels, we find evidence of crowding-in for both forms of social trust. It should be noted 
however that the impact of decommodification contains an explicit functional dimension, 
which assumes that its effects differ across social provisions. As the analysis confirms, the 
effects of welfare states on social trust are policy specific and should be studied for each 
social provision separately.  
Stratification affects social trust elements in a different way. The preserving of the 
existing class structure, which is inherent to conservative welfare regimes, negatively 
influences institutional trust but positively affects interpersonal trust. The stigmatizing 
approach of liberal welfare states erodes interpersonal trust but boosts institutional trust. 
Finally, socialism’s universal approach leads to crowding-in effects in both forms of social 
trust.  
The results obtained reveal that regardless of the way welfare state development is 
operationalized, one can expect that its impact on institutional and interpersonal trust is 
positive in most cases. These findings are in line with empirical studies which directly or 
indirectly test the crowding-out hypothesis (Delhey and Newton, 2005; Van Oorschot and 
Arts, 2005; Knack and Zack, 2001). Social spending can hence be used as a good proxy for 
decommodification levels since both measures lead to the same findings that demonstrate a 
positive impact on social trust.  
The impact of the outcome dimension should be considered a product of both 
decommodification and stratification. This stems from the fact that social trust indexes are 
usually significantly higher in social democratic welfare regimes compared to liberal and 
conservative regimes (Van Oorschot and Arts, 2005). Along with decommodification, the 
stratification mechanism can hence be regarded as effective in manipulating trust.  
Based on the relationship of trust with decommodification and social stratification, it 
is possible to say that the recent trend towards liberalism may result in social trust levels 
going down, especially in the case of interpersonal trust. For this form of trust, the effect will 
be joined, since lower levels of decommodification and the stigmatizing-like approach of 
stratification mechanisms may ruin the confidence of individuals in other people. For 
institutional trust, the negative impact of the liberal paradigm will stem mostly from reduced 
decommodification levels.  
What remains unclear is the mechanism that underlies the relationship of interest. 
There must be many links between welfare states and social trust through which the effect 
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materializes. Based on the aggregated level of analysis, it is possible to conclude that the 
effect itself is at least dubious. Welfare states boost trust by reducing income inequality levels 
and by improving the performance of public institutions. But the direct effect can also be 
negative because of the erosion by social policy of social networks or individuals’ morality. 
An additional research is necessary to study the mechanism of the relationship between 
welfare states and social trust.  
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Chapter 8: CHARACTERISTICS OF SOCIAL POLICIES AND SOCIAL TRUST: 
THE QUALITATIVE DIMENSION  
 
 
8.1.  Introducing a qualitative spectrum in social trust analysis  
Welfare states represent a multidimensional concept that has quantitative as well as 
qualitative characteristics. By defining a package of social rights, social policies are based on 
the principles upon which the maintenance of an individual’s welfare takes place. These 
principles include not only the level of decommodification of those experiencing social risks 
or certain mechanisms of social stratification, but also the particular design of benefit 
schemes, their form of delivery, and the mode of financing.  
Up to now, there is no research that accounts for effects of these characteristics on 
social trust levels. The general tendency in analyzing the relationship between welfare states 
and social trust consists in using either their spending level or Esping-Andersen’s welfare 
regime typology to describe welfare state development. Using social spending as the measure 
of welfare state development omits from the analysis any kind of qualitative features that 
describe the principles of  welfare provisions to individuals.  
An alternative way to operationalize welfare states is to use Esping-Andersen’s 
welfare regime typology based on a three-dimensional approach defined along de-
familiarization, de-commodification, and stratification axes. Nevertheless, this typology also 
has disadvantages. This classification itself is highly criticized. Esping-Andersen’s 
classification is a continuation of the old ‘quantitative tradition’ and only partially accounts 
for some qualitative dimensions, the effects of which are often debated in the literature. The 
latter includes for instance debates about the replacement of passive unemployment schemes 
with more effective active labor market policies (Aust and Arriba, 2005;  Kvist and Ploug, 
2003; Taylor-Gooby, 2005a,b), discussions about shifting to general and indirect taxation 
instead of contributory modes of financing (Edlund, 2002; Orsini, 2006), or arguments to 
substitute cash benefits with in-kind benefits.     
The question that arises is ‘why’ we should recognize the existence of the qualitative 
spectrum. The starting point of the argument is that the welfare state itself represents a 
synthetic construct which reflects not only the level of the state’s intervention into societal 
arrangements, but also ‘how’ this intervention happens. This involves using multiple 
mechanisms in organizing and financing the provision of welfare to individuals experiencing 
social risks for whatever reasons. Organizing the same range of social policies, countries 
differ in ‘how’ these policies are designed, implemented, and financed. So it is possible to 
assume that the same policy may lead to different outcomes (in terms of social trust levels) 
just because its characteristics vary across different countries. The diversity of instruments for 
 164 
policy design, implementation, and financing thus presupposes particular features of every 
social policy in each specific country, which reflects the principles upon which the 
organization of welfare provisions at national or sub-national levels takes place.  
 On the other hand, the isolation of the qualitative characteristics of social policies is 
necessary for the analysis of their effects on social trust because of the existence of ‘mixed’ 
effects. The latter is based on the assumption that the final outcome in the relationship 
between social policy and social trust is the result of simultaneous interactions between the 
effects stemming from different policy characteristics. It is plausible to assume that these 
effects may sometimes have the opposite sign of influence and hence neutralize each other 
when analyzed as a whole. It is thus necessary to disaggregate the qualitative characteristics 
and analyze their separate effects on interpersonal and institutional trust.  
Finally, this new approach allows us to grasp all possible effects welfare states 
conducts on trust perception from a different prospective and go beyond the usual spending 
level. The latter permits describing welfare state development in more detail. In addition, this 
approach also contributes to a better understanding of the mechanisms that underlie the 
relationship between welfare state development and social trust formation.  
We must thus introduce a qualitative spectrum in the analysis of the relationship 
between welfare states and social trust. This includes isolating social policy characteristics 
and analyzing their separate characteristics on social trust indexes. These characteristics that 
form the qualitative spectrum are:  
(1) general taxation versus contributory financing,  
(2) in-kind versus cash benefits,  
(3) active versus passive labor market policies, 
(4) means-tested versus non means-tested benefits. 
It is impossible to analyze the effects of all qualitative characteristics. Therefore, we 
will choose only one of them to conduct a detailed analysis of the relationship between these 
characteristics and social trust levels on the one hand, and its interaction with the functional 
dimension on the other. Our choice is based on the availability of data. An additional criterion 
is the availability of theory to explain the mechanism that underlies this phenomenon. This 
characteristic is the institutional design of benefits schemes which can be either non means-
tested or means-tested.  
 
8.1. The Institutional design and social trust: a theoretical elaboration  
The relationship between welfare states and social trust is subject of many debates that 
very often lead to controversial results. There are studies that suggest that the effects of social 
policies are positive and hence welfare states enhance an individual’s confidence in 
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institutions as well as in other people (Knack and Zak, 2001; Patulny, 2005; Rothstein and 
Uslaner, 2006;  Szreter, 2002). But there are some studies that advocate the opposite. Scholars 
argue that welfare states crowd-out social trust (Fukuyama, 2000; De Swaan, 1988). The 
recent attempt to explain this contradiction is the idea of taking into account the institutional 
design of welfare states or benefit schemes. This approach recognizes the possibility of both 
crowding-in and crowding-out as will be shown later. 
The studies about the effects of the institutional design of social provisions on social 
trust represent a new trend in analyzing the relationship between welfare states and trust. 
They all fit in the general framework of the research, which is focused on the effects social 
policy conducts on faith in other people or public welfare institutions. Although, it is an 
independent trend in social trust research, this field of analysis incorporates the main 
drawbacks of general studies on the welfare state-social trust nexus, which lack empirical 
analysis which that would help prove or disprove the hypothesis about the effects welfare 
states have on social trust. Another drawback inherent to social trust research is the fact that 
the mechanisms of the effects of the institutional design are quite numerous, which makes the 
analysis cumbersome. There are however some differences between the so called 
‘institutional’ approach to social trust analysis and the general trend mentioned above. While 
relying on numerous mechanisms, the effects are not controversial with respect to the final 
outcomes. The discussion always concludes that universalism, which is associated with non 
means-testing, has a positive impact on generalized trust, while ‘selectivity’, which is based 
on means-testing, has  a negative relationship with confidence in other people.  
Before starting an overview of the literature on the effects of the institutional design 
on social trust, it should be mentioned that the origins of this analysis stem from the research 
conducted by Rothstein (1998), where he introduces a distinction between universal and 
selective 29  welfare states. Although this study does not directly elaborate on the effects 
institutional design can have on social trust, Rothstein (1998) draws a detailed scheme of how 
institutions charged with the making and implementation of collective decisions may be 
designed and how this particular design affects the willingness of citizens to assist in realizing 
the objectives of welfare policy. His main contribution consists in showing the advantages of 
the universal design of welfare states, which include a greater (compared to selective ones) 
redistributive effect. Based on calculations of the effects of universal welfare states, Rothstein 
(1998) comes to a conclusion that there is a dramatic reduction in inequality between the 
highest and the lowest percentiles of income distribution. He concludes that this reduction can 
                                                 
29
 Some scholars name selective welfare states as categorical. 
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be achieved with no progressivity in taxation and without targeting benefits and services for 
the truly needy. 
In his other research conducted together with other scholars, he elaborates in more 
detail how the particular design of welfare state programs may explain the kind of influence 
they conduct on social capital. As was said before, in spite of the diversity of studies, they all 
come to the conclusion that crowding-out is expected in the case of means-tested schemes, 
while universal non means-tested schemes usually have a positive influence on social trust 
levels. The difference mainly lies in the diversity of the mechanisms that underlie the 
relationship in question.  
Rothstein and Stolle (2001) for instance provide explanations which in the form of the  
‘justice enforcement” argument. They argue that universal welfare states are the most 
effective in generating trust since they enable, more than any other system of public policy, 
the implementation of norms of impartiality, fairness, and respect, particularly in comparison 
to selective or conservative public policy systems. General inclusiveness, which excludes 
discrimination on any basis, functions here as an important factor in the development and 
maintenance of generalized trust. The effectiveness of a universal system in generating trust 
lies in the more transparent procedures of implementing social programs as selective systems 
presuppose a wide range of discretionary power which escalates fears of fraud and/or 
dishonesty into increased control and complicated rules of getting social benefits. However, 
they do not conduct an empirical analysis to prove their arguments.  
This idea is developed by Kumlin and Rothstein (2007) who base their analysis in the 
frame of a ‘justice enforcement argument’, although they do limit justice to a procedural 
interpretation.  They argue that people are concerned not only with the final results of 
personal contacts with public institutions, but in whether the process that eventually leads to 
the final results is fair. Kumlin and Rothstein (2007) distinguish between several aspects of 
procedural justice. These may involve questions of whether or not an individual is received 
with respect and dignity; whether he or she is able to communicate opinions to civil servants; 
and whether there are signs of discrimination, corruption, and /or cheating. They further argue 
that needs-tested public services may more readily give rise to suspicions concerning 
procedural justice and arbitrary treatment than do universal agencies. In other words, 
programs based on needs-testing imply a greater scope for bureaucratic discretion. Citizens 
for their part have an incentive and opportunity in this situation to withhold relevant 
information from bureaucrats to try to convince the latter that they should qualify for the 
service in question. This easily escalates into a vicious spiral of distrust from clients leading 
to increased control from bureaucrats. Because of this complex and controversial decision 
making process, needs testing and bureaucratic discretionary power are often more difficult to 
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reconcile with the principles of procedural justice compared with universal public services. 
Their empirical analysis explicitly shows the negative relationship between the number of 
needs-tested institutional contacts and the levels of social trust based on the Sweden SOM 
survey. Their analysis was thus limited to one country. Furthermore, they do not prove 
whether or not the mechanism that underlies the phenomenon under study works as they 
assume, but instead they focus on establishing the fact that the number of contacts with 
means-tested programs negatively correlates with generalized trust levels.  
In their further research, scholars focus more on explaining why selective and 
conservative welfare regimes undermine trust among individuals. Unlike a universal one, 
Rothstein and Stolle (2001) argue that both selective and conservative welfare states are 
designed to plot groups of people against each other, which violates the principle of fairness. 
They use the so called ‘stigma creation’ argument to explain how means-testing may ruin 
social trust among the recipients of such benefits. They continue their reasoning by arguing 
that if citizens are singled out as special ‘problem’ cases as they are in selective welfare 
systems, it is possible that the majority of citizens might not trust them. This in turn causes 
‘problem’ people to be distrustful of others. They also explain the development of distrust 
among clientele of means-tested programs with the discriminatory experience they go through 
when applying for, and receiving relevant benefits.30 Rothstein and Stolle (2001) conduct an 
empirical analysis based on SOM data for Sweden for the years 1996-2000, which confirms 
their hypothesis that citizens who use selective welfare state services in Sweden are less 
trusting than the rest of the population. They stop however at this point without checking 
whether means-testing is a negative determinant of social trust with respect to all policies or if 
it can be policy specific. Moreover, their analysis is based exclusively on data for one country 
and ignores the possibility of a cross-national investigation. 
Rothstein and Uslaner (2006) also elaborate on the reasons why universal programs are 
positive in their effects on social trust while selective programs have negative effects. They 
provide their explanation in the frame of reasoning called as the ‘equality promotion’ 
argument. Equality is understood as income equality. More specifically, they say that unlike 
selective social schemes, universal schemes may enhance trust. This occurs due to the fact 
that such programs are much better in reducing inequality than simple redistributive schemes 
that imply selective policies. The authors insist that apart from economic equality, one should 
also take account of the equality of opportunities as a determinant of social trust. Universal 
programs may also ensure this since they possess a number of specific characteristics. First, 
they are delivered with less bureaucratic hassle and control. Second, they may create feelings 
                                                 
30
 In line with these findings, Mofflat and Higgs argue that the ‘stigmatizing’ of people through means-testing 
may create among participants a feeling of being demeaned by the system that negatively affects their trust level. 
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of social cohesion in society. Third, high quality universal programs may increase feelings of 
optimism and equal opportunity among large segments of the population. They use a 
regression analysis to test the effects of means-tested benefits on generalized trust. The results 
meet their expectations and show that being a client of means-tested benefit schemes in the 
United States entails negative effects on trust indexes. Moreover, these negative effects on 
social trust caused by interaction with means-testing institutions remain statistically 
significant even after controlling for the personal characteristics of recipients. As in the 
previous research, they do not elaborate on whether or not the effects of the institutional 
design of benefit schemes on social trust are policy specific. They again base their research on 
an individual level analysis for one country. Apart from that, the authors do not prove the 
mechanism of the effects directly, but rather limit their empirical investigation to general 
statements that claim that experience with means-testing may ruin social trust. They conclude 
their analysis with a pessimistic prediction about the dynamics of trust based on the notion of 
social traps: “social trust will not increase because massive social inequality prevails, but the 
public policies that could remedy this situation cannot be established precisely because there 
is a genuine lack of trust.”  
In spite of the fact that the question of the relationship between the institutional design 
and social trust receives some attention and is elaborated on to a great extent in the literature, 
there are some problems that require a further analysis. First, the research conducted so far  
focuses on explaining the mechanisms that underlie effects non means-testing and means-
testing have on social trust. The empirical analysis that supports the hypothesis is poor and 
limited to the individual level on the basis of two countries: the United States and Sweden. 
Moreover, scholars merely focus on studying whether or not the contact with means-tested 
programs ruins generalized trust. There is no cross-national research based on a wide range of 
countries that relates spending on non means-tested and means-tested benefit schemes to their 
social trust levels. This analysis is necessary since the narrow boundaries of research do not 
allow for generalizing the findings to the rest of the world, which goes far beyond Sweden 
and the United States.  
Second, the analysis conducted so far generalizes the effects of the institutional design 
to all social policies and ignores the fact that they may be policy specific. Welfare states 
represent a number of policies that differ in their aims, clientele, and effects. A wide range of 
policies use means-testing and it is plausible to assume that the complexity of means-testing 
and hence the strength of its influence on social trust will largely depend on the perception of 
how deserving people who are experiencing social contingencies and hence become the 
clientele of welfare states are. It is also widely known that the deservingness for public 
support substantially varies across social groups for whom the policies are designed. It is 
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hence possible to expect that the effects of the institutional design on social trust will be 
policy specific.  
Third, all studies presented above limit social trust to generalized trust, or confidence 
in other people. It is hence more or less known how a particular institutional design will affect 
interpersonal trust. It remains however ignored that trust itself is a multifaceted concept that 
has several forms. The most common used in empirical research (besides interpersonal trust) 
is institutional trust, which reflects confidence in public welfare institutions. There is no 
analysis that attempts to explain how and why institutional trust may be affected by welfare 
states in general and their institutional design in particular. It is interesting to see whether 
institutional design matters for institutional trust and if so, whether it follows the pattern 
found for interpersonal trust.31 
Thus, we will try to account for the problems mentioned above and will conduct a 
cross-national investigation based on data of 18 OECD countries. We will also check for the 
policy specific effects of institutional design on social trust, while extending the analysis of 
institutional effects to institutional trust.  
 
 
8.3. Division of spending between non means-tested and means-tested  
The division of spending between non means-tested and means-tested schemes follows 
the expected distribution. The vast majority of social provisions is provided through non 
means-tested schemes in all countries, especially in conservative and social democratic 
welfare regimes. Means-tested benefits account there for only about two percent. In liberal 
countries, the share of means-tested schemes in total social spending constitutes almost 25 
percent or 5.26 percent of GDP. In other words, continental and northern Europe rely on non 
means-tested benefits, while using means-tested scehems as a complementary measure mainly 
in the case of social assistance. Anglo-Saxon countries by contrast use the stigmatizing 
principle in social welfare provisions, which pre-supposes the dominance of means-tested 
mechanisms with their sometimes rude procedures of defining and monitoring the need for, 
and the level of, benefits.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31
 There is a study conducted by Rothstein and Stolle (2001) that demonstrates that institutional trust that reflects 
the impartiality of political and social institutions is important for interpersonal trust development. They argue 
that citizens generalize from knowledge about the honesty and impartiality of public officials and the public 
welfare/legal system to other people.  
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Table 8.1.: Average levels of social spending by institutional design, % of GDP   
 Percentage of non means-
tested schemes  
Percentage of means-tested 
schemes 
 
Social democratic  
27.61 1.96 
 
Conservative  
24.21 1.83 
 
Liberal  
16.47 5.26 
Source: Calculated based on Eurostat  
 
 
8.4. The institutional design and social trust: an aggregated-level analysis 
To some extent, interesting results are obtained when relating the level of spending by 
institutional design to trust indicators (see Table 8.2.). In line with the theory discussed before, 
crowding-in effects are found for interpersonal trust in the case of non means-tested schemes. 
This positive relationship remains even after sequentially controlling for four out of five 
country-level covariates. Only when keeping the inequality level constant does the positive 
relationship turns negative, while remaining statistically significant. First, this proof that 
social policy influences social trust through redistribution. The positive impact of non means-
tested schemes is thus mainly due to their redistributive effect. Moreover, it is also obvious 
from the table that the spurious effects of redistribution are stronger for universal policies 
compared to selective ones, which are always mentioned in the literature. This supports the 
equality promotion argument that states that non-means tested social programs are more 
effective in reducing income inequality. Second, it supports the idea that when redistributive 
effects are controlled for, the direct effects of social spending on interpersonal trust are 
negative, which is often conceptualized in the ‘crowding-out hypothesis’ (Fukuyama, 2000; 
De Swaan, 1988). The mechanism that underlies the negative partial correlation between the 
two phenomena under study remains a ‘black box’, although the literature assumes that it 
entails an erosion of either civil society or the ability of individuals to cooperate with each 
other. Finally, these results are in line with many findings (Kawachi et al., 1997; Knack and 
Keefer, 1997; Putnam, 1993; Seligman, 1997; Uslaner, 2000) that emphasize the detrimental 
effects of income inequality on trust formation process.  
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Table 8.2.: The correlation between social trust and measures of universalism and 
categorization: an aggregated-level analysis  
 
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey  
 
The quality of public institutions expressed through corruption has a little effect in the 
case of non means-tested benefits since this way of delivering social provisions does not 
require intense interaction between public welfare institutions and the beneficiaries of social 
security systems. 
When relating spending on means-testing benefit schemes and interpersonal trust 
indexes, one sees a negative relationship, which is fully in line with the results of recent 
research. It is hence possible to conclude that means-testing tends to erode interpersonal trust 
even when keeping most of country-level characteristics constant. Only when controlling for 
income inequality level does the negative effects turn neutral and lose their significance level. 
The effect of redistribution is smaller here than in the case of non means-tested spending. 
Controlling for corruption strengthens the negative influence of means-tested benefits on 
interpersonal trust. It is hence possible to conclude that what matters in the case of means-
tested spending is not their redistributive effects but rather the quality of welfare institutions 
through which the provision of these benefits takes place. In corrupt systems, which are 
known to tolerate bribes and which do not adhere to any norms of impartiality, generalized 
trust cannot thrive (Rothstein and Stolle, 2001; La Porta et al., 1999; Putnam, 1993). It 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation 
between 
spending by 
institutional 
design and 
social trust 
 
 
 
Controlled for 
 
Fractionali
zation  
 
Wealth 
 
 
Income 
Inequality  
 
Corruption  
 
% of 
Protestant
s  
Spending on non 
means-tested schemes 
  
1. Interpersonal trust 
 
2. Institutional trust 
 
 
 
 
0.132*** 
 
-0.062*** 
 
 
 
0.123*** 
 
-0.057*** 
 
 
 
0.136*** 
 
-0.067*** 
 
 
 
-0.024*** 
 
0.112*** 
 
 
 
0.066*** 
 
0.000 
 
 
 
0.051*** 
 
-0.011 
 
Spending on means-
tested schemes  
 
1. Interpersonal trust 
 
2. Institutional trust 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.039*** 
 
-0.024*** 
 
 
 
 
-0.076*** 
 
-0.004 
 
 
 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.064*** 
 
 
 
 
0.006 
 
-0.075*** 
 
 
 
 
-0.093*** 
 
0.017** 
 
 
 
 
-0.045*** 
 
-0.025*** 
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confirms the ‘justice enforcement’ argument that assumes the importance of impartiality for 
manipulating trust levels.  
For institutional trust, the effects of institutional design develop their own pattern that 
substantially differs from interpersonal trust. Crowding-out effects are detected when linking 
spending on both non means-tested and means-tested schemes to institutional trust indexes. 
When talking about the relationship with non means-tested spending, the negative sign 
remains even after controlling for fractionalization, country wealth, income inequality, and 
percentage of Protestants. Out of these four covariates, income inequality can be defined as 
most influential since keeping redistributive effects constant substantially increases the 
absolute value of the negative coefficient measuring the direct relationship between non 
means-tested spending and social trust. What also matters for institutional trust is the 
corruption level. Corruption conducts a spurious effect on the relationship between trust and 
non means-tested spending. Hence, even if interaction with public welfare institutions is rare 
in universal welfare states, the quality of their performance essentially predefines the level of 
institutional trust in society. If corruption levels are controlled for, the direct effect of non 
means-tested spending on institutional trust is neutral, but not negative. Trust in public 
institutions is thus highly determined by the degree of credibility and the fairness of these 
institutions. This can again be considered proof of the justice enforcement argument. 
Although there are not so many studies elaborating on this association, we find a strong 
correlation (0.747) between institutional trust and corruption indexes.  
The relationship between spending on means-tested schemes and institutional trust is 
also found negative and remains so even after keeping fractionalization, country wealth, 
income inequality level and percentage of Protestants constant. Although the ability of means-
tested social provisions to reduce income inequality is low, their redistributive effects on 
institutional trust are large. A strong effect is again seen in the case of corruption, which is 
positive and statistically significant this time. For institutional trust, it is hence more 
important how public welfare institutions operate or how fairly they treat applicants for 
means-tested benefits. If institutions are characterized as ‘not corrupt’, the effect of means-
tested spending on institutional trust is positive. It supports the argument provided by 
Rothstein and Stolle (2001) that suggests that institutional trust largely depends on how 
impartial, just, and fair social and political institutions, which are responsible for the 
implementation of public policies, are.  
Thus, the results indicate that social spending, in any institutional form, can lead to the 
erosion of institutional trust, unless the corruption level in institutions through which social 
provisions are delivered is controlled for. With respect to interpersonal trust, this happens 
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when welfare provisions are done through means-tested schemes while non means-tested 
schemes enhance interpersonal trust formation completely in line with the theory. 
 
 
8.5. The institutional design and social trust: an individual-level analysis  
When moving to an individual-level analysis, we again see mixed results that are not 
completely consistent with our expectations. Our expectations are: 
 
Hypothesis 6.1.: Higher spending on non means-tested schemes in countries should be 
associated with higher levels of interpersonal and institutional trust among the population. 
 
Hypothesis 6.2.: Higher spending on means-tested schemes in countries should be associated 
with lower levels of interpersonal and institutional trust among the population. 
 
At the individual-level analysis, we see again mixed results not completely consistent 
with our expectations (see Table 8.3). The effects of the institutional design on social trust 
only partially coincide with the theory that asserts that crowding-out can be expected in the 
case of means-tested schemes, while crowding-in is usually the outcome when the analysis is 
focused on non means-tested schemes. In the case of interpersonal trust, it is true that hassle 
and control, which are the main characteristics of means-testing, tend to erode confidence 
levels while more universalistic approaches to granting social benefits on a universal basis 
tend to enhance trust levels. The positive impact of non means-tested schemes may also arise 
from the fact that the latter are more efficient in poverty reduction than means-tested benefits. 
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Table 8.3.: Impact of the institutional design of benefit schemes on social trust levels: an 
individual-level analysis  
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey  
 
 Institutional trust Interpersonal trust  
 
Non means tested 
spending  
Means-tested 
spending  
 Non means tested 
spending  
Means-tested 
spending  
 
 
 
Non means-tested 
spending  
 
Means-tested 
spending   
 
 
0.076*** 
 
 
 
 
0.071*** 
  
0.043*** 
 
 
 
 
-0.064*** 
 
Volunteering  
 
0.125** 0.122**  0.286*** 0.247***  
Sociability  
 
0.416*** 0.429***  0.361*** 0.432***  
Religion 
Catholic  
Protestant  
Other  
 
 
0.225 
0.387 
0.035 
 
0.602 
0.693 
0.312 
  
-0.215*** 
0.066** 
0.050 
 
-0.176*** 
0.029 
0.020 
 
Religiousness 
 
-0.157*** -0.160***  -0.025*** -0.028***  
Gender  
 
0.119** 0.124**  0.062** 0.063**  
Age 
15-29 
30 – 44 
45 –above  
 
 
Ref/category 
-0.133* 
0.170**  
 
Ref/category 
-0.136* 
0.165** 
  
Ref/category 
0.161*** 
0.172*** 
 
Ref/category 
0.169*** 
0.188*** 
 
Education 
Lower 
Middle  
Upper  
 
 
Ref/category 
-0.044 
0.118** 
 
Ref/category 
-0.057 
0.116** 
  
Ref/category 
0.085*** 
0.690*** 
 
Ref/category 
0.093*** 
0.675*** 
 
Unemployed  
 
-0.367*** -0.392***  -0.255*** -0.244***  
Income 
1st  qu.  
2nd qu. 
3rd qu. 
4th qu. 
5th qu 
 
 
Ref/category 
0.135* 
0.079 
0.088 
0.045 
 
Ref/category 
0.132* 
0.086 
0.094 
0.069 
  
Ref/category 
0.075** 
0.230*** 
0.437*** 
0.576*** 
 
Ref/category 
0.079** 
0.231*** 
0.434*** 
0.582*** 
 
Variance at level 1  
 
9.265 (0.111) 9.262 (0.111)  Not calculated Not calculated  
Variance at level 2 
 
0.318 (0.022) 0.216 (0.014)  0.220 (0.014)0 0.206 (0.013)  
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 More specifically, the coefficient values indicate that an increase in social spending 
on non means-tested schemes by one percent increases the odds of trusting other people by an 
average of 3.5 percent when other variables are kept constant. An increase in means-tested 
schemes by one percent leads to a decrease in the odds of trusting by an average of 6.2 
percent when other variables are held constant. The coefficient on the ratio of non means-
tested spending to means-tested spending is found to equal 0.007, which confirms that an 
increase in the provision of benefits on non means-tested principles should positively affect 
interpersonal trust indexes. Thus, complex and sometimes humiliating procedures of means-
testing might cultivate the feeling of being at a disadvantage among those applying for 
benefits, leading to psychological closure of the personality and hence results in less trust in 
other people.  
With respect to institutional trust, the relationship has a different nature. It seems that 
the institutional design matters little for institutional trust: regardless of whether or not the 
benefits are provided based on means-testing or not, they have a positive influence on trust 
levels. For institutional trust, the fact that the state provides individuals with financial support 
is hence more important than the mechanisms through which it does so. This thus supports the 
integration argument that assumes that if governments guarantee to keep an individual alive 
and in good health when he or she has difficulties, then the individual will feel integrated and 
as a result his or her perception of failing substantially decreases, which forms the necessary 
grounds for higher institutional trust (Szreter, 2002).  
The coefficients point out that an increase in social spending on non means-tested 
schemes by one percent leads to an increase in institutional trust by an average of 0.076 units 
while an increase in means-tested spending by one percent is usually associated with an 
increase o 0.064 units in confidence in public welfare institutions. The coefficient on the ratio 
of non means-tested to means-tested spending is estimated at 0.035, which means that in spite 
of the fact that both types of spending lead to crowding-in, non means-tested provisions must 
have more positive effects on institutional trust.  
Hence, the effects of institutional design may differ across trust forms, which has not 
been mentioned before in the literature. One should limit the theory of means-testing to 
generalized or interpersonal trust. Institutional trust develops a completely different type of 
relationship with means-tested social provisions. The effects remain positive even after 
making a distinction between means and non means-tested spending. Regardless of the 
principles the provision of social benefits is based on, they induce positive effects on 
institutional trust. The fact that public institutions give support to those in need positively 
affects the recipients of public aid and their confidence towards these institutions. What 
becomes important here is how the institutions operate. As the aggregated level of analysis 
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shows, the level of corruption conducts an essential influence on the relationship between 
means-tested spending and institutional trust. If the institutions are perceived as fair and not 
corrupt, they gain high regards from the individuals who will have higher levels of confidence 
in them even in the case of means-testing.  
 
8.6. Interaction of the institutional design with the functional dimension  
It is an open question as to whether the effects of the institutional design are policy 
specific. To shed more light on this, we disaggregate total spending on means-tested and non 
means-tested schemes on functional a basis, thus obtaining the percentage of GDP spent on 
non means-tested and means-tested pension and unemployment schemes. An overview of 
these spending levels is summarized in the table below.  
 
Table 8.4.: Variation of spending on means-tested and non means-tested 
unemployment and pension schemes by welfare regime type, in % of GDP 
 Pension schemes Unemployment schemes 
Non 
Means-tested 
 
Means-tested Non  
Means-tested  
Means-
tested  
 
Social democratic  
9.28 0.48 3.09 0.22 
 
Conservative  
10.29 0.35 1.58 0.21 
 
Liberal  
5.84 0.78 0.19 0.25 
 
The data suggest that with respect to pensions, countries tend to give preference to non 
means-tested schemes while means–tested schemes are used as a supplementary measure to 
the traditional way of supplying pensions. As expected, liberal welfare regimes take the lead 
in using means-tested scheme, where eleven percent of pension spending is dedicated to 
means-tested pensions. In the other two welfare regimes, this share is much smaller and 
barely exceeds five percent.  
With respect to the institutional design of unemployment schemes, the variation of the 
share of GDP devoted to means-tested schemes is analogous. Here, governments tend to rely 
more on means-testing when providing the unemployed with financial support. In liberal 
welfare regimes, almost 57 percent of unemployment provisions are done through means-
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tested schemes. This percentage varies between six and twelve percent in social democratic 
and conservative welfare regimes. 
  
Table 8.5.: The correlation between the institutional design of pensions and 
unemployment schemes and social trust: an aggregated-level analysis  
 
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey  
 
The aggregated level of analysis failed to provide statistically significant results 
although the sign in the relationship between the institutional design of the selected provisions 
and social trust varies considerably. More specifically, a negative relationship  is seen 
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between 
spending by 
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design and 
social trust 
 
 
 
Controlled for 
 
Fractionali
zation  
 
Wealth 
 
 
Income 
Inequality  
 
Corruption  
 
% of 
Protestants  
Spending on non 
means-tested pension  
schemes 
  
1. Interpersonal trust 
 
2. Institutional trust 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.141 
 
-0.458 
 
 
 
 
-0.102 
 
-0.546* 
 
 
 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.444 
 
 
 
 
-0.283 
 
-0.676** 
 
 
 
 
-0.028 
 
-0.052 
 
 
 
 
-0.219 
 
-0.518 
 
 
Spending on means-
tested pension 
schemes  
 
1. Interpersonal trust 
 
2. Institutional trust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.058 
 
0.415 
 
 
 
 
 
0.191 
 
0.386 
 
 
 
 
 
0.287 
 
0.710 
 
 
 
 
 
0.303 
 
0.460 
 
 
 
 
 
0.075 
 
0.344 
 
 
 
 
 
0.117 
 
0.382 
 
Spending on non 
means-tested 
unemployment  
schemes 
  
1. Interpersonal trust 
 
2. Institutional trust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.318 
 
0.133 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.292 
 
0.137 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.188 
 
0.205 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.303 
 
0.460 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.203 
 
-0.031 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.178 
 
-0.023 
Spending on means-
tested unemployment 
schemes  
 
1. Interpersonal trust 
 
2. Institutional trust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.232 
 
0.053 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.161 
 
0.097 
 
 
 
 
0.158 
 
0.101 
 
 
 
 
0.371 
 
0.106 
 
 
 
 
0.200 
 
-0.064 
 
 
 
 
0.316 
 
0.123 
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between non means-tested pension schemes and both forms of trust. A positive relationship is 
found in the case of means-tested pension provisions and social trust. The results are 
completely opposite to what the theory asserts.  
The institutional design seems to matter little for unemployment benefits since the 
relationship between relevant types of unemployment spending and social trust is usually 
positive, although the relationship is not statistically significant in any case. Controlling for 
the five covariates changes the significance level of the relationship in question.  
The individual-level effects of the institutional design on social trust provide evidence 
of a clear existence of policy specific effects. When analyzing institutional trust (see Table 
8.6.), one comes to the conclusion that the institutional design matters. For pension schemes, 
we have results, which are opposite to those for total social spending. More specifically, non 
means-tested schemes are found to crowd-out institutional trust among pensioners, while 
means-tested pension schemes tend to boost confidence in public welfare institutions. For 
unemployment spending, the division between means-tested and non means-tested only 
partially supports the general hypothesis. The former is found to have neutral effect on 
institutional trust among the unemployed, while the latter increases trust levels among the 
direct recipients of unemployment benefits. 
  
Table 8.6.: Policy specific effects of the institutional design on institutional trust32 
 Pension spending  Unemployment spending              
 
 
 
Non means-tested Means-tested Non means-tested Means-tested 
Relevant social 
spending  
On pensions  
 
-0.167*** 
  
0.536*** 
 
On unemployment  0.818***  0.053 
Variance at 
individual level 
 
9.985 (0.256) 
 
9.987 (0.256) 
 
10.688 (0.0542) 
 
10.645 (0.540) 
Variance at 
country level  
 
0.495 (0.091) 
 
0.495 (0.101) 
 
0.168 (0.179) 
 
0.588 (0.328) 
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey   
 
In the case of interpersonal trust, only one of the effects is statistically significant (see 
Table 8.7.). For pension schemes, the effects of non means-tested pensions are in line with 
previous findings. Namely, they tend to negatively influence trust levels among pensioners. 
Means-tested schemes are found to boost interpersonal trust levels, although none of the 
coefficients is found to be statistically significant. For unemployment schemes, the 
                                                 
32
 The coefficients on control variables are not reported since they are similar to those in Table 8.3. 
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institutional design seems to matter since we have a positive relationship for non means-tested 
schemes and a neutral relationship for means-tested schemes.   
 
Table 8.7.: Policy specific effects of the institutional design on interpersonal trust33 
 Pension spending  Unemployment spending              
 
 
 
Non means-tested Means-tested Non means-tested Means-tested 
Relevant social 
spending  
On pensions  
 
-0.013 
  
0.187*** 
 
On unemployment  0.060  0.519 
Variance at 
individual level 
 
Not calculated  
 
Not calculated 
 
Not calculated 
 
Not calculated 
Variance at 
country level  
 
0.172 (0.042) 
 
0.206 (0.063) 
 
0.413 (0.259) 
 
0.369 (0.175) 
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey   
 
Thus, the effects of institutional design on social trust can be considered policy 
specific. What comes as a surprise here is the negative impact of non means-tested pension 
spending on both interpersonal and institutional trust among pensioners, which coincides with 
the negative relationship found earlier between total pension expenditures and social trust 
among pensioners. Since social trust is an attitudinal variable we will try to explain the 
negative effects with the theory of attitude formation and change. The effects of recent 
changes in pension levels and conditions of delivery may ruin an individual’s level of trust in 
national pension system and in public institutions in general. The latter in turn contributes to 
people’s negative experience, which may also negatively affect their trust in other people.34 
There are however other considerations for the negative impact of non means-tested 
pension spending on social trust. The reason for the negative effect could be a result of a 
purely technical problem. In order to obtain the negative correlation, there must be a situation 
in which lower pension spending is associated with higher trust levels and vice versa.  This 
was the case for the selected countries. To explain the possibility of such a situation, one 
should recall pension system characteristics in the countries selected for the analysis. On the 
one hand, in Scandinavian nations, where trust is relatively high, spending on public pensions 
is relatively moderate (Norway -7 % of GDP, Finland -7% of GDP) since in northern 
                                                 
33
 The coefficients on control variables are not reported since they are similar to those in Table 8.3. 
34
 Brehm and Rahn (in Rothstein and Stolle, 2003), for example, found that confidence in institutions has a large 
effect on interpersonal trust. Jamal (2007) as well argues that those individuals who feel existing political 
institutions are adequate in representing their interests are also more likely to feel trusting towards others. 
Because individuals feel that existing political institutions can protect their interest they are more likely to feel 
secure in trusting others. In other words, representative institutions can create the foundation for trust. When 
citizens feel their rights are protected through legal institutions for example they are more inclined to trust others.  
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countries they managed to build a two or three pillar system with public pensions offering 
only a basic income relative to occupational and private pensions. On the other hand, 
countries where trust levels are relatively low, public pensions sometimes constitute the only 
source of income and are the biggest spending item in social security systems. Such countries 
are France (10 %) and Italy (12% of GDP). This can be equally applied to Anglo-Saxon 
countries, which spend a lot on supporting the elderly and have moderate levels of trust (the 
UK- 10 % of GDP). This is due to the fact that in liberal welfare regimes, pensions constitute 
one of the largest items of social spending and supporting pensioners is integral to their social 
security system. They grant minimum pensions to everyone even if an individual paid 
contributions for a short period of time. This situation results in a negative correlation 
between pension spending and social trust levels.   
There are some questions that arise here. The first is why the effects of non means-
tested spending on social trust are different for the two social provisions. The first explanation 
lies in the distinct stratification mechanisms. Unemployment policy presupposes that income 
related benefits are paid within a short period of time after which an individual receives social 
assistance benefits. The liberal stratification mechanism hence prevails in the case of 
unemployment benefits. Pensions are almost always income related since they are calculated 
based on income levels or previous contributions to the system. This is directly related to 
income since how much you contributed during your work history depends on how high your 
income was. This state of affairs suggests that pensions have less of a redistributive effect 
than unemployment benefits. On the other hand, it may mean that pensions rest more on the 
conservative stratification mechanisms than unemployment benefits, which seek to preserve 
the existing class structure. Conservative stratification mechanisms are present with respect to 
pensions not only in conservative welfare state regimes, but also in liberal and socialist 
welfare states. Conservatism, as was demonstrated before, negatively affects institutional trust, 
which is completely in line with the results obtained that show a negative statistically 
significant correlation between non means-tested pensions and institutional trust among 
pensioners.  
Another reason why pensions may negatively affect trust levels is the fact that in many 
countries, pension schemes are more segmented than unemployment schemes. They are 
usually status oriented social insurance schemes in every country regardless of welfare regime 
type.  According to Scruggs and Allan (2006a), Finland has 7 occupationally distinct pension 
schemes, France has 9, Ireland has 3, Norway has 6, Italy has 7, etc. Such an approach creates 
different treatment outcomes. The segregation of pension schemes may lead to pensions that 
are tailored to specific clientele, which in turn has a negative effect on social trust. This is 
because social trust is very sensitive to singling out one group of the population and plotting it 
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against another group. This makes people feel unequal, which erodes trust levels among 
pensioners.  
Another other question that arises is why the effects of means-tested expenditures are 
different for the selected social provisions. It should be also noted that in the case of pension 
spending, the effects of means-tested schemes appear to be positive for interpersonal and 
institutional trust. This finding refutes what the theory usually asserts and can be explained by 
two factors. First, the vast majority of pensions are  non means-tested. Means-tested pension 
schemes are mainly used for very poor elderly people for whom obtaining a source of income 
can outweigh the negative consequences of passing through bureaucratic procedures and the 
hassles inherent to means-tested benefits. Second, the complexity of means-testing might 
depend on society’s perception of deservingness and retired people are considered to be most 
deserving of public help (Van Oorschot, 2006). 
In the case of unemployment policy, positive effects of relevant social spending are 
found in both forms of social trust, although they are only statistically significant for non 
means-tested spending. The fact that the state provides the unemployed with financial support 
might reinforce their confidence towards public institutions. Receiving unemployment 
benefits allows them to keep the attained standards of living and not feel abandoned, which in 
turn helps maintain their trust in other people. Means-tested unemployment schemes however 
must imply more complex procedures (compared to means-tested pension schemes) since 
they show a neutral effect on the levels of interpersonal and institutional trust among  the 
unemployed. Their complexity may be explained by less favorable (compared to pensioners) 
perceptions of the deservingness of the unemployed for state support (Van Oorschot, 2006), 
which results in more bureaucratic procedures of obtaining means-tested unemployment 
benefits.  
Dissimilar effects of the benefit schemes design on interpersonal and institutional trust 
among pensioners and unemployed people can thus be explained by different perceptions of 
deservingness for state support between pensioners and the unemployed. This might 
determine the complexity of obtaining means-tested benefits and hence their influence on 
social trust levels. 
 
 
8.7. Overview and concluding remarks 
Institutional theory asserts that the institutional design of benefit schemes predefines 
its influence on social trust levels. Many studies conclude that non means-tested benefit 
schemes should positively influence interpersonal trust while means-tested ones are expected 
to be negatively associated with confidence in others. The main rationale behind this 
 182 
mechanism rests on the idea that the former is more effective in reducing income inequality 
and guarantying equality of opportunities than the latter.  
Our cross-sectional tested this hypothesis for 18 OECD countries and provided 
evidence that only partially supported our expectations in the case of interpersonal trust. The 
aggregated-level and individual-level analyses confirm that means-testing usually erodes 
confidence in other people while non means-testing positively affects interpersonal trust 
levels. The spurious effect of redistribution is indeed larger for non means-tested spending 
although it is also present for social spending on means-tested schemes. What appears to 
matter more for means-tested provisions is the quality of the performance of public 
institutions as measured through their corruption level.  
The results for institutional trust follow a completely different pattern. At the 
aggregated level of analysis, the institutional design of benefit schemes seems to play no 
essential role since both types of spending show a negative relationship to institutional trust 
indexes. This relationship changes considerably and turns positive (even more strongly for 
means-tested benefits) when the spurious effects of corruption are controlled for. Institutional 
trust thus depends on how fairly the institutions through which the provisions of public 
support occurs are. The individual level of analysis proves that whatever the institutional 
design of benefit schemes is, they tend to enhance confidence in public welfare institutions. 
This shows that the fact that the state supports individuals who are in need is more important 
for institutional trust than the mechanisms through which this support is delivered.  
The analysis also indicates that the effects of institutional design can be policy specific. 
Disaggregating social spending on a functional basis may bring completely different results. 
For pension spending, means-testing is found to have a positive impact on both forms of trust. 
This effect is neutral in the case of unemployment means-tested spending. The difference in 
the effects can be explained by the different complexity of means-tested procedures, which in 
turn depends on the perceptions of how deserving those who apply for public support are.  
What remains unexplained here is the negative effect of non means-tested pension 
spending on social trust among pensioners. This contradicts all theoretical reasoning and 
cannot be easily explained. This negative effect is in line with the argument of the ‘crowding-
out’ hypothesis. But the question however remains why this crowding-out hypothesis does not 
hold true for non means-tested unemployment spending? And why is it that the sub-sample of 
pensioners triggers negative mechanisms of social spending effects? Finally, what is the exact 
mechanism of the effects of crowding-out of pension spending? It is possible to expect that 
each social policy develops its own relationship with social trust that goes through many 
direct and indirect links. These links thus require more theoretical and empirical analysis for 
the social sciences to be able to answer the questions raised above.  
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Chapter 9:  SOCIAL POLICIES AND TRUST IN SOCIAL SECURITY 
SYSTEMS  
 
9.1. Data source and method of analysis 
This extended analysis investigates the relationship between social policies and only 
one element of institutional trust, namely trust in social security systems.  The main scope of 
this investigation consists in comparing the patterns of the relationship with relevant social 
spending between institutional trust and trust towards social security systems. The data come 
from the European Quality of Life Survey which was launched by the European Foundation 
for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions in 2003. 
The survey covers a range of questions mainly aimed at assessing quality of life in 
28 European countries from a different perspective. The survey examines the quality of life in 
core life domains covering a broad spectrum of circumstances in the surveyed countries. 
Generally speaking, the EQLS explores both subjective and objective aspects of quality of life 
in major areas that shape living conditions and opportunities for individuals. This survey also 
contains a traditional question on generalized trust and a question on the trust of individuals 
towards social security systems. We include in the sample only those countries which are 
present in the previous analysis. Moreover, the choice of countries is stipulated by the 
availability of data on different aspects of welfare state development. The final sample 
includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden with the total amount of observations equal to 11,149.   
The main research method used for the analysis is an ordered multilevel logit of the 
following form:  ologit = β0 + β1 Xij + β2 Zj , where X are the individual-level characteristics 
and Z are country-level characteristics. The final model will take the following form wthat 
again will only have one variable at the second level.  
 
 
 
 
Where X is the set of individual-level control variables and Welfare_State is the 
main independent variable at the second level that again will sequentially include measures of 
all three dimensions of the proposed multidimensional approach to describing welfare state 
development.  
Operationalization of the dependent variables in the EQLS is done in the following 
way. Institutional trust is limited to trust towards social security systems and measured with 
 
Ologit  = β0 + β1 Xij + β2 Welfare_Statej 
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the relevant question, with answers based on a four point scale, ranging from ‘great deal’ to 
‘no trust at all’.  
As in the previous case, we control for individual level characteristics that are 
selected based on the theory about social trust determinants provided in subchapter 2.2. as 
well as on the data availability in the EQLS. The final list of individual-level control variables 
includes gender, employment status, volunteering, religiousness, socializing, education level, 
income, age, optimism level, and the perception of safety in the living area.   
To control for gender, we include a male dummy that takes a value of 1 if the 
respondent is male and 0 if female. Employment status reflects whether the respondent is 
unemployed or not. It takes a value of 1 if he or she is unemployed at the moment the survey 
was conducted and 0 if the respondent is employed. The education variable measures the 
highest degree of education the respondent has and is grouped into three categories: 
‘primary’, ’secondary’, and ‘university’. Religiosity is defined on the basis of the self-rated 
frequency of church attendance ranging from 1 as ‘more than once a week’ to 7 as ‘never’. 
Optimism is operationalized on the basis of the self perception of an individual about his or 
her optimism level. The answers range from ‘agree completely’ to ‘disagree completely’. 
Socializing reflects how often an individual meets with friends and ranges from ‘more than 
once a day’ to ‘less than several times per year’. Volunteering is operationalized on the basis 
of a question about the time spent on volunteer activities and varies from ‘too much’ to ‘too 
little’. The age variable reflects the actual  age of the respondent at the time the survey was 
conducted and is combined into three categories: ‘16 – 29’, ‘30 – 44’, ‘45 and more’. The 
income variable is grouped into four quintiles of OECD equivalent household incomes.  
As in the previous case, we distinguish between the three dimensions formed around 
functional, outcome, and qualitative axes. The results of the analysis are summarized in the 
table below.  
 
Table 9.1.: The effects of welfare states on trust towards social security systems  
in a multidimensional approach.  
 Trust towards social 
security system 
FUNCTIONAL DIMENSION  
 
*Total social spending 
*Pension spending  
*Unemployment spending  
 
 
 
-0.025 
0.061 
-0.531** 
OUTCOME DIMENSION  
 
Decommodification  
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*benefit generosity index 
 
-0.058** 
Stratification  
*Liberalism 
*Social democratic  
*Conservatism  
 
 
-0.025 
-0.040 
0.041 
 
QUALITATIVE DIMENSION   
*Universalism   
*Categorization  
 
-0.887*** 
-0.007** 
CONTROL VARIABLES   
Male dummy 
 
-0.059 
Unemployed dummy 
 
0.000 
Volunteering  
 
-0.066 
Religiousness  
 
0.066*** 
Socializing  
 
0.059*** 
Education  
Low   
Middle  
Higher   
 
 
Ref/category  
0.022 
-0.288*** 
Income  
1st quintile  
2nd  quintile  
3rd quintile  
4th quintile  
 
 
Ref/category  
-0.075 
-0.135** 
-0.084 
Age  
16 – 29 
30 – 44 
44 and more  
 
 
Ref/category  
0.238*** 
-0.150** 
Optimism  
 
0.456*** 
Safe 
 
0.178*** 
 
Before proceeding to the analysis of the dimensions, one should say that the 
inclusion in the model of the proposed measures of welfare state development helps explain 
only a small portion of the total variance. This is possibly due to the fact that there is a small 
variance of social trust levels at the second level compared to the first level. More specifically, 
only 3.6 percent of the total variance is attributed to the country level, while the rest of the 
variation occurs at the individual (first) level. However, controlling for welfare state 
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development helps reduce variance at the second level by 12 percent, which is a sufficiently 
large number.  
When analyzing the proposed three dimensions, a straightforward conclusion is that 
welfare states are rather neutral in their influence on trust in social security systems since 
most of the coefficients on the measures of welfare state development are not statistically 
significant. However, this should be taken with some caution since the small number of cases 
at the second level, namely the number of countries included in our analysis, may contribute 
to the failure of their significance test. We hence refer to the coefficients’ sign and values 
regardless of their significance level.  
 
 
9.2. The functional dimension  
The analysis of the functional dimension supports the plausibility of policy specific 
effects to some extent. Relating total social spending to trust in social security systems among 
the whole population points out that in general, crowding-in effects can be expected. Hence, 
social policy can be expected to generate confidence is social security systems. The support of 
an individual’s wellbeing through a social security system tends to generate positive feelings 
not only among its direct recipients but also among the whole population. The redistributive 
effect of welfare state activities leads to less inequality and hence more trust towards such 
systems. Likewise, the replacement of lost sources of income by social provisions plays a 
crucial role in defining trust levels compared to the negative effects expected of from the 
traditional assumption about erosion of trust through volunteering.  
When limiting the sample only to pensioners, the results partially support the idea 
about policy specific effects, although the significance test fails to prove them. Relating 
spending on pensions to trust in socials security systems among pensioners tends to erode 
trust levels. The fact that the state supports retired people through providing them with a 
source of income does not generate higher regards about the state or higher confidence in 
social security systems. The nature of these effects remains however unexplained while the 
negative mechanism of pension spending on social trust formation still constitutes a ‘black 
box’. The recent instability in pension systems, especially in countries with high pension 
spending, the constant curtailment of pension funds, and a gradual shift to a multi-pillar 
system with an increasingly residual role for public pensions mostly likely undermines the 
level of trust in social security systems. It is hence possible to argue that recent changes in 
pension policy are the main reasons for the negative effects of pension spending on people’s 
confidence in social security systems since pension reforms are more often discussed and 
implemented in the countries where pension spending is higher.   
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As far as unemployment spending is concerned, the results advocate for the presence 
of crowding-in effects which are also statistically significant. The fact that the state supports 
individuals when they have difficulties might play a crucial role in forming trust levels among 
the unemployed. Even recent changes in unemployment systems aimed at tightening 
entitlement conditions, reducing replacement rates, and shortening the period of payment for 
unemployment benefits do not negatively affect confidence of in the welfare state. The 
positive effect probably comes as well from the fact that the state does not simply try to 
reduce unemployment spending but rather focuses on reducing the duration of unemployment 
spells by replacing the traditional passive payment of unemployment benefits with active 
labor market policies.    
The analysis of the functional dimension provides results that advocate for the 
presence of policy specific effects. Although the analysis on the basis of different data sources 
creates some controversy about the impact of total social spending on social trust among the 
whole population, the EQLS results in general support the previous findings based on the 
WVS. More specifically, pension spending may be detrimental to general trust in institutions 
and to trust in social security systems in particular, whereas unemployment policy tends to 
enhance trust levels among the unemployed.  
 
 
9.3. The outcome dimension  
The analysis of the outcome dimension provides results that differ slightly from what 
is found before. Decommodification tends to positively correlate with trust in social security 
systems.  Moreover, the results are statistically significant, allowing for a statistical inference 
about the effects of decommodification on trust in social security systems. The results suggest 
that welfare state efforts increase confidence of people in social security systems.   
The stratification function of welfare states is found to be rather neutral towards trust 
in social security systems since the case of statistical significance is not seen at all. Although 
the coefficients are not statistically significant, their signs and the values are in line with the 
effects of institutional trust in general. More specifically, preserving existing class structures 
tends to erode trust in social security systems. A universal approach aimed at guaranteeing 
individuals’ independence enhances trust levels. The same impact is seen in liberalism with 
its stigmatizing approach to organizing welfare provision.  
The analysis based on the EQLS advocates the positive impact that the level of 
decommodification and stratification may have on social trust. The supportive attitude of the 
state regardless of the type of stratification tends to enhance trusting behavior in society. 
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These results do not differ much from what was found on the basis of the WVS for 
institutional trust.  
 
9.4. The qualitative dimension  
The qualitative dimension again supports the results obtained for institutional trust in 
general. More specifically, the positive effects are present for both forms of the institutional 
design of benefits schemes. They enhance trust in social security systems regardless of 
whether they are non means-tested or means-tested. The positive effects are however stronger 
for non means-tested social spending compared to means-tested spending.  
The analysis of the qualitative dimension therefore provides results that advocate the 
prevalence of crowding-in effects over crowding-out effects. Moreover, these results are 
consistent with the previous findings based on the WVS for institutional trust. It is hence 
possible to say that trust in social security systems shows a lot of conformity and consistency 
with institutional trust. The effects of the different measures of welfare state development on 
trust in social security systems are always in line with what is found for institutional trust.  
As far as the individual-level control variables are concerned, we find results that are 
completely in line with the theory.  More religious people tend to have higher scores on trust. 
Socializing with friends is also found to enhance trust levels. Education seems to have a 
strong impact on trust scores. Less educated and moderately educated people show almost the 
same levels of trust. Highly educated people have higher trust in social security systems. 
Income tends to have non-linear effects on trust. The effects tend to first increase as income 
goes up, reaching its peak in the third quintile and slowing down afterwards. Optimism can 
also be regarded as a determinant of trust: optimistic people show more trusting behavior 
towards social security systems. Trust is also influenced by the safety level in the area the 
respondent lives in. High regards of safety are associated with higher trust levels. 
Volunteering is found to have no impact on trust in social security systems. But this is 
probably due to the imperfect operationalization of this control variable. Employment status is 
found to have no effect on trust is social security systems. Gender has a certain influence on 
trust: men show more trust in social security systems than women, although this effect is not 
statistically significant.  
 
9.5. Overview and concluding remarks 
The main objective of this chapter is to analyze the effects of welfare states on trust 
in social security systems. The analysis is based on estimating the effects of all three 
dimensions on one specific element of institutional trust. The analysis thus demonstrates that 
there is strong conformity in the direction and the size of the effects of social policies between 
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institutional trust and trust in social security systems. Both forms of trust develop the same 
pattern of relations with different measures of welfare state development.  
Trust in institutions can therefore be considered a good proxy for trust in social 
security systems. Although it is a synthetic construct, institutional trust approximates possible 
changes in levels of trust in social security systems as the result of state intervention in society 
in the form of social policies. However, institutional trust must be regarded as a wider concept 
compared to trust in social security systems since it is based on confidence in various public 
welfare state institutions while including trust in social security systems as one of its elements.  
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Chapter 10: GROUP SPECIFIC EFFECTS OF SOCIAL POLICIES ON SOCIAL 
TRUST  
 
10.1. The evidence of a gender gap in social capital  
Research supports the general understanding that social capital is differently 
distributed across different social groups. Segregation occurs initially on the basis of gender, 
that is, significant differences in social capital appear between females and males. The studies 
on gender differences are concentrated primarily on analyzing the gender gap in membership 
in voluntary associations. Since volunteering is a strong predictor of both interpersonal and 
institutional trust, we include in the analysis an overview of literature on participation rates in 
voluntary organizations for men and women.  
The early studies conducted in the 1950s and 1960s usually find some gender 
differences in the membership in voluntary associations.  Scott (1957), for instance, suggests 
that more men, 75 percent, than women, 56 percent, are members of voluntary associations. 
Men also have more associational memberships than women: men average 2.09 memberships 
while women average 1.35 memberships. He also finds that women attend meetings more 
frequently than men. The frequency of attendance per membership average 1.23 times a 
month for women and 0.84 times a month for the men. The appeal of various associational 
types is nevertheless very different for each sex. The highest percentage of memberships for 
women is in religious associations, and the lowest is in labor organizations. The 
representation of men is found to be greatest in fraternal and to be least in cooperative and 
mutual benefit associations.  
These results are confirmed by the study conducted by Babchuk and Booth (1969). 
They find that men and women differ considerably in their patterns of affiliation. Men are 
more likely to be affiliated with groups than women and have more multiple memberships as 
a rule. Moreover, they are more variable and less stable in their memberships, and belong to 
categorically different types of associations. Men become a member of a job-related group 
and fraternal-service groups more often than women. A greater number of women than men 
belong to recreational groups and they are more involved in church-related groups than men. 
Nevertheless, men and women are equally represented in civic political groups.  
The vast majority of the recent research is focused on the gender differential in 
network diversity and size. By summarizing a great amount of relevant studies, Lin (2000a,b) 
argues that, despite the fact that men and women may have almost exactly the same number 
of memberships, the dramatic difference in the size and types of their organizations expose 
men to many more potential contacts and other resources than women. In other words, males 
have larger networks, are affiliated with larger associations and enjoy the benefits of 
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associations with other males. The latter is an example of gender homogeneity, since males 
occupy higher positions in hierarchical structures. By contrast, females are affiliated with 
disadvantaged networks – smaller and less diverse networks, more female ties and ties lower 
in hierarchical positions. Since their associations and networks also tend to be homogenous, 
there is also a network closure and reproduction of resources, which leads to disadvantages 
among females. As the result, men’s positions in the voluntary network are much more likely 
to provide access to information about possible jobs, business opportunities, and chances for 
professional achievement, while women’s positions are more likely to expose them to 
information about the domestic realm. Lin (2000a,b) also emphasizes the effect of child-
rearing on network size, which also appears to be gendered: having a child had no effects on 
men’s network sizes, but has a significant negative effect on women’s.  
Hall (1999) analyzes the dynamics of gender difference in social capital over time. 
According to his statistics, there is a substantial gender gap in associational memberships in 
1956. However, over the next thirty years, this gap completely disappears, so that by the 
1990s, there is no difference in memberships between men and women. Hall (1999), too, 
investigates the gender differences in generalized trust. In 1959 he finds no gender gap: 56 
percent of both men and women answer positively to the trust question. Yet a small difference 
appears by 1990. By that point in time, 46 percent of men report trusting attitudes. Only 42 
percent of women report the same. The difference is not striking, but still suggests the 
existence of a small gender gap.   
Lowndes (2000) criticizes Hall’s results on the decreasing difference in voluntary 
association between men and women. He emphasizes that “increasing participation in the 
community is not explored further” and is defined solely in terms of formal associations. He 
further argues for the existence of important differences in the character of men’s and 
women’s involvement by referring to the statistics on voluntary participation. According to 
the latter, more than twice as many men as women undertake voluntary work related to sports 
and recreation (29 percent compared with 13 percent) Women, by contrast, are more active in 
voluntary work in the fields of health, education and social services. As for the specific roles 
assumed during this work, men are more likely to occupy committee posts, while women 
dominate in visiting and befriending activities.  
Lowndes (2000) further argues for the existence of gender–specific patterns of activity 
in relation to informal sociability. The focus of informal sociability varies with women 
spending a third of the time spent by men in sports’ activities and only half much time at 
social clubs. Men, however, spend only a third of the time devoted by women to visiting 
friends. Furthermore, he analyses the effects of child-caring activities on women’s social 
capital. His argument clearly indicates that time spent on child-care is clearly compatible with, 
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and could even promote, wider networks of sociability and community involvement. 
According to him, mothers of young children enjoy particularly robust patterns of social 
exchange and, in general, women are more strongly connected to neighbourhood networks 
than men.  
Moore (1990) conducts an empirical analysis on the determinants of personal 
networks. On the basis of the results, he comes to the conclusion that women and men differ 
considerably in their network composition, though not in network size. Compared to men, 
women’s networks are comprised of more kin and fewer non-kin. Most of these gender 
differences disappear or are reduced, however, when structural variables are controlled for. In 
particular, men and women have networks that contain similar numbers of non-kin of various 
types when work, family, and age are controlled. On the other hand, structural variables do 
not fully eliminate the effect of gender on kin ties. In their personal networks, women include 
more and larger proportions of kin as well as more diverse types than do similarly situated 
men, although the disparities are reduced to some degree when women work full time. 
Women may be disposed to focus more of their close ties on family members, whereas men 
focus more on ties to non-kin. However, he emphasizes that as more women move into paid 
employment, the gender’s network composition can be expected to become more alike, with 
more close ties to non-kin, especially co-workers, and fewer ties to kin. Women still maintain 
a larger number of ties to kin than men do, however, as long as they remain the primary 
caretakers and kin-keepers in most families.  
McPherson and Smith-Louvin (1982) also find substantial sex segregation in the 
voluntary sector, despite the fact that, according to their empirical data, men and women 
possess almost exactly the same number of membership. The dramatic gender differences 
concern foremost the typical size of voluntary organizations they belong to. They find that 
only ten percent of women’s memberships are in organizations of over 200 members and that 
fully thirty percent of men’s memberships are in such organizations. On the basis of this, they 
conclude that there are a large number of small, predominantly female organizations and a 
small number of large, predominantly male organizations.  
Moreover, McPherson and Smith-Louvin (1982) find that these differences are 
greatest in organizations that are economically oriented. Furthermore, the differences are 
remarkably consistent across social categories: men tend to belong to larger organizations 
when compared with women in similar categories, whether of work status, age, education or 
marital status. Hence, men are located in core organizations, which are large and related to 
economic institutions, while women are located in peripheral organizations, which are smaller 
and more focused on domestic or community affairs. On the basis of these results, they 
conclude that even though men and women have almost exactly the same number of 
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memberships on average, the dramatic differences in sizes and types of their organizations 
expose men to many more potential contacts and other resources than women.  
In their further research, McPherson and Smith-Louvin (1986) analyze the sex 
composition of a great number of face-to-face voluntary organizations in ten communities. 
They come to the conclusion about the existence of substantial sex segregation in the 
voluntary sector. According to their calculations, nearly one-half of the organizations are 
exclusively female, while one-fifth are all male. In addition, their analysis shows that 
instrumental organizations (business related or political groups) are more likely to be sex 
heterogeneous, while expressive groups are more likely to be exclusively male or female. 
Furthermore, their analysis demonstrates that men’s contacts are both more numerous and 
more heterogeneous. On the basis of these results, McPherson and Smith-Louvin (1986) 
conclude that there is little support for the sex integration hypothesis, although the sex 
heterogeneity of instrumental groups indicates that this pattern may change as women move 
into the labor force in increasing numbers.  
Fisher and Oliker (1982) provide an analysis of personal relations between men and 
women. Their data widely support the findings mentioned earlier: women are more likely to 
be involved with kin and men with co-workers. However, they find numerous differences that 
interact with life-cycle stages. During early marriage and parenthood, women’s friendships 
shrink relative to men’s, but in post-parental years, men’s shrink relative to women’s. Further 
evidence suggests that this interaction effect can be explained by both structural and 
dispositional factors, the former working to reduce women’s friendships relative to men’s in 
the earlier period and the latter expanding their friendships later on.  
Booth (1972) also contributed to studying the extent and quality of participation in 
friendship dyads, voluntary associations, and kin relations. Based on interview data from a 
sample of adults in two urban communities, he find that males have more friends than females, 
but at the same time, female friendship relations are affectively richer than that of men. He 
also provides evidence that men exceed women in voluntary association memberships  but not 
in commitment of time to group activities. Moreover, extensive kinship resources are found to 
affect men’s and women’s affiliations differently. Females maintain more kinship ties than 
males, while their ties limit their participation in other social relationships, particularly those 
calling for strong affective investments, such as friendship. Moreover, females’ kinship ties 
are found to be stronger than men’s. In general, he comes to the conclusion that women are 
more spontaneous with friends and kin, and devote more time to the voluntary organizations 
to which they belong. Women also retain active membership longer than men, indicating a 
greater stability in their affiliations. Furthermore, the fact that they maintain a constant 
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number of friendships through life, despite adversity, indicates that affiliative stability is not 
limited to voluntary associations.  
Thus, research is predominantly concentrated on gender differences in voluntary 
memberships. Since voluntary participation is considered the main mechanism of trust 
formation, one may conclude that the latter may involve some gender differences in trust 
levels. Even if the recent evidence indicates that women and men do not differ in their 
memberships, but rather in the type of voluntary associations they participate in, it is possible 
to assume that this may also contribute to a gender cleavage in trust levels. The latter occurs 
mostly due to the fact that different voluntary associations have different potential in 
generating trust among their participants. Hence, differences in associations’ types may entail 
differences in the outcomes, namely, trust levels among their members.  
There are however studies that directly elaborate on the relationship between gender 
and trust levels. These are primarily conducted by economists who used the Investment Game 
Design to study gender differences in trust levels. Buchan, Croson and Solnick (2003), for 
instance, analyze in their research the existence of gender differences in trusting others, being 
trusted by others and being trustworthy (rewarding trust through reciprocation). They used the 
Investment Game to explore experimentally whether there are gender differences in trust 
behavior and whether those differences can be attributed to the gender of the trust-giver, the 
gender of the trustee or the interaction of the genders. Based on results from 377 pairs of 
subjects, they come to the conclusion that men are more trusting than women and that women 
are trustworthier than men.  
Chaudhuri and Gangadharan (2002) obtain similar results. They, too, use the 
Investment Game to explore gender differences in trust and reciprocity. They find that men 
exhibit greater trust than women do whereas women show higher levels of reciprocity. 
Trusting behaviour, according to them, is driven strongly by expectations of reciprocation. 
They attribute the lower levels of trust among women to a higher degree of risk aversion.  
Innocenty and Pazienza (2006) conduct a similar study. Their results support a general 
assumption of trust games that women send less than men when playing as senders, and return 
back more than men as responders. They claim that this behavior can be better explained by 
the fact that women are more altruistic than men. Since trust mainly depends on risk aversion 
and trustworthiness in altruism, differences in altruism explain gender differences in the trust 
game.  
Vyrastekova and Onderstal (2005) come to a different conclusion. They analyze 
gender differences in the trust game in a ’behind the veil of ignorance’ design. They observe 
that on average men and women do not differ in trust, but, as in the previous research, they 
find that women are slightly trustworthier than men. In line with these findings, Croson and 
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Buchan (1999) find that the amount of trust exhibited in the game (the amount sent) is not 
significantly different between men and women. However, according to them, women exhibit 
significantly more reciprocity in this game by returning a higher proportion of their wealth. 
They explain this with the fact that women are more altruistic than men, and thus return a 
higher proportion of their earnings.  
Bonein and Serra (2006) use a different game design, but also study the effects of  
gender on the relationship between trust and reciprocity. Their Investment Game consists of 
two stages: in the first stage, the participants did not know the gender of their partners and in 
the second stage, they were fully aware (sender as well as receiver) of the gender of their 
partners. The results obtained show great heterogeneity of the individual behavior. More 
specifically, knowing the gender of the partner by the sender does not affect the amount of 
money sent, even if the men seem to trust more to their partners than the women trust theirs. 
As far as the reciprocity is concerned, they discover a phenomenon, which they call ‘sex 
solidarity’: individuals have a tendency to trust more to partners of the same sex. The gender 
of the sender is, however, found to have a significant influence on the amount of return as 
soon as it becomes known to the responders. 
The literature is therefore quite controversial with respect to the existence of gender 
differences in social capital, in general, and social trust, in particular. Nevertheless, much 
research is conducted on this topic, while the impact of social policy on eliminating the 
gender differences in social capital remains under-researched.  
Our main objective is not to try to understand through which mechanisms the impact 
of social policy on social trust by gender goes; rather, it is to investigate the direction and size 
of this influence. Before proceeding to analyzing the coefficients, it is worth comparing levels 
of trust between men and women based on the WVS. The immediate conclusion that can be 
drawn is that women hardly develop less trust than men, despite all the negative moments 
mentioned above. In the case of institutional trust, both men and women show equal 
confidence in public welfare institutions, which is found at the level of 14.6 in both cases. 
Hence, despite the fact that males are found to be the main subject of welfare state application, 
females tend to cultivate deep trust in welfare state institutions. This allows us to assume that 
welfare state spending levels are not the main factor that determines confidence of people in 
public welfare institutions.  
As far as interpersonal trust is concerned, the comparison on the basis of the whole 
sample suggests that trust in others equals 0.40 for women, compared to 0.42 for men35. 
Therefore, the average interpersonal trust level among women is only slightly behind that of 
                                                 
35
 The independent samples T-test revealed that, despite the fact that the difference in means of social trust 
between men and women is small, it is still statistically significant. 
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men. This difference is not that high to talk about substantial leg of trust among female 
population.  
Empirical analysis based on introducing a gender dummy into equations however 
shows that in almost all cases, there is a small gender gap in social trust levels in favor of 
males when individual-level characteristics are controlled for. More specifically, the previous 
analysis demonstrates that men, on average, possess scores on confidence in public welfare 
institutions that are  0.122 points higher than those among women.  
In the case of interpersonal trust, the same direction of prevalence is found. Levels of 
interpersonal trust among men are 7.3 percent higher than among women. These differences 
obtained for both forms of trust are not so large, but still advocate the existence of a certain 
gender gap in confidence towards both public institutions and other people. Moreover, the 
positive coefficients on male dummies are in almost all equations that embrace all three 
defined dimensions. 
 
Table 10.1.: Gender differences in social trust by welfare regime type  
 Institutional trust Interpersonal trust 
Men Women Diff. Men Women Diff. 
 
Social democratic  
 
11.3 
 
11.3 
 
0.0 
 
0.63 
 
0.64 
 
- 0.01 
 
Liberal  
 
10.4 
 
10.4 
 
0.0 
 
0.39 
 
0.37 
 
+ 0.02 
 
Conservative  
 
10.4 
 
10.4 
 
0.0 
 
0.37 
 
0.34 
 
+ 0.03 
 
Source: Own calculations based on World Values Survey 
 
Findings presented in the table above show that, on average, males do not differ from 
females in their confidence in public welfare institutions as far as the institutional trust is 
concerned. Women tend to display exactly the same level of institutional trust as men. With 
respect to interpersonal trust, a small, insignificant difference is found between the two sexes. 
More specifically, in Scandinavian nations, women show more trust in others whereas their 
interpersonal trust is 0.01 units higher compared to that of men. In two other welfare regimes, 
the opposite tendency takes place, reflecting that men are characterized with higher levels of 
trust compared to women. This gender difference amounts to 0.02 units in liberal welfare 
regimes and to 0.03 units in conservative regimes.   
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When moving to country case analysis, the picture changes dramatically, showing that 
the averaging of trust levels among countries may hide some gender differences. It is however 
difficult to find some logic in the level of change of social trust, especially in the case of 
institutional trust. The results provided in the table below show that among 18 OECD 
countries, one can find all three possible outcomes: those with no difference in levels of social 
trust between men and women; those where men display higher levels of confidence than 
women, and those where women possess higher levels of social trust than men. This tendency 
is found in the case of both interpersonal and institutional trust.  
As far as institutional trust is concerned, there is no gender gap in trust in Belgium or 
Italy. Higher levels of trust for men are obtained for Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and the UK. In Finland, France, Germany, and Ireland, the opposite situation is 
discovered, which is characterized by higher levels of institutional trust among women than 
men. One should emphasize that there is no general tendency which would explain the 
direction of gender differences in institutional trust across the selected OECD countries.   
In the case of interpersonal trust, we obtain similar results that do not allow to extract 
any kind of dependency for the gender gap change across countries. Again, there are two 
major groups of countries that display positive or negative differences levels of in 
interpersonal trust between men and women. It should be noted that no difference  is seen in 
any of the cases. However, the differences have very small values and hardly permit 
discussion about a substantial gap in interpersonal trust among men and women. Regardless 
of this fact, we report these differences. In particular, higher levels of interpersonal trust are 
found among men compared to women in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. In other countries, 
the opposite situation is discovered that indicates that it is quite possible to find cases where 
women display higher levels of interpersonal trust than men. It should be also noted that a 
negative difference that reflects a higher level of interpersonal trust among women than men 
is predominantly found in Scandinavian countries (Finland, Norway, and Sweden) as well as 
in France, Switzerland, Japan, and the United States.  
To summarize, the country case analysis of institutional trust reveals that all 
possibilities of gender differences can be found in 18 OECD countries. It is, however, 
difficult to say that there is a certain relationship in the distribution of this gender gap 
according to welfare regime types. As far as interpersonal trust is concerned, we find both 
positive and negative gender gaps between the two sexes. There is also certain logic in the 
sign of gender gaps with respect to welfare regime types. Social democratic regimes show 
that women have predominantly higher levels of interpersonal trust than men, whereas in 
liberal countries, men usually display higher levels of interpersonal trust than women. Finally, 
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in continental welfare regimes, a mixed situation is found, in which both cases are possible: in 
some countries, men show higher levels of interpersonal trust and in other countries, women 
have higher levels of trust than men.  
 
Table 10.2.: Gender differences in social trust for 18 OECD countries  
 
Country  
Institutional trust Interpersonal trust 
Men Women Diff. Men Women Diff. 
Australia     0.41 0.38 + 0.03 
Austria 11.6 11.3 + 0.3 0.37 0.30 + 0.07 
Belgium 9.9 9.9 0.0 0.33 0.27 + 0.05 
Canada - - - 0.40 0.36 + 0.04 
Denmark 11.7 11.5 + 0.2 0.67 0.65 + 0.02 
Finland  11.2 11.6 - 0.4 0.55 0.59 - 0.04 
France 10.0 10.1 - 0.1 0.21 0.22 - 0.01 
Germany 9.8 10.0 - 0.2 0.36 0.33 + 0.03 
Ireland 10.7 11.0 - 0.3 0.41 0.30 + 0.11 
Italy 8.8 8.8 0.0 0.34 0.31 + 0.03 
Japan - - - 0.42 0.44 - 0.02 
Netherlands  10.8 10.5 + 0.3 0.61 0.58 + 0.03 
New Zealand - - - 0.50 0.48 + 0.02 
Norway - - - 0.63 0.67 - 0.04 
Sweden 11.0 10.7 +0.3 0.65 0.66 - 0.01 
Switzerland  - - - 0.40 0.42 - 0.02 
United Kingdom 9.9 9.6 + 0.3 0.31 0.28 + 0.03 
United States  - - - 0.33 0.38 - 0.05 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey 
 
 
10.2. The gender dimension in social policies and social trust.  
 
The character of public provisions affects women’s material situations, shapes gender 
relationships, structures political conflict and participation, and contributes to the formation 
and mobilization of specific identities and interests. However, not enough is known about 
how and to what extent social security systems actually do vary in their gender content, how 
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social provisions and other state institutions affect gender relations, and how the state’s 
impact on gender relations is related to its effects on other social relations.  
Orloff (1993) argues that the gender dimension is poorly accounted for in Esping-
Andersen’s welfare regime typology and in general criticizes the power resources analysts’ 
understanding of citizenship and their analytic scheme for describing social policy regimes. 
Orloff highly criticizes all three dimensions defined by Esping-Andersen. She asserts that 
power resource analysts have given more attention to the division of labor between states and 
markets in providing welfare than to relations among states, markets and families. Families 
are generally ignored as private providers of welfare goods and services, while provision of 
welfare counts only when it occurs through the state or the market with women’s unpaid work 
in the home being completely ignored. Furthermore, the sexual division of labor within states, 
markets, and families also goes unnoticed.  
At the end of the discussion, Orloff (1993, 1996) proposes to include two new 
dimensions of welfare states. The dimension of access to paid work captures the extent to 
which women, particularly married women and mothers, are assumed employment, a 
significant source of economic and political power. The dimension of women’s capacity to 
form and maintain an autonomous household permits the investigation of the extent of 
women’s freedom from compulsion to enter or stay in marriages in order to obtain economic 
support.  
Walby (2001) however argues that the criticism of Esping –Andersen’s typology of 
welfare state regimes for neglecting gender is only partially correct. While it was not a central 
feature of his typology, gender, albeit conceptualized as ‘family’, was significantly present in 
the characterization of two of his categories. In the corporatist welfare state regime, the family 
takes a traditional form, while in the social democratic welfare state regime, individual 
independence is promoted. She does not say anything about the liberal welfare regime. But, 
she strongly criticizes the overgeneralization of decommodification effects, and asserts that 
there is more than one way that decommodification can be achieved: either corporatism 
involving the state, unions and church, or universal participation in the state based on 
universal employment. Again, the employment directly through the market inherent to liberal 
welfare regimes is omitted from the analysis. However, this is partially taken into account 
when she analyzes variations in ways that the shift from domestic to public employment 
occurs. The most important of these is contrast between the market and the state. She 
distinguishes that in some countries, this transition takes place principally through market-
based mechanisms, and in others, principally through the state. Moreover, the author 
emphasizes that when the transition is mediated primarily through the market, the resulting 
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inequalities, both between women and men and between women, are likely to be greater than 
when it is mediated through the democratic state.  
Furthermore, she defines the common features of recent research on gendered welfare 
regimes, which consist of a focus on two main elements of welfare provisions by the state: 
first, that of the provision of care, especially child-care, and second, that of tax and benefit 
policies. This is set within a common analytical framework composed of three main elements: 
employment, family/care-work, and the welfare state, while continuity of gendered welfare 
patterns is seen as particularly rooted in cultural traditions of the family. She further 
emphasizes the need to broaden the understanding of gender relations, which should go 
beyond work and the state. In her opinion, the relationship between the welfare dimensions of 
the state and unpaid and paid work is only part of any model for understanding differences in 
patterns of gender relations. She conceptualizes a gender regime as composed of a set of inter-
related domains of employment, unpaid work, the state, male violence, sexuality, and culture.  
She distinguishes between two major forms of gender regimes: domestic and public 
while assuming the continuum between them. This continuum is articulated at both levels of 
the system as a whole and in specific domains. Thus, the comparison between the pole 
positions of domestic and public gender regimes includes the extent to which women are 
confined to the household, excluded from paid employment, represented in the state, 
restricted to one sexual partner for life, subject to male violence, and culturally represented as 
embracing subordination.  Next, the author studies gender regimes by analyzing the change of 
women in civilian employment, divorce rates, births outside of marriage, fertility rates, and 
political representation of women in parliament. Her data suggest a considerable change over 
time, but at the same time, allow it to define clusters of countries that coincide to some extent 
with the welfare regime typology. More specifically, she distinguished between Nordic 
countries, former Soviet bloc central Europe, liberal Anglo-Saxon countries, middle or 
continental Europe, Southern Europe, and industrializing countries.  
Lewis (1992) proposes another typology of gender regimes. The basis for the division 
within the typology lies in the extent to which there is a ‘male breadwinner’ model. This 
ranges from ‘strong male breadwinner’, ‘modified male breadwinner’ to ‘weak male 
breadwinner’ types. Ireland is regarded here as an example of ‘a strong male breadwinner’ 
model, Germany and France are seen as a ‘modified male breadwinner’, while Sweden is 
defined as a ‘weak male breadwinner’ model. Lewis stops at this point without elaborating on 
the possibility of extrapolating the male breadwinner models to gender welfare regimes. To 
some extent, this typology can be seen as coinciding with the four welfare regime types, with 
Southern Europe and Anglos-Saxon countries as the “strong male breadwinner” model, 
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continental Europe as the “modified male breadwinner” model and Nordic countries as the 
“weak male breadwinner” model. This however remains  unelaborated upon in the study.  
Misra (2000) analyzes the role of women’s movements in promoting the adoption of 
family allowances. She argues that for nations without large Catholic populations, strong 
working class movements and women’s participation on the Left are necessary to the 
development of family allowance policies. In many of these nations, Leftist parties initially 
focus on increasing the wages of male workers, rather than developing the state support for 
families. Women activists who belong to these Leftist parties played key roles in lobbying for 
these family programs, and placing these programs on their party’s political agenda. However, 
the direct impact of social policies on gender issues is not analyzed in this study.  
The gender dimension in the welfare state is also discussed in Mandel’s (2005) study 
of the impact of welfare state activities on the labor force participation of women and on 
gender occupational inequalities. His empirical analysis of 22 industrialized countries shows 
that the participation rate of women in the labor force tends to be higher in countries 
characterized by progressive welfare states. Apparently, expansion of family-oriented services, 
availability of public child-care and, a large public service sector provide women with better 
opportunities to become economically active. But, he concludes that the same welfare state 
activities that promote one dimension of gender equality appear to inhibit another dimension. 
Mandel emphasizes that once women become economically active, benefits to working 
mothers and high demand for female labor in the public sector services serve to restrict their 
occupational achievements. His data shows that in the countries characterized by a 
progressive welfare state system, women are disproportionately under-represented in 
managerial positions. This allows him to infer that family-friendly policies and employment 
practices assume the primacy of women’s familial responsibilities. As such, they are designed 
to allow women time off for the care of young children through extended maternity leaves 
and support of part-time employment. These policies in turn discourage employers from 
hiring women for managerial and powerful positions, and foster attachment to female-type 
occupations and jobs with convenient work conditions.  
Mandel’s (2005) analysis of welfare regime types makes this argument clearer. Social 
democratic regimes promote women’s integration into the labor market by providing them 
with convenient and flexible working conditions. However, this goal is achieved at the cost of 
greater occupational segregation and restricted opportunities for women to enter the most 
desirable positions. By contrast, liberal regimes neither restrict nor support women’s 
economic activities and no special work arrangements are mandated for mothers. In liberal 
market economies women, like men, are expected to work continuously and on a full time 
basis. These conditions may not meet the justified desire of many women for family-
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supportive arrangements. At the same time, women who become economically active are in a 
better position to compete for higher-status managerial jobs than their counterparts in social 
democratic countries.  
Thus, the analysis allows one to demonstrate that welfare states may affect women in a 
different way compared to men. This provides the necessary grounds to expect that social 
trust among females may be subject to a different pressure of change than it is among males. 
In the next section, we will try to find theoretical explanations for what kind of differences 
one can expect.  
 
10.3. Justifying gender differences in the impact of social policies on social trust  
 
Based on the analysis provided above, it is possible to expect that effects of welfare 
states will be different for men and women. One can assume that welfare states affect men 
and women in a different way, initially, due to the existence of an emphasis primarily on 
men’s well-being and the relative ignorance to women’s, or the inferior position of women as 
subject to social policy regulations. The analysis of a possible explanation of why trust among 
women may be differently affected by welfare state activities, as compared to trust among 
men, provides the following results.  
(1) Different emphasis on employment. Theories of trust formation emphasize the 
importance of employment and social networks built between co-workers as generators of 
social trust. Social policies in their majority put a greater emphasis on men’s employment, 
while women are often regarded as caretakers or housewives, whose duties consist of keeping 
the household and doing a greater share of domestic work. The domestic work tends to be 
ignored in most of the analysis, or underestimated in its impact on the family’s, as well as 
society’s, well-being. This is true for many countries and for many decades with the exception 
of Scandinavian nations, where the individual freedom from both markets and families is 
promoted through welfare states. The inferiority of women’s employment is especially 
obvious in continental and south European countries, where men are regarded the 
breadwinner, whereas women are assigned to the role of running the household. This in turn 
leads to limited networks of women and induces a feeling of inferiority or playing a 
secondary role in the development of society or a community. The latter strongly affects trust 
among women and drives down their levels compared to men. The same tendency may also 
be present in Scandinavian nations, where, regardless of the higher emphasis on women’s 
employment, the labor market remains highly segregated with women occupying mostly 
secondary positions and rarely achieving higher managerial jobs. This may lead to feelings of 
 203 
being at a disadvantage when compared to men, which strongly influence females’ levels of 
trust, leading to their decline.  
(2). Differences in levels of social benefits between men and women. Another 
important predictor of trust is the income level available to an individual, which defines his or 
her living standards.  Securing minimum or maintaining living standards when the source of 
income is lost, is one of the main functions of social policies. Again, one can argue that this 
function takes different forms for men and women. First, entitlements to social benefits are 
mostly guaranteed to those working full time, while part-time workers remain outside of 
generous welfare state provisions. Since women are overrepresented in the category of part-
time workers, they are relatively poorer (compared to men) with respect to the amount and 
level of social benefits available to them. 
Second, as Orloff (1993) emphasizes, women are the main recipients of social 
assistance programs, while men are more likely to be eligible for social insurance benefits. 
This allows them to assume the existence of a huge difference in levels of benefits, since 
social assistance programs usually perform the function of securing minimum living standards. 
Social insurance programs, by contrast, tend in their vast majority to ensure the acquired 
living standards. As a result, the latter is more generous than the former, having as a 
consequence the situation in which women are less financially supported by the state than 
men.  
(3). Different treatment during the application for and monitoring of social 
benefits. This argument is related to the previous one, which reveals the overrepresentation of 
women in social assistance programs as compared to men. The difference between social 
assistance and social insurance programs is not only the level of benefits, but also the kind of 
treatment of those applying for benefits. It is widely known that social assistance benefits are 
primarily means-tested, which requires a complex application procedure and the regular 
monitoring of an applicant’s behavior and income. The latter is associated with more 
bureaucratic hassles and control, as well as with a kind of stigmatizing of those applying for 
social assistance programs. As theory asserts, social trust is ruined as the result of experience 
with means-tested procedures. Since women are overrepresented in means-tested schemes, 
their social trust levels can hence be lower when compared to men, who are overrepresented 
in social insurance schemes.  
 (4). Higher poverty rates among women than among men. As the result of inferior 
treatment of women by welfare states, poverty rates are much higher among women, and 
especially among single mothers, as compared to men (Huinink and Schröder, 2008). Poor 
social rights of part-time workers, overrepresentation of women in social assistance programs, 
and entitlement to social assistance based on motherhood or marriage all contribute to the fact 
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that women are at a higher risk of poverty than men. Inequality leads to the reality that people 
feel at a disadvantage to the others, which in turn leads to lower levels of trust. The 
redistributive function of social security systems is thus more effective in the case of men 
than in that of women. It is subsequently possible to expect that social security systems more 
positively affect men than women, which which entails higher levels of trust among the 
former when compared to trust levels among the latter.  
(5) Different treatment of men and women by social insurance. Orloff (1993) 
refers to the fact that social insurance programs may not treat men’s and women’s work-based 
claims equally, either. Gaining eligibility for social insurance programs is often more difficult 
for working women than for working men. For example, until recently, married women had to 
be unable to perform housework and paid work to claim work-related disability benefits under 
Britain’s social insurance system. Under U.S. unemployment insurance programs, claimants 
may be declared ineligible because they are unable to work at any time or place because of 
child care responsibilities or the spouse’s work commitments. Furthermore, she argues that 
even if entitlement to welfare states is based on universal citizenship, the range of needs 
covered by such benefits often betrays a gender bias. For example, benefits claimed on the 
basis of paid work receive funding priority, while the public services that women depend on 
are not funded sufficiently to serve all those eligible. This different treatment of men and 
women, which reflects setting higher entitlement requirements for women than for men, and 
putting more pressure on the former than on the latter, allows one to assume that women are 
differently affected by welfare states than men are. It is hence possible to expect that the 
effect of welfare states on men’s trust levels will be stronger and more favorable than that of 
women.  
(6) Reproduction by welfare states of the subordination of women to men. The 
secondary role of women in the family is to some extent perpetuated by the welfare state 
arrangements. The fact that women are entitled to state support mostly as mothers or wives 
limits the freedom and independence of females as an individual, and points out the inferior 
position of females compared to males. Furthermore, the state perpetuates the old-fashioned 
or traditional gender division of labor in a variety of ways. For instance, gaining entitlement 
to social assistance sometimes requires women to demonstrate homemaking skills. Other 
public mechanisms – from tax systems to the absence of services to alleviate domestic 
responsibilities – also maintain the traditional division of labor. This secondary role of women 
as the clientele of welfare states and emphasis on maintaining the traditional division of labor, 
or even power, in the families may entail feelings of inferiority, and reproduce subordination 
of women to men. The latter in turn serves as a negative factor for their confidence in public 
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welfare state institutions, forming the necessary precondition for a bad experience, which 
results in lower levels of interpersonal trust.  
(7) Unequal division of caring activities between men and women. As was shown 
before, socializing constitutes one of the main determinants of social trust accumulation. 
Frequent informal contacts with neighbors, friends or colleagues usually generate a higher 
stock of social capital, in general, and social trust, in particular. The difference in the intensity 
of social trust accumulation is mediated here by differing involvements of men and women in 
caring activities. Caring responsibilities in their own right appear to divorce people from 
extensive social engagements (Platt, 2006). Caring does increase risks of infrequent visits and 
of people going out more infrequently, suggesting that caring responsibilities keep people 
predominantly at home (Platt, 2006), which hinders social capital creation. Hence, it is 
possible to conclude that caring activities can be regarded as one of the negative factors of 
social capital accumulation. Since women are more often involved in caring compared to men, 
and since welfare states mostly perpetuate this state of order by providing fewer opportunities 
for caring outside the family or by not rewarding women’s caring activities within the family, 
it is plausible to say that women’s stock of social capital will be less than that of men. In other 
words, one may expect that the effects of social policies are less positive on women than on 
men.  
 
The analysis provided above, therefore demonstrates that one may expect that the 
effects of social spending on social trust may differ between men and women. This difference 
consists first of all of the different direction and strength of the impact of welfare states on 
trust levels among males and females. The hypothesis can be formulated as follows: with 
respect to both forms of trust, the effects of welfare states on social trust are more favorable 
for men than for women. 
Men thus tend to show more trust when compared to women, which is confirmed 
empirically. The following questions arise here: first, it is not clear whether social security 
systems affect men and women differently. Second, one should analyze to which extent social 
security systems are responsible for the existence of this gender gap.  
 
The below given table demonstrates the empirical results of the gender differences in 
welfare state effects on social trust.  
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Table 10.3.: The effects of social spending on social trust by gender  
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey 
  
 
As far as the first question is concerned, the empirical results show that there is indeed 
a gender difference in the effects of welfare states on social trust. As the coefficients indicate, 
men are more strongly affected by welfare state policies than women in the case of 
institutional trust. Their trust coefficients show some difference in values, although both of 
them are statistically significant. More specifically, an increase in welfare spending by one 
 Institutional trust  Interpersonal trust   
 
Men  
 
Women   Men  Women   
 
Total social 
spending  
 
 
0.084**** 
 
0.065*** 
  
0.012** 
 
0.014*** 
 
Volunteering  
 
0.153* 0.129*  0.210*** 0.311***  
Sociability  
 
0.380*** 0.504***  0.337*** 0.419***  
Religion 
Catholic  
Protestant  
Other  
 
 
-0.784 
-0.144 
-0.392 
 
0.031 
0.199 
-0.241 
  
-0.129*** 
0.098* 
-0.020* 
 
-0.199*** 
0.039 
-0.020 
 
Religiousness 
 
-0.177*** -0.135***  -0.025*** -0.030***  
Age 
15-29 
30 – 44 
45 – more  
 
 
Ref/category  
0.043 
0.481*** 
 
Ref/category 
-0.291*** 
-0.147 
  
Ref/category 
0.095 
0.114** 
 
Ref/category 
0.211*** 
0.222*** 
 
Education 
Lower 
Middle  
Upper  
 
 
Ref/category 
0.110 
0.282*** 
 
Ref/category 
-0.230*** 
-0.055 
  
Ref/category 
0.055 
0.717*** 
 
Ref/category 
0.149*** 
0.681*** 
 
Unemployed  
 
-0.452*** -0.308***  -0.325*** -0.201**  
Income 
1st  qu.  
2nd qu. 
3rd qu. 
4th qu. 
5th qu. 
 
 
Ref/category 
0.162 
0.151 
0.152 
0.065 
 
Ref/category 
0.120 
0.035 
0.072 
0.090 
  
Ref/category 
0.085 
0.214*** 
0.487*** 
0.554*** 
 
Ref/category 
0.041 
0.240*** 
0.396*** 
0.631*** 
 
Variance at level 1  
 
9.593 (0.166) 8.900 (0.148)  Not calculated Not calculated  
Variance at level 2 
 
0.339 (0.042) 0.686 (0.070)  0.289 (0.029) 0.263 (0.036)  
 207 
percent leads to an increase in institutional trust level by 0.084 units among men and by 0.065 
units among women. In other words, the effects of welfare states are about 23 percent 
stronger for males’ than for females’ trust. The latter can be explained by the fact that social 
policies are less favorable towards women than they are towards men. Their indirect 
assignment towards welfare states as wives or mothers, along with the heavy emphasis on 
means-tested schemes and less generous benefits as compared to those for men, all contribute 
to the situation characterized by a less positive impact of social policies on institutional trust. 
This impact is still found positive, regardless of less favorable approaches used by the state 
towards women in securing their well-being. It seems that the fact that the state secures at 
least some support for the female population outweighs the negative impact of the 
mechanisms through which the delivery of state support is done.   
In the case of the interpersonal trust, no gender difference in the welfare state effects 
is found. For both men and women, the coefficients are positive and almost equal in values, 
indicating that there is a crowding-in happening in confidence in others as a result of state 
activities. The effects are estimated at 0.012 for men and 0.014 for women, which indicates an 
increase in the odds of trusting by 1.2 percent for men and by 1.4 percent for women when 
total social spending increases by one percent. The effects are not large, but still confirm the 
presence of crowding-in in interpersonal trust for both females and males. The small value of 
coefficients can also be interpreted as inferior power, which welfare states have in defining 
levels of confidence in other people. Most probably, there are other, more important variables 
coming into play when an individual’s propensity to trust others is formed.  
Interesting conclusions can also be drawn about the gender differences in the effects 
of individual-level variables on social trust levels. Volunteering is more important for 
interpersonal trust formation among women than it is for men. In the case of institutional trust, 
though, it is the other way around. Socializing with friends is also more important for 
inducing pro-social behavior among women, although the strength of influence of this 
determinant is also big for men. Religion is found important for both, especially in the case of 
interpersonal trust. The effects of frequency of church attendance also differ between men and 
women, but this gender gap is almost negligible. Unemployment seems to affect men’s trust 
levels more strongly than those of women. Income is important in trust building for both 
sexes, especially in the case of interpersonal trust. Certain gender differences are seen in the 
effects of age and education. In the case of institutional trust, older women tend to have lower 
trust levels. For men, the influence of age is positive by contrast, especially for those over the 
age of 45. In the case of interpersonal trust, the effect of age goes into the same direction, 
indicating that older people have on average more confidence in other individuals than 
younger people have. As far as education is concerned, the effects differ across trust forms. 
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For institutional trust, more educated men have higher trust levels, while women’s trust scores 
drop as their education levels increase. For interpersonal trust, the effects of education are 
positive for both sexes, indicating that more educated individuals possess higher confidence 
in other people.  
Our analysis does not stop here, but takes as the next step the investigation of gender 
differences in each welfare state regime. The main objective of this analysis is to see whether 
the effects of social policies on social trust among men and women differ across welfare 
regimes. The results obtained represent certain peculiarities. With respect to institutional trust, 
the results are rather surprising. In two out of three welfare state regimes, we find crowding-
out effects for men as well as women, which are statistically significant for both groups.   
 
Table 10.4.: Institutional trust among men and women by welfare regime type36  
 
 Social democratic 
 
Liberal Conservative  
Men 
 
Women Men 
 
Women Men 
 
Women 
 
Total social spending  
 
 
-0.129*** 
 
-0.166*** 
 
-0.186** 
 
-0.224*** 
 
0.213*** 
 
0.267*** 
Variance at level 1 
 
7.497 
(0.282) 
6.889 
(0.263) 
11.170 
(0.549) 
10.345 
(0.472) 
9.898 
(0.211) 
9.106 
(0.185) 
Variance at level 2 
 
0.016 
(0.027) 
0.017 
(0.032) 
0.012 
(0.018) 
0.344 
(0.021) 
0.313 
(0.049) 
0.433 
(0.067) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey 
 
More specifically, in social democratic welfare states, an increase in total social 
spending by one percent is associated with a decrease in institutional trust by 0.129 units for 
men and 0.166 units for women. The negative effect of social policies is larger for females 
than it is for males. This is indeed surprising since social democratic policies heavily 
emphasize women’s independence, equal division of domestic work, wide employment in 
public sector, and large-scale organization by the state of caring services. It is unexpected that 
these social policies may produce crowding-out effects in confidence of people in public 
institutions, especially for women.   
A similar situation is found in the case of liberal welfare regimes. There, an increase 
in total social spending by one percent leads to a decrease in institutional trust by 0.186 units 
among men and by 0.224 units among women. The negative effect is again larger for women 
when compared to the effect on men. Moreover, the crowding-out effect is statistically 
significant for both groups. It seems that segmented and stigmatizing welfare state provisions 
                                                 
36
 The coefficients on control variables are not reported since they are similar to those given in Table 10.3.  
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in liberal welfare states lead to an erosion of institutional trust in both sexes. Most surprising 
is the fact, that regardless of differences in the quality, methods and principles of organizing 
welfare provisions between social democratic and liberal welfare states, their effects on 
institutional trust of women are similar in sign and almost identical in strength.  
Conservative welfare states represent an exception, but are also characterized by the 
existence of gender differences in welfare state effects on institutional trust. For both men and 
women, the effect is positive and statistically significant. According to the data, an increase in 
total social spending by one percent leads to an increase in institutional trust by 0.213 units 
for men and by 0.267 units for women. The positive effect for women is stronger as compared 
to that for men.  
In summary, the effect of welfare state development is always less positive for women 
than for men with respect to institutional trust. The latter is fully in line with our expectations 
and confirms that less favorable, less generous, and more strict treatment of women by 
welfare states leads to their trust towards public welfare state institutions being more 
negatively affected by social policies than men’s. In social democratic and liberal welfare 
states, the effects are even negative and highly significant.  
To some extent, similar results are found in the case of interpersonal trust, which 
sends a similar message: there is an obvious gender difference in social policy effects. 
 
Table 10.5.: Interpersonal trust among men and women by welfare regime type37 
 
 Social democratic 
 
Liberal Conservative  
Men  
 
Women Men 
 
Women Men 
 
Women 
 
Total social spending  
 
 
0.009 
 
-0.063*** 
 
0.020 
 
-0.037** 
 
-0.021*** 
 
-0.031*** 
Variance at level 1  
 
Not 
calculated  
Not 
calculated 
Not 
calculated  
Not 
calculated 
Not 
calculated  
Not 
calculated 
Variance at level 2  
 
0.001 
(0.008) 
0.012 
(0.037) 
0.193 
(0.066) 
0.261 
(0.078) 
0.228 
(0.037) 
0.247 
(0.042) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey 
 
 This time it is obvious for all the three welfare state regimes that the effects are less 
positive for women than for men. More specifically, in liberal welfare regimes, an increase in 
total social spending by one percent leads to a decrease of women’s odds of trusting by 3.7 
percent. For men, the effect of social spending is positive, but not statistically significant. It 
can be explained by the fact that a stigmatizing approach in liberal welfare states dominates in 
                                                 
37
 The coefficients on control variables are not reported since they are similar to those given in Table 10.3. 
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designing and providing welfare to both men and women. Stigmatizing generally lies deep at 
the roots of organizing social policy here. It is possible to assume that women are more 
prevalent as welfare states’ clients, and hence come into contact with welfare institutions 
more often than men. Logically, they more often experience the negative effect of 
stigmatizing, which leads to a stronger erosion of their interpersonal trust as compared to men.  
A similar effect is found in the case of conservative welfare states, where the gender 
difference is present, which is again in favor of men over women, although the coefficients 
are negative in both cases. An increase in total social spending is associated with  a 3.1 
percent decrease in the odds of trusting among women and a 2.1 percent decrease in the odds 
of trusting among men. These results are also statistically significant and fully confirm our 
expectations that conservative welfare states are designed to support men rather than women, 
which results in more negative effects for women.  
In this respect, Scandinavian countries do not constitute an exception here, since they 
represent a welfare state regime, where the effects of social spending on interpersonal trust are 
positive for men and negative for women. More specifically, an increase in total social 
spending by one percent is associated with an increase in the odds of trusting by 0.9 percent 
among men and a decrease in the odds of trusting by 6.2 percent among women. Furthermore, 
there is a clear gender difference in welfare state effects on interpersonal trust in favor of men, 
which is fully in line with our expectations.  
To summarize, the effects of welfare states on interpersonal trust differ among men 
and women and this occurs in a similar manner across welfare state regimes. In the case of all 
three welfare regimes, we receive evidence that supports our expectations, suggesting that 
men’s interpersonal trust is less negatively affected by welfare states than women’s trust 
indexes.  
Overally, it is possible to assert that there is a certain consistency in the effects of 
welfare states on social trust. We find that the gender gap in the effects of welfare states has a 
similar nature for institutional and interpersonal trust. Our expectations are generally 
confirmed that less favorable treatment by the welfare states of women as compared to men 
leads to more negative effects for women than for men. 
 
 10.4. The effects of social policies on gender differences in social trust  
 
Another question that should be analyzed is whether welfare states may chnage the 
gender gap in social trust. The main objective is to see whether social policies have some 
influence on the gender gap in social trust by broadening it or, by contrast, eliminating it. The 
recent policies implemented by many welfare states are basically aimed at mobilizing women 
 211 
and their inclusion in paid employment. The latter must, in theory,  positively affect women 
by enhancing their social trust and thus making the difference in trust levels among men and 
women narrower. Policies aimed at mobilizing the female workforce have two political 
agendas, each representing cognitive and more normative founded aspects. The first agenda 
consists of more cognitive oriented policies, enabling women, particularly mothers, to 
reconcile work, and family and thereby intends to improve national productivity, growth and 
competitiveness by enhancing women’s participation in paid work. The second agenda relates 
to equal opportunity policies that encourage both woman and men towards a more equal 
sharing of the provider and caring roles in order to advance social justice. It exemplifies 
attempts to transform policy-makers and the general public’s ideological perception away 
from the male breadwinner/female housewife model, towards an adult worker society, where 
both men and women are seen as equal workers and carers (Larsen, 2005). The latter should 
positively affect women’s trust levels, leading to the elimination of the trust gap between the 
two sexes.  
The analysis of the effects of welfare state activity on the difference in trust between 
men and women reveals that the mixed results can be obtained. In the case of institutional 
trust, when analyzing this relationship on the basis of the data for the whole population, the 
results reveal that total social spending has no effect on the gender gap. More specifically, the 
coefficient on social spending indicates that an increase in total social spending by one 
percent leads to an increase in institutional trust by 0.139 points. The analysis however shows 
no difference in institutional trust between two sexes. The coefficient on male dummies 
indicates that in the case of zero social spending, men’s levels of institutional trust would be 
0.119 points higher than women’s. Yet, this difference is not statistically significant. The 
interaction between total social spending and male dummies is not statistically significant, 
either. However, it is positive and it could be interpreted that an increase in total social 
spending tends to increase the difference in social trust between men and women. Social 
policies thus do not eliminate the gender gap in social trust, but, on the contrary, tend to 
broaden it. 
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Table 10.6.: The impact of welfare states on gender differences in institutional 
trust38  
 Institutional trust 
Total By welfare state regimes 
Social 
democratic 
Liberal Conservative 
Total social 
spending 
 
0.139*** -0.180*** -0.242*** 0.288*** 
Male   
 
0.119 -0.560 -0.345 0.868 
Male*total social 
spending  
 
0.009 0.060 0.085 -0.030 
Variance at level 1  
 
9.264 (0.111) 7.248 (0.144) 10.809 (0.361) 9.525 (0.140) 
Variance at level 2 
 
0.046 (0.008) 0.128 (0.002) 0.198 (0.015) 0.273 (0.028) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey 
 
When moving to the analysis of the relationship between social spending and the 
gender gap in institutional trust by welfare regime type, we obtain interesting differences. For 
Scandinavian nations, welfare state development erodes institutional trust.  An increase in 
total social spending by one percent tends to decrease institutional trust by 0.180 points when 
other variables are constant. Here, there is also a substantial gender gap in favor of women, 
suggesting that women have institutional trust levels, which are, on average, higher than those 
of men by 0.560 points. The interaction term between social spending and male dummies is 
positive, indicating that an increase in total social spending leads to a decrease in institutional 
trust differences between the two sexes. The latter allows one to draw conclusions that the 
erosion of institutional trust among men occurs at a slower pace than among women, which is 
consistent with the results obtained in the previous sub-chapter.  
In liberal countries, the results are different. More specifically, there is an obvious 
crowding-out effect in institutional trust caused by welfare state development, which is also 
statistically significant. An increase in total social spending by one percent decreases 
institutional trust by 0.242 points, when other variables are constant. Male dummies are also 
negative, indicating that women usually have higher levels of trust than men, although it is 
not statistically significant. The interaction term is positive, which suggests that as welfare 
state spending increases, the institutional trust difference between the two sexes increases in 
favor of men. However, this happens at a very low pace so that the overall effect is not 
                                                 
38
 The coefficients on control variables are not reported since they are similar to those given in Table 10.3. 
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statistically significant. Regardless of the non-significant coefficients, the result allows one to 
assume that as in the case of Scandinavian nations, welfare state activities erode institutional 
trust among women at a higher pace than among men, which is in line with the results 
obtained in the previous sub-chapter.  
In contrast to liberal and Scandinavian countries, one finds obvious crowding–in 
effects in the case of conservative welfare regimes. The coefficient indicates that an increase 
in total social spending by one percent tends to increase institutional trust by 0.288 points, 
which is also statistically significant. Neither the male dummies nor the interaction terms are 
statistically significant here. The male dummies indicate that in conservative countries, 
women usually have institutional trust levels that are 0.868 units lower than those of men. But, 
this gender gap in institutional trust lessens as social spending increases, which can be 
deduced from the negative interaction terms. This effect is however not statistically 
significant. Yet, it does allow one to say that the crowding-in effects are slightly stronger for 
women than for men which is completely in line with the results obtained for conservative 
welfare regimes in the previous sub-chapter. 
In the case of interpersonal trust we obtained results that are slightly different.  
 
Table 10.7.: The impact of welfare states on gender differences in interpersonal trust39  
 Interpersonal trust 
Total By welfare state regimes 
Social 
democratic 
Liberal Conservative 
Total social 
spending 
 
0.042*** -0.046** 0.034** -0.065*** 
Male 
 
0.088 -0.849 -0.077 0.241 
Male*total social 
spending  
 
-0.001 0.028 0.012 0.013 
Variance at level 1 
 
Not calculated  Not calculated  Not calculated  Not calculated  
Variance at level 2 
 
0.352 (0.023) 0.074 (0.063) 0.181 (0.041) 0.247 (0.029) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey 
 
More specifically, on the basis of data for the whole population, one may conclude 
that there is a crowding-in effect in interpersonal trust caused by welfare state development. 
On the other hand, there is no gender difference in levels of interpersonal trust, and there is no 
                                                 
39
 The coefficients on control variables are not reported since they are similar to those given in Table 10.3. 
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interaction between social spending and gender variables. Despite the fact that male dummies 
and their interaction terms with social spending are found to be not statistically significant, we 
will report and interpret the results since the coefficients on them represent some interest.  
The analysis however reveals no statistically significant differences in interpersonal 
trust between two sexes, although the values of coefficients on male dummies are found to be 
large. It indicates that men usually have the odds of trusting which are 8.9 percent higher than 
those of women. The interaction term between two variables of interest has a negative sign, 
indicating that the difference in trust levels between men and women decreases as total social 
spending increases. This happens however at a very low rate – by 0.1 per cent as the result of 
an increase in total social spending by one percent. The insignificance of interaction terms 
also reflects the fact that the social spending affects men’s and women’s interpersonal trust in 
the same way, which was obtained in the analysis conducted in the previous chapter.  
When analyzing the relationship of interest by welfare regime type, the results 
generally support what is found in studying the differences in effects of social spending on 
interpersonal trust between men and women. In the case of Scandinavian welfare regimes, the 
results show an interaction between social spending and interpersonal trust. An increase in 
total social spending by one per cent tends to erode the odds of trusting by 4.6 percent. 
Nevertheless, there are substantial gender differences in interpersonal trust, which indicates 
that in Scandinavian nations, women have levels of interpersonal trust that are higher than 
that of men. This, however, is not statistically significant. There is also an interaction between 
social spending and the gender variable. The sign of the coefficient on the interaction term is 
positive that suggests that existing differences in trust levels between men and women tend to 
decrease as social spending increases. This happens at quite a rapid pace: by 2.9 percent per 
one percent increase in total social spending. This supports the results obtained in the 
previous sub-chapter that indicate that the erosion of interpersonal trust by welfare state 
polices happens mostly among women.  
A similar relationship is found in the case of conservative welfare regimes: the effects 
of total social spending on interpersonal trust are statistically significant, with the coefficients 
on gender dummies and their interaction terms being not statistically significant.  More 
specifically, an increase in total social spending by one percent tends to erode the odds of 
trusting by 6.3 percent. There is an obvious gender gap in interpersonal trust levels in favour 
of men. Women have on average the odds of trusting that are lower by 21.5 percent than those 
of men. This difference tends to become larger as social spending increases: an increase in 
total social spending by one percent increases the gender gap in interpersonal trust by 1.3 
percent.  
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In liberal welfare regimes, the situation is different. Stigmatizing social policies 
surprisingly tend to enhance interpersonal trust. There is no statistically significant gender gap 
in interpersonal trust although the coefficients on male dummies have high values, indicating 
that men tend to have scores on interpersonal trust that are lower by 7.5 percent than those of 
women. The elimination of this gender gap however happens at a very low rate. As a result, 
the coefficient on the interaction term is not statistically significant: 1.2 percent per one 
percent increase in total social spending.  
Therefore, the regime case analysis advocates that social spending affects social trust 
mostly in a negative way, which means that there is an obvious crowding-out effect in the 
relationship between total social spending and social trust. Statistically significant differences 
in levels of social trust between men and women are found in none of the cases when the 
interaction term is introduced. Although being not statistically significant, the gender gap in 
social trust levels is almost always in favor of women. Nevertheless, these differences tend to 
become smaller as the result of welfare state activities. The latter suggests that the erosion of 
social trust among women occurs at a higher rate than among men. This in turn supports the 
results found in the previous sub-chapter and reveals that social policies affect women and 
men in a different way. Women are found to be more negatively affected by welfare states as 
measured through total social spending.  
To some extent, our findings are surprising, since they demonstrate that females 
usually have higher trust scores than males.  According to the literature, the opposite situation 
is primarily discussed, while the analysis is limited to a cross sectional research for a number 
of countries. Our approach to disaggregate the analysis and shift it to welfare regime levels 
for discussing the relationship between social trust and social spending allow us to obtain 
completely different results than those based on the pooled sample for all selected countries. 
For this reason, isolation of welfare state regimes appear to be plausible and demonstrates that 
the gender differences in trust levels and as the effects of welfare state development on social 
trust are regime specific. The latter suggests that the existing gender differences can be 
interpreted as a result of cultural specificities embedded in each welfare regime type that 
reflect the path of their historical development and formation of  society’s values.  
On the other hand, small effects of social policies on the gap in social trust between 
men and women can be attributed to their poor performance in combating the ‘pro-male’ 
mode of welfare provisions. As Larsen (2005) demonstrates, the current transformation 
towards an adult worker model remains at an early stage. Recent reforms tend to follow the 
logic of the male breadwinner model, as they lack incentives for families to pursue a more 
equal gender division. Most work-family life policies support women as carers rather than 
workers and less attention is paid to men’s rights and obligations, and their potential role in 
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informal child-care. Policies tend to rest on the argument that justifies their attempts to 
mobilize the female workforce and legitimize their work-life balance policies in terms of the 
efficient use of resources and mobilization of the labor force, operating in terms of 
instrumental rationality. They do not seek to legitimize an adult worker discourse, based 
ultimately on values of social justice and gender equality in outcomes, by demonstrating its 
appropriateness in terms of transforming national values. For these reasons, recent reforms do 
not represent a radical policy discourse that presages a move towards the adult worker society. 
The discourse, in which policy reforms are discussed, is much more likely to relegate women 
to the position of secondary worker available to take the chief role in relation to child and 
elder care responsibilities, rather than promoting genuine equality in the labor market (Larsen, 
2005). 
 
 10.5. Overview and concluding remarks  
Chapter ten elaborates on the existence of a gender gap in social trust and on the 
differences in the effects of social policies on social trust between men and women. Although 
according to the data, there are no statistically significant differences in trust levels between 
men and women, they seem to be differently influenced by social policy. The research shows 
that there is no gender dimension in social policy, but it allows one to conclude that women 
are usually treated by the welfare state in a less favorable manner than men. The latter 
includes differences between the two sexes in the following aspects: emphasis on employment; 
social benefits levels; treatment during the application for and monitoring of social benefits; 
poverty rate levels; treatment by social insurance; and in general, the reproduction by welfare 
states the subordination of women to men. It is plausible, therefore, to expect that the effects 
of welfare states on social trust must be different for men and women. The empirical analysis 
proves this hypothesis only for institutional trust when analyzing the pooled sample. When 
investigating social policy effects on social trust by welfare regime type, one obtains evidence 
of a more negative impact of social spending on trust women rather than on that of men. This 
is also in the case of interpersonal trusts. In the following the interaction between gender 
variable and social spending is studied. The results obtained suggest that a gender gap in 
social trust in favor of women can be found in some welfare regimes.  This however tends to 
be gradually eliminated as welfare spending increases. This is completely in line with the 
previous findings that show that welfare state activities as usually more negative towards 
females than towards males.  
It should be more theoretically elaborated how and why welfare states may affect the 
gender difference in social trust levels. It remains unclear why in some welfare regimes, 
social spending enlarges the gender gap in social trust, while in other regimes, it reduces the 
 217 
gap. It also remains  under-researched in which ways social policies may potentially promote 
gender equality in trust.  
Moreover, the analysis of group specific effects should not be limited only to gender. 
It is possible to argue that there are other social characteristics that can divide society into 
groups and, hence, presuppose that the effects of social policies differ across these groups. 
The easiest example here is age and education in addition to the gender of an individual. The 
analysis of effects of these social characteristics on social trust lies beyond the scope of this 
research. Further research, however, should account for the possible existence of group- 
specific effects of social policies. 
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Chapter 11: CONCLUSIONS  
 
The main objective of this research is to analyze the relationship between welfare 
states and social trust. The main contribution to this research field consists of introducing a 
multidimensional approach to measure the degree of welfare state development. The 
multidimensionality is formed along three axes: functional, outcome and qualitative. Each 
axis is assumed to reflect the specificity of welfare state organization and the degree of its 
development.  
The functional axis allows one to defining the functional dimension, which is based on 
decomposing total social spending on a functional basis and relating relevant social 
expenditures to social trust among their direct recipients. The empirical analysis confirms the 
plausibility of such an approach. On the other hand, it demonstrates that the effects of social 
spending on social trust are policy specific, which means that some social policies may 
enhance social trust formation, while others, on the contrary, discourage social trust.  
It should be also noted that apart from being policy specific, the effects of social 
spending are also group specific. The analysis for the gender variable does not directly prove 
this hypothesis when analyzed at the aggregated level. When moving to specific welfare 
regimes, the results provide evidence that supports this assumption. More research is however 
needed to explore and explain why in some welfare regimes the welfare state is less favorable 
to women in its impact on social trust than to men. It may possibly stem from the fact that 
men and women use a different basis for building trust: men use a monetary basis whereas 
women use a non-monetary one.  
The outcome axis, around which the outcome dimension is formed, is defined based 
on the outcomes of social policies. More specifically, we take into account 
decommodification levels and the type of social stratification to analyze their effects on social 
trust. The results allow us to conclude that both outcomes have a certain relationship with 
social trust levels, while in most cases, we are able to infer about the existence of their 
positive effects on social trust. Moreover, some evidence is found with respect to a certain 
interaction between the outcome and the functional dimensions. The strength of the impact of 
decommodification differs across social provisions, although none of them reveals a negative 
correlation with social trust indexes.  
Finally, the qualitative dimension is aimed at describing the effects of institutional 
design of benefit schemes on interpersonal and institutional trust. The analysis proves that non 
means-tested benefit schemes usually enhance confidence towards other people, while means-
testing usually negatively affects interpersonal trust indexes. In the case of institutional trust, 
we find that regardless of institutional design, social policies tend to enhance trust levels. 
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However, these effects are found to be policy specific, which confirmed the existence of an 
interaction between the qualitative and the functional dimensions.  
The main objective of this chapter is to summarize the analysis and provide some 
predictions of how recent trends in welfare state restructuring may affect social trust levels.  
 
11.1. Summing up the relationship between welfare states and social trust  
To see how the changes in welfare state provisions will affect social trust levels, it is 
necessary to recall the kind of relationship between social trust and levels of social provisions, 
as well as the characteristics of social benefit design. The table below summarizes the kind of 
relationship between social trust and welfare states in light of the multidimensional approach.  
 
Table 10.1: The relationship between welfare states and social trust in a 
multidimensional approach 
 Correlation between 
Institutional trust Interpersonal trust 
THE FUNCTIONAL 
DIMENSION:  
  
Total social spending  
 
Positive  Positive  
Pension spending  
 
Negative  Negative  
Unemployment spending  
 
Positive  Positive  
THE OUTCOME 
DIMENSION:  
 
  
Decommodification level  
 
Positive  Positive  
Stratification    
(a) conservatism  Negative  Positive  
(b) liberalism  Positive  Negative  
(c) socialism  
 
Positive  Positive  
THE QUALITATIVE 
DIMENSION:  
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Non means-tested schemes  
 
Positive  Positive  
Means-tested schemes 
 
Positive  Negative  
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey  
 
Summarizing the relationship in question shows some peculiarities. The results 
however seem to be inconsistent to fully explain the kind of influence welfare states have on 
social trust. What is possible to infer is that the total effect of social policy on social trust has 
a complex nature, consisting of a number of simultaneous effects, which sometimes have an 
opposite direction.  
For institutional trust, the effect of total social spending is positive. However, when 
taking into account the functional dimension, the effect turns to be negative in the case of 
pensions, but still remains positive in the case of unemployment benefits. The only conclusion 
that can be drawn on the basis of these results is that the effects of social policies on trust 
formation are policy specific.  
The outcome dimension also provides mixed results. In line with the positive effects of 
total social spending, decommodification levels seem to crowd-in institutional trust. The 
impact of stratification has its own peculiarities. The conservatism tends to crowd-out 
institutional trust, while the liberalism and the socialism conduct a positive influence on 
confidence in public welfare institutions.  
The analysis of the qualitative dimension provides evidence that advocates the 
crowding-in effects regarding institutional trust. Non means-tested schemes have positive 
effects on institutional trust according to the results based on the WVS. Surprisingly, means-
tested social provisions have the same influence on institutional trust.  
What seems to matter for institutional trust is the fact that the state provides an 
individual with financial support when he or she has difficulties. How this support is provided 
has little importance for trust in public welfare institutions.  
For interpersonal trust, the effects of welfare states are found to be in some cases quite 
different from institutional trust. The functional dimension shows the presence of policy 
specific effects. As in the case of institutional trust, the impact of the total social spending is 
positive, while pension spending is found to be negative in their effects on interpersonal trust 
according to the WVS. Unemployment spending has positive effects on confidence in other 
individuals.  
The analysis of the outcome dimension reveals results similar to those obtained for 
institutional trust. Decommodification levels have a positive impact on confidence in others, 
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which is in line with the positive impact of total social spending. In the case of social 
stratification, a negative impact is obtained for liberalism, while positive effects are found in 
the case of socialism and conservatism.  
For the qualitative dimension, the effects advocate for a negative impact in some cases. 
Universalism and selectivity are both found to affect interpersonal trust indexes in a way that 
is in line with the theory. Non means-tested schemes show a positive correlation with 
interpersonal trust scores, while means-testing can be regarded as a reason for crowding-out 
effects in confidence in other people.   
 
 
11.2. Predicting possible outcomes of welfare state transformation on social trust 
levels  
Before proceeding to the analysis of possible effects of recent changes in welfare 
states on social trust levels, it is worth giving a general overview of the main directions in 
welfare state transformation, which may potentially affect social trust levels. The recent 
changes in welfare states can be summarized as follows.  
1. As the result of external and internal pressure, a new political discourse 
may appear, which favors the introduction of a more flexible and de-regulated European 
social model, while policy debates about the future of welfare states are often focused on 
restructuring and retrenchment (Moreno and Palier, 2005). Therefore, it is possible to 
expect that the overall trend in welfare state spending will involve lowering social 
expenditures over the next decades (Pierson, 1996; Taylor-Gooby, 2002, 2005a,b)40. This 
trend may negatively affect the approach of the middle class towards social security 
systems (Svallfors, 2002). 
2. National developments evolve –albeit gradually- towards a similar 
approach for social policy reforms. The measures adopted to meet new risk challenges are 
analogous in the four welfare regimes. They consist of retrenchment defined as cuts in 
public welfare programs, which will result in residual welfare states, because the cuts 
undermine the redistributive aims of social policy. In general, many countries are moving 
towards a more liberal social protection system (Aust and Arriba, 2005; Kananen, 2005; 
Trampusch, 2006).  
3. The debates are focused on adopting the liberal principles in organizing 
welfare state provisions. The latter will concern the fact that welfare states will be directed 
in minimizing decommodification levels and maximizing self-reliance in providing welfare. 
                                                 
40
 This is contested by some scholars (see for instance Adelantado and Cuevas, 2006) 
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This will also have implications for the stratification function of welfare states. If the 
liberal approach is supported in the future, the reliance on the market and the stigmatizing 
function of welfare states will be the main characteristics of the social stratification process.   
4. The pressure on labor markets and greater economic openness make it 
more difficult for governments to pursue standard post-war employment policies, which 
relied on Keynesian demand management and social transfers to regulate the supply of 
jobs and ensure the income of those out of work. This excludes the redistributive discourse 
from the policy agenda and complements and legitimizes a policy shift of some actors 
towards increased conditionality in social assistance and unemployment benefits (Aust and 
Ariba, 2005).  
5. The change in employment discourse entailed the fact that there was a 
drastic reduction in the level of unemployment benefits, while an essential restructuring of 
principles of their delivery occurred in parallel to this.  The latter mainly consisted of 
linking unemployment benefits to activation measures, which are supposed to lessen the 
unemployment span and assist in a gradual transition from unemployment to employment. 
As a result, there was a shift from passive to active measures to support a greater flexibility 
in labor markets.  
6. Considerable changes were also introduced in the provision of pensions.  
European countries have pursued broadly similar measures to control pension spending, 
such as taking into account longer working lives and applying actuarial criteria for the 
calculation of benefits. The most common feature of pension policy reforms is the 
implementation of private pensions as a supplement to the state scheme (Bönker, 2005).     
7. An emphasis on the liberal ideas and a gradual scaling down of welfare 
state administration may involve a gradual shift to means-testing as a key principle of 
welfare state provisions. Many countries (among which, Scandinavian countries are also 
often found) recently introduced means-tested benefits schemes. This process is especially 
famous in welfare states that rely on social assistance and welfare states, where great 
discretionary power is given to the local welfare actors.  
 
One should however be very careful in assessing the final effects of recent changes on 
social trust levels. There is not a single trend in their effects: rather, the final outcome will be 
a result of the simultaneous effects and interactions among many trajectories in interpersonal 
and institutional trust dynamics. On the other hand, the effects of these change in welfare state 
characteristics and levels of their intervention may entail some changes in social trust levels 
that are not immediately evident. It is hence possible to expect that the immediate effects may 
differ from the final effects in their size, direction, and strength.  
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The recent trend towards retrenchment will most probably bring controversial results. 
Cuts in social expenditures will first negatively affect institutional trust. The retrenchment 
will contribute to spreading uncertainty among the population, especially among those 
experiencing any of the social risks or those on the margins of labor markets. The fact that the 
state leaves the unfortunate to their own fate without providing them with any support or 
providing with insufficient support will contribute to feelings of being unprotected, as well as 
increased uncertainty among the population. This forms the necessary grounds for believing 
that such a state of affairs may undermine trust in public welfare state institutions.  
This negative experience of individuals with public institutions may be considered a 
ground upon which negative effects on interpersonal trust build as well. Moreover, increased 
uncertainty and pessimism resulting from retrenchment will be additional factors that lead to a 
reduction in interpersonal trust levels. Another factor that contributes to a decrease in both 
levels of trust is poverty. Curtailment of social spending will result in less redistribution and 
lead to higher poverty rates within the population.  It is reasonable to judge that the reduction 
in levels of social spending will, in the short-term, result in a decrease in interpersonal trust. 
But, it is quite possible to expect that interpersonal trust may increase in the long-term due to 
expanding volunteering and an increase in socializing of individuals with friends and families. 
This happens due to the fact that poverty enhances collectivism as the result of an increased 
reliance on social ties and fellow in-group members (Simpson, 2006). On the other hand, an 
increase in the role of the voluntary sector can be deduced from the recent changes in welfare 
state principles, which consist of the shift from government to governance on all scales. This 
new approach to welfare provisions is based on decreasing social spending, but increasing 
regulation of welfare provisions by alternative actors, among which the voluntary sector is 
one of utmost importance. Moreover, it is widely assumed that this new regime leaves more 
room for creativity and local innovations (Bode, 2006), which presumes more space for acting 
on the part of the voluntary organizations.  
The shift to relying mainly on the liberal principles in welfare state provisions will 
also have its impact on social trust levels. The latter will mainly stem from decreasing 
decommodification levels and the gradual shift to liberalism in the social stratification process. 
A decrease in decommodification levels will lead to a decrease in both forms of trust since the 
relationship between them is positive. It is hence possible to assume that the recent trend in 
reducing decommodification levels may result in a negative impact on trust.   
With respect to the stratification effects, the results obtained contradict the logic, 
especially in the case of institutional trust. Based on this kind of relationship, one should 
expect that the shift to liberalism would result in an increase of institutional trust. It seems 
that a stigmatizing-like approach in social stratification will not have a negative effect on 
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institutional trust levels. It is likely that trust in institutions is less affected by the stigmatizing 
principles in organizing welfare benefits, which is also confirmed by the positive relationship 
between selectivity measures and institutional trust scores. What matters here is that the state 
supports the ‘unfortunate’ through a range of social policies, even if they are based on 
isolating these from the rest of the population. Moreover, the use of means-tested schemes 
may enhance this tendency, since they show a positive correlation with institutional trust 
scores among the whole population. Hence, these stigmatizing-like principles are of little 
importance, when discussing institutional trust levels.  
In the case of interpersonal trust, one should also expect a decrease in its levels as a 
result of decreasing decommodification levels. This occurs as a consequence of increased 
poverty and uncertainty, as was discussed above. This must happen in the short-term, while 
the results may differ in the long-term.  
Expanding liberalism will also lead to a decrease in confidence in other people. The 
liberal approach to isolating the needy from the rest of the population will negatively affect 
their trust levels, as well as trust among the rest of the population. In the liberal practice of 
organizing welfare, the needy are usually stigmatized and almost always stamped as socially 
inferior or as ‘others’ with other types of social characteristics and needs. This has negative 
consequences for an individual’s self-respect and confidence, leading to less trust among 
these people. Moreover, if some citizens are singled out as special or ‘problem’ cases, it 
seems plausible that the majority of citizens might not trust them (Rothstein and Stolle, 2001). 
This tendency is also supported by the impact selectivity has on interpersonal trust. The 
relationship is negative, which confirms that the increased reliance on means-tested schemes 
will lead to a reduction in interpersonal trust scores.  
The change in the employment discourse will have mixed effects. A reduction in 
unemployment benefits should lead to a drop in trust levels of both forms. It seems that 
increased uncertainty, combined with the tendency to overestimate the risk of unemployment, 
will lead to a negative shift in confidence in public institutions. The latter will also form the 
necessary grounds for a decrease in levels of interpersonal trust, too. However, it should be 
noted that the drop in institutional trust that results from a decrease of unemployment benefits 
can be off-set by an increase in spending on active labor market policies. This can be 
explained by the fact that the latter will precipitate the transition from unemployment to 
employment, which is associated with positive effects on institutional trust levels.  
Recent trends in the reduction of pension levels will have surprisingly positive effects 
on interpersonal and institutional trust among pensioners. The positive effect may result from 
the fact that the reduction in public pensions will be accompanied by an increase in private 
provisions, which will be associated with less uncertainty concerning levels of pensions. On 
 225 
the other hand, it is possible to expect that in the long-term, the shift to private pensions may 
entail losses in both forms of trust. It is plausible to assume that the spread of private pensions 
will bring more inequality. Higher income inequality is certainly an expression of stronger 
segmentation of society into various groups that do not live in similar life circumstances, 
thereby ruining social trust levels.   
It is difficult to define one single trend in the dynamics of social trust as a result of the 
changes in welfare state provisions. Welfare states constitute a multifaceted concept that has 
many characteristics and is under the impact of many interrelated and interdependent 
processes of change. The final outcome will be a result of interactions of different trajectories, 
whose effects in the short-term may significantly differ from those in the long-term. In 
general, one should expect that recent changes in the level and structure of welfare state 
provisions will result in a decrease of levels of institutional trust. The dynamics of 
interpersonal trust is less clear: it seems that in the short-term, the tendency will be negative 
as a result of increased poverty; but in the long-term, it must be reversed by greater reliance 
on volunteering and socialization as the substitutes for state support.  
 
11.3. Theorizing the relationship between welfare states and social trust  
The analysis of the Welfare State Trust Nexus allows us to deduce that the relationship 
between them is complex. Apart from being multi-dimensional, it can be considered multi-
level as well, since it happens at three societal levels: macro, micro and meso. The general 
structure of this relationship can be visualized as follows:  
 
 
Figure 11.1: Welfare states and social trust: a multi-level approach  
Welfare state 
Social policy t1 
Welfare state  
Social policy t2 
Social network 
relations t1 
Social network 
relations t2 
Personal 
social trust t1 
Personal  
social trust t2 
macro 
meso 
micro 
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The relationship is based on several principles: 
(1) The principle of simultaneous effects, which means that all selected 
concepts are interrelated and conduct an influence on each other, whether 
in the same time period or with a delay.  
(2) The principle of self-reflexivity, which means that social processes may 
reinforce each other, which makes it difficult to determine what the causal 
link between them is.  
(3) The principle of reverse effects, which conveys the fact that the 
relationship between the selected concepts goes not only from concept C1 
to concept C2 but can also be reversed. The complexity of social processes 
allows the influences to go in both directions. It should be however noted 
that the reverse effect may come with a certain delay.  
(4) The principle of feedback effects, which expresses the fact that there is 
room for new social relations that appear as a result of the feedback 
coming from actors who are involved in these social relations.  
(5) The principle of hierarchical relations, which reflects that there is a certain 
hierarchy among actors participating in social relations. This, however, is 
not excluded that an actor of a lower order can influence an actor of a 
higher order.  
 
According to the principle of hierarchical relations, it is possible to distinguish three 
societal levels in social trust relations: macro, which represents welfare states; micro, which 
represents an individual; and meso, which embraces social networks. The principle of 
simultaneous effects allows that they all influence each other when taking part in social 
processes.  
Welfare states influence both levels: micro and meso. By implementing social policies, 
the state determines the extent of development and type of social networks. On the one hand, 
they may encourage the development of family-based networks, as happens in Mediterranean 
countries. In this welfare regime, the delivery of the welfare rests on the premise that family 
constitutes the main source of support and, therefore, entitlements to social benefits are done 
on a family basis. This forms a basis for the strong development of familial networks. The 
effects of the state on networks may take a different form. As it happens in liberal welfare 
regimes, the state may encourage the grass-roots creation of volunteer organizations, which 
are then regarded as equal partners for delivering support to individuals.  
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On the other hand, the state may substitute the third sector. The direct provision of 
benefits for those experiencing social contingences leaves no room for volunteer 
organizations, whose role then declines as welfare states expand. The erosion of volunteering 
by welfare states is a classical assumption that is widely contested and was framed in the 
crowding-out hypothesis. For this reason, the state may have a double effect on social 
networks. First, it may substitute social networks and, second, it can create a legal and social 
environment for them to flourish. 
Welfare states also affect an individual, which happens directly and indirectly.  The 
indirect impact rests on the assumption that social networks are an important source for social 
trust. Since social networks are heavily influenced by social policies, the ability of an 
individual to trust, and especially to trust other people, is also influenced. Thus, the state 
creates room for social relations within social networks, it exerts an essential influence on the 
degree of the development of social trust.  
Besides the indirect effect, the direct impact of welfare states on social also occurs, 
which is grounded in the integration argument. This positive effect is double: first, its 
magnitude is defined by the degree of redistribution resulting from the state intervention in 
societal arrangements. As the empirical analysis shows, the higher the redistribution is, the 
higher its positive effect is. Second, social trust is influenced by the quality of public 
institutions, in which welfare state functions are embedded. The better the quality of these 
institutions and the less corrupted they are, the higher the degree of social trust is. Also, the 
institutional design of social provisions defines social trust levels. In universal welfare states, 
which treat all people equally and do not pit one group against the other or isolate the 
‘problem’ people, social trust levels are usually higher. It should be however noted that the 
direct effect of welfare states on social trust could be based on the selectivity principle, which 
assumes that not all social groups are affected by social policies linearly. In addition, it is true 
that not all social policies affect social trust in the same way; the effects are policy specific, 
instead.  
The effects described above may have a reverse nature as the principle of reverse 
effects assert. As it is argued in the literature on the topic, trust may affect the creation of 
social networks, since more trusting people are more often members of social networks. 
Conversely, individuals may influence the development of welfare states. In trusting societies, 
they may delegate more functions to the state, including the support of individuals in the case 
of experiencing any contingences.  
Furthermore, social networks may promote welfare state formation. It can happen 
based on the subsidiarity principle: those functions that cannot be arranged by family or social 
networks are delegated to welfare states. Moreover, social networks may complement welfare 
 228 
states: under the conditions of low intervention of welfare states, social networks may flourish. 
This happens due to the fact that poverty increases collectivism as a result of increased 
reliance on social ties and fellow in-group members, as was mentioned before.  
It is difficult to say which social process takes place in the first period and triggers the 
feedback mechanism, and which comes as a result in the later period. It is also hard to argue 
what happens in the first period and what takes place in the second, but it can be accepted as 
true that all processes taking place between the state, networks and individuals are self-
reflexive, as the principle of self-reflexivity assumes. It means that they reinforce each other, 
leading to the results from which it becomes almost impossible to disaggregate the effects and 
argue what comes first and what follows next. 
  
 
11.4. Overview and concluding remarks  
This chapter is focused on analyzing recent trends in the evolution of welfare state 
approaches to securing an individual’s well-being and predicting their effects on social trust, 
given the relationship between relevant social spending and social trust obtained from the 
empirical analysis. The overview of the literature on welfare state transformation shows that 
under pressure of external and internal factors, social policies undergo a deep restructuring 
concerning both the level of spending and the character of social benefits provisions. These 
trends are diverse, but have one feature in common - they are usually derived from the 
increasingly used liberal paradigm, leading to minimizing the state intervention and 
maximizing  an individual’s motivation to be re-commodified in the labor market.  
Based on the observed relationship between welfare states and social trust, it is 
difficult to define one single trend in the dynamics of social trust resulting from changes in 
welfare state provisions. Welfare states constitute a multifaceted concept that has many 
characteristics and is under the impact of many interrelated, as well as interdependent, 
processes of change. For this reason, it is possible to say that the final outcome will be the 
result of interactions of different trajectories, whose short-term effects may significantly differ 
from those in the long-term.  
Our analysis also indicates the lack of theory, which may explain the effects that each 
social policy has on social capital. It seems that there are many direct and indirect links 
between the two variables of interest, through which the effect materializes. It is difficult to 
restrict their causal mechanism to the traditional assumption about reciprocal ties and civic 
engagement, as well as to a more recent one about the reduction of inequality. They might be 
specific for each policy and in turn, involve multidimensional effect structures. Therefore, 
additional theoretical and empirical research is still needed to explore and explain the causal 
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mechanism in the relationship between welfare state development and social capital formation 
within the framework of multidimensionality in social spending.  
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Appendix  
 
Table A 1: Change in confidence in civil services  
 
Country 
Share of people having ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ confidence in 
civil services. 
(1) 
1981 - 1984 
(2) 
1989-1993 
(3) 
1994 - 1998 
(4) 
1999-2004 
Australia  47.3  -  37.9 - 
Austria _ 41.9 - 42.5 
Belgium  46.3 42.3 - 46.3 
Canada 51.3 49.6 - 51.6 
Denmark  47.0 51.3 - 54.9 
Finland - 33.3 34.2 40.2 
France 52.0 49.2 - 45.9 
Germany  - 30.4 44.6 37.8 
United Kingdom  46.9 45.6 - 46.1 
Ireland  54.4 59.4 - 62.1 
Italy 26.8 25.1 - 33.2 
Japan 30.7 33.6 - - 
Netherlands  44.4 45.6 - 37.1 
New Zealand - - 29.0 - 
Norway 58.1 43.7 51.0 - 
Sweden  45.6 43.9 45.2 48.2 
Switzerland - - 50.0 - 
United States 58.2 59.6 51.0 55.2 
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey 
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Table A 2: Change in confidence of people in parliament  
 
Country 
Share of people having ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ confidence in 
parliament 
(1) 
1981 - 1984 
(2) 
1989-1993 
(3) 
1994 - 1998 
(4) 
1999-2004 
Australia  55.3  -  40.5 - 
Austria -- 41.2 - 40,2 
Belgium  38.3 42.0 - 39.1 
Canada 43.1  37.3 - 39.6 
Denmark  36.2 42.0 - 48.6 
Finland - 34.2 31.3 42.3 
France 54.8 48.3 - 40.4 
Germany  - 46.6 23.0 37.2 
United Kingdom  40.1 44.1 36.2 - 
Ireland  52.0 50.3 - 33.0 
Italy 30.0 30.6 - 34.1 
Japan 27.8 28.8 26.3 21.7 
Netherlands  44.5 53.1 - 54.3 
New Zealand - - 15.1 - 
Norway 77.7 58.8 69.4 - 
Sweden  46.2 47.1 44.7 50.6 
Switzerland - - 46.9 - 
United States 52.2 44.9 29.8 38.0 
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey 
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Table A 3: Change in confidence of people in the police  
 
Country 
Share of people having ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ confidence in the 
police 
(1) 
1981 - 1984 
(2) 
1989-1993 
(3) 
1994 - 1998 
(4) 
1999-2004 
Australia  80.4  -  75.8 - 
Austria - 67.8 - 75.2 
Belgium  63.5 51.3 - 55.0 
Canada 84.9 84.2 - 80.0 
Denmark  84.4 89.2 - 90.9 
Finland - 76.1 85.7 90.2 
France 63.5 66.5 - 66.9 
Germany  - 57.5 61.3 71.1 
United Kingdom  85.4 76.8 - 68.8 
Ireland  85.8 85.6 - 86.2 
Italy 64.6 64.9 - 67.2 
Japan 68.2 58.5 78.4 50.4 
Netherlands  72.3 72.9 - 64.3 
New Zealand - - 80.5 - 
Norway 89.0 87.9 85.6 - 
Sweden  79.9 74.4 81.0 75.1 
Switzerland  - 69.8 - 
United States 79.9 74.7 71.3 72.2 
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey 
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Table A 4: Change in confidence in the justice system  
 
Country 
Share of people having ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ confidence in the 
justice system 
(1) 
1981 - 1984 
(2) 
1989-1993 
(3) 
1994 - 1998 
(4) 
1999-2004 
Australia  60.5  -  34.7 - 
Austria - 58.4 - 68.1 
Belgium  57.8 46.6 - 36.7 
Canada 64.4 54.0 - - 
Denmark  79.1 79.5 - 78.4 
Finland - 66.3 68.7 66.7 
France 56.4 57.5 - 46.3 
Germany  - 55.9 43.8 57.3 
United Kingdom  65.8 52.5 - 47.1 
Ireland  57.4 47.2 - 55.6 
Italy 42.4 31.8 - 31.5 
Japan 69.4 62.4 79.5 - 
Netherlands  65.1 62.9 - 47.5 
New Zealand - - 46.7 - 
Norway 83.9 75.1 69.5 - 
Sweden  73.2 55.9 62.6 60.8 
Switzerland - - 67.7 - 
United States 53.2 56.8 36.7 - 
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey 
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Table A 5: Social expenditures averaged over 1990- 2000 by welfare regime type 
 
Country 
Social expenditures, % of GDP 
Mean  St. deviation  
 
Social democratic 
 
 
27.40 
 
3.549 
Liberal  
 
17.58 2.217 
Conservative  
 
22.45 4.908 
Source: own calculations based on OECD41  
 
                                                 
41
 http://www.oecd.org/statisticsdata/ 20-04-2007 
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Table A 6: Changes in social expenditures in 18 OECD countries 
 
Country 
 Social expenditures, % of GDP 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Australia  10.9 13.0 14.1 17.1 17.9 
Austria 22.6 23.9 23.7 26.6 25.3 
Belgium  23.5 26.2 25.0 26.4 25.3 
Canada 14.1 17.3 18.4 19.2 16.7 
Denmark  25.2 24.2 25.5  28.9 25.8 
Finland 18.4 22.8 24.5 27.4 21.3 
France 20.8 25.8 25.3 28.3 27.6 
Germany  23.0 23.6 22.5 26.6 26.6 
United Kingdom  16.6 19.6 17.2 20.4 19.1 
Ireland  16.8 21.8 15.5 16.3 13.6 
Italy 18.0 20.8 19.9 19.8 23.2 
Japan 10.3 11.2 11.2 13.9 16.1 
Netherlands  24.1 24.2 24.4 22.8 19.3 
New Zealand 17.1 18.0 21.8 19.0 19.1 
Norway 16.9 17.9 22.6 23.5 22.2 
Sweden  28.6 29.7 30.5 32.5 28.8 
Switzerland 13.9 14.8 13.5 17.5 18.0 
United States 13.3 12.9 13.4 15.4 14.6 
Source: OECD42  
 
 
                                                 
42
 http://www.oecd.org/statisticsdata/ 20-04-2007 
